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The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis provides information pertinent to the political economy of trade barriers. This book discusses the cross-sectional regression analysis across industries to understand why some industries have been more privileged than others.
Organized into seven chapters, this book begins with an overview of the structure of protection and identifies the primary actors or principles that condition the formation of trade policy more generally. This text then evaluates the institutional and theoretical reasons why political leverage should not be expected to play a significant role in explaining tariffs. Other chapters consider the notion that the structure of protection at any point in time represents some sort of equilibrium. This book discusses as well the distinction between nominal and effective tariffs. The final chapter deals with individual regressors and groups of regressors.
This book is a valuable resource for economists and specialists in quantitative analysis.
I. Interest and Nature of the Subject Matter
II. Previous Work
2 Theoretical and Institutional Aspects of Tariff Policy
I. An Economic Model of Decision-Making by Politicians
II. The Role of Pressure Groups
III. Response to Pressure
IV. Remaining Pressure Points
Appendix: The Trade Agreements Program
3 Equilibrium, Continuity, and Change in the Tariff Structure
II. The Equilibrium Approach
III. Problems with the Equilibrium Approach
IV. Implications for Empirical Research
4 Measures of Protection
I. Nominal and Effective Tariffs
II. Possible Use of Input Duties as a Regressor
III. Nominal and Effective Tariffs: A Corollary
IV. Nontariff Barriers
Data Appendix: Sources and Details of Tariff and NTB Data
5 The Comparative Disadvantage Variables
II. Hypothesized Relationship Between Tariffs and Comparative Disadvantage
III. Previous Work
Appendix: Tariffs, Rents, and Quasi-Rents
6 Other Hypotheses and Variables
I. Tariffs and Pressure Groups
II. Displacement Costs
III. Tariffs as a Product of International Negotiation
IV. Tariff Structure as a Remnant from the Past
V. Tariffs and the Public Interest
VI. Summary of Variables
Data Appendix: Sources and Details of Exogenous Variables
7 Empirical Results
II. The Explanatory Power of the Model
III. Interest Groups
IV. Displacement Costs
V. Comparative Disadvantage
VI. Historical Continuity
Appendix: Experiments Performed
- No. of pages:
- © Academic Press 1983
- 28th January 1983
- Academic Press
- eBook ISBN:
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