The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs

The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs

An Empirical Analysis

1st Edition - January 28, 1983

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  • Author: Réal P. Lavergne
  • eBook ISBN: 9781483271231

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The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis provides information pertinent to the political economy of trade barriers. This book discusses the cross-sectional regression analysis across industries to understand why some industries have been more privileged than others. Organized into seven chapters, this book begins with an overview of the structure of protection and identifies the primary actors or principles that condition the formation of trade policy more generally. This text then evaluates the institutional and theoretical reasons why political leverage should not be expected to play a significant role in explaining tariffs. Other chapters consider the notion that the structure of protection at any point in time represents some sort of equilibrium. This book discusses as well the distinction between nominal and effective tariffs. The final chapter deals with individual regressors and groups of regressors. This book is a valuable resource for economists and specialists in quantitative analysis.

Table of Contents

  • Preface

    1 Introduction

    I. Interest and Nature of the Subject Matter

    II. Previous Work

    2 Theoretical and Institutional Aspects of Tariff Policy

    I. An Economic Model of Decision-Making by Politicians

    II. The Role of Pressure Groups

    III. Response to Pressure

    IV. Remaining Pressure Points

    V. Conclusion

    Appendix: The Trade Agreements Program

    3 Equilibrium, Continuity, and Change in the Tariff Structure

    I. Introduction

    II. The Equilibrium Approach

    III. Problems with the Equilibrium Approach

    IV. Implications for Empirical Research

    4 Measures of Protection

    I. Nominal and Effective Tariffs

    II. Possible Use of Input Duties as a Regressor

    III. Nominal and Effective Tariffs: A Corollary

    IV. Nontariff Barriers

    V. Summary

    Data Appendix: Sources and Details of Tariff and NTB Data

    5 The Comparative Disadvantage Variables

    I. Introduction

    II. Hypothesized Relationship Between Tariffs and Comparative Disadvantage

    III. Previous Work

    IV. Measurement

    V. Summary

    Appendix: Tariffs, Rents, and Quasi-Rents

    6 Other Hypotheses and Variables

    I. Tariffs and Pressure Groups

    II. Displacement Costs

    III. Tariffs as a Product of International Negotiation

    IV. Tariff Structure as a Remnant from the Past

    V. Tariffs and the Public Interest

    VI. Summary of Variables

    Data Appendix: Sources and Details of Exogenous Variables

    7 Empirical Results

    I. Introduction

    II. The Explanatory Power of the Model

    III. Interest Groups

    IV. Displacement Costs

    V. Comparative Disadvantage

    VI. Historical Continuity

    VII. Bargaining

    VIII. Miscellany

    Appendix: Experiments Performed

    8 Conclusion



Product details

  • No. of pages: 224
  • Language: English
  • Copyright: © Academic Press 1983
  • Published: January 28, 1983
  • Imprint: Academic Press
  • eBook ISBN: 9781483271231

About the Author

Réal P. Lavergne

About the Editor

Karl Shell

Affiliations and Expertise

Cornell University

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