The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs

The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis provides information pertinent to the political economy of trade barriers. This book discusses the cross-sectional regression analysis across industries to understand why some industries have been more privileged than others.

Organized into seven chapters, this book begins with an overview of the structure of protection and identifies the primary actors or principles that condition the formation of trade policy more generally. This text then evaluates the institutional and theoretical reasons why political leverage should not be expected to play a significant role in explaining tariffs. Other chapters consider the notion that the structure of protection at any point in time represents some sort of equilibrium. This book discusses as well the distinction between nominal and effective tariffs. The final chapter deals with individual regressors and groups of regressors.

This book is a valuable resource for economists and specialists in quantitative analysis.

Preface

1 Introduction

I. Interest and Nature of the Subject Matter

II. Previous Work

2 Theoretical and Institutional Aspects of Tariff Policy

I. An Economic Model of Decision-Making by Politicians

II. The Role of Pressure Groups

III. Response to Pressure

IV. Remaining Pressure Points

V. Conclusion

Appendix: The Trade Agreements Program

3 Equilibrium, Continuity, and Change in the Tariff Structure

I. Introduction

II. The Equilibrium Approach

III. Problems with the Equilibrium Approach

IV. Implications for Empirical Research

4 Measures of Protection

I. Nominal and Effective Tariffs

II. Possible Use of Input Duties as a Regressor

III. Nominal and Effective Tariffs: A Corollary

IV. Nontariff Barriers

V. Summary

Data Appendix: Sources and Details of Tariff and NTB Data

5 The Comparative Disadvantage Variables

I. Introduction

II. Hypothesized Relationship Between Tariffs and Comparative Disadvantage

III. Previous Work

IV. Measurement

V. Summary

Appendix: Tariffs, Rents, and Quasi-Rents

6 Other Hypotheses and Variables

I. Tariffs and Pressure Groups

II. Displacement Costs

III. Tariffs as a Product of International Negotiation

IV. Tariff Structure as a Remnant from the Past

V. Tariffs and the Public Interest

VI. Summary of Variables

Data Appendix: Sources and Details of Exogenous Variables

7 Empirical Results

I. Introduction

II. The Explanatory Power of the Model

III. Interest Groups

IV. Displacement Costs

V. Com