Handbook of Game Theory - 1st Edition - ISBN: 9780444537669, 9780444537676

Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 4

1st Edition

Editors: Petyon Young Shmuel Zamir
eBook ISBN: 9780444537676
Hardcover ISBN: 9780444537669
Imprint: North Holland
Published Date: 14th July 2014
Page Count: 1024
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Table of Contents

  • Preface
    • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction to the Series
  • Chapter 1: Rationality
    • Abstract
    • 1.1 Neoclassical Rationality
    • 1.2 Revealed Preference
    • 1.3 Decisions Under Risk
    • 1.4 Bayesian Decision Theory
    • 1.5 Knowledge
    • 1.6 Nash Equilibrium
    • 1.7 Black Boxes
    • 1.8 Conclusion
    • Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 2: Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games
    • Abstract
    • 2.1 Introduction
    • 2.2 Recursive Structure
    • 2.3 Asymptotic Analysis
    • 2.4 The Dual Game
    • 2.5 Uniform Analysis
    • 2.6 Differential Games
    • 2.7 Approachability
    • 2.8 Alternative tools and topics
    • 2.8.2 The “Limit Game”
    • 2.8.3 Repeated games and differential equations
    • 2.8.4 Multimove games
    • 2.9 Recent Advances
    • 2.9.2 Markov games with incomplete information on both sides
    • 2.9.3 Counter examples for the asymptotic approach
    • 2.9.4 Control problem, martingales, and PDE
    • 2.9.5 New links between discrete and continuous time games
    • 2.9.6 Final comments
    • Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 3: Games on Networks
    • Abstract
    • 3.1 Introduction and Overview
    • 3.2 Background Definitions
    • 3.3 Strategic Complements and Strategic Substitutes
    • 3.4 A Model with Continuous Actions, Quadratic Payoffs, and Strategic Complementarities
    • 3.5 Network Games with Incomplete Information
    • 3.6 Choosing Both Actions and Links
    • 3.7 Repeated Games and Network Structure
    • 3.8 Concluding Remarks and Further Areas of Research
    • Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 4: Reputations in Repeated Games
    • Abstract
    • 4.1 Introduction
    • 4.2 Reputations With Short-Lived Players
    • 4.2.7 Interpretation
    • 4.2.8 Exogenously informative signals
    • 4.3 Reputations with Two Long-Lived Players
    • 4.4.3 Changing types
    • 4.5 Discussion
    • Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 5: Coalition Formation
    • Abstract
    • 5.1 Introduction
    • 5.2 The Framework
    • 5.3 The Blocking Approach: Cooperative Games
    • 5.4 The Bargaining Approach: Noncooperative Games
    • 5.5 The Welfare Economics of Coalition Formation
    • 5.6 Coalition Formation: The Road Ahead
    • Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 6: Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
    • Abstract
    • 6.1 Evolutionary Dynamics And Equilibrium Selection
    • 6.2 Equilibrium Selection in 2 × 2 Games
    • 6.3 Stochastic Stability in Larger Games
    • 6.4 Bargaining
    • 6.5 Public Goods
    • 6.6 Network Games
    • 6.7 Speed of Convergence
    • 6.8 Concluding Remarks
  • Chapter 7: Advances in Auctions
    • Abstract
    • 7.1 Introduction
    • 7.2 First-Price Auctions: Theoretical Advances
    • 7.3 Multiunit Auctions
    • 7.4 Dynamic Auctions
    • 7.5 Externalities in Single-Object Auctions
    • 7.6 Auctions with Resale
    • 7.7 All-Pay Auctions
    • 7.8 Incorporating Behavioral Economics
    • 7.9 Position Auctions in Internet Search
    • 7.10 Spectrum Auctions
    • 7.11 Concluding Remarks
    • Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 8: Combinatorial Auctions
    • Abstract
    • 8.1 Introduction
    • 8.2 Supporting Prices
    • 8.3 Incentives
    • 8.4 Complexity Considerations
  • Chapter 9: Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Through the lens of Multiunit auctions
    • Abstract
    • 9.1 Introduction
    • 9.2 Algorithmic Mechanism Design and this Survey
    • 9.3 Representation
    • 9.4 Algorithms
    • 9.5 Payments, Incentives, and Mechanisms
    • 9.6 Conclusion
    • Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 10: Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling
    • Abstract
    • 10.1 Introduction
    • 10.2 Cognitive Hierarchy and Level-K Models
    • 10.3 Quantal Response Equilibrium
    • 10.4 Learning
    • 10.6 Sociality
    • 10.7 Conclusion
  • Chapter 11: Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology
    • Abstract
    • 11.1 Strategic Analysis—What Matters to Biologists?
    • 11.2 Sex Ratios—How the Spirit of Game Theory Emerged in Biology
    • 11.3 The Empirical Success of Sex-Ratio Theory
    • 11.4 Animal Fighting and the Official Birth of Evolutionary Game Theory
    • 11.5 Evolutionary Dynamics
    • 11.6 Intragenomic Conflict and Willful Passengers
    • 11.7 Cooperation in Microbes and Higher Organisms
    • 11.8 Biological Trade and Markets
    • 11.9 Animal Signaling—Honesty or Deception?
  • Chapter 12: Epistemic Game Theory
    • Abstract
    • 12.1 Introduction and Motivation
    • 12.2 Main Ingredients
    • 12.3 Strategic Games of Complete Information
    • 12.4 Equilibrium Concepts
    • Acknowledgement
  • Chapter 13: Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics
    • Abstract
    • 13.1 Introduction
    • 13.2 Population Games
    • 13.3 Revision Protocols and Mean Dynamics
    • 13.4 Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics
    • 13.5 Families of Evolutionary Dynamics
    • 13.6 Potential Games
    • 13.7 ESS and Contractive Games
    • 13.8 Iterative Solution Concepts, Supermodular Games, and Equilibrium Selection
    • 13.9 Nonconvergence of Evolutionary Dynamics
    • 13.10 Connections and Further Developments
    • Acknowledgements
  • Chapter 14: The Complexity of Computing Equilibria
    • Abstract
    • 14.1 The Task
    • 14.2 Problems and Algorithms
    • 14.3 Good Algorithms
    • 14.4 P and NP
    • 14.5 Reductions and NP-complete Problems
    • 14.6 The Complexity of Nash Equilibrium
    • 14.7 Approximation, Succinctness, and Other Topics
    • Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 15: Theory of Combinatorial Games
    • Abstract
    • 15.1 Motivation and An Ancient Roman War-Game Strategy
    • 15.2 The Classical Theory, Sum of Games, Complexity
    • 15.3 Introducing Draws
    • 15.4 Adding Interactions Between Tokens
    • 15.5 Partizan Games
    • 15.6 Misère Play
    • 15.7 Constraint Logic
    • 15.8 Conclusion
    • Acknowledgment
  • Chapter 16: Game Theory and Distributed Control**
    • Abstract
    • 16.1 Introduction
    • 16.2 Utility Design
    • 16.3 Learning Design
    • 16.4 Exploiting the Engineering Agenda: State-Based Games
    • 16.5 Concluding Remarks
  • Chapter 17: Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility
    • Abstract
    • 17.1 Introduction
    • Part I Nonexpected Utility Theory Under Risk
    • Part II Nonexpected Utility Theory Under Uncertainty
    • Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 18: Calibration and Expert Testing
    • Abstract
    • 18.1 Introduction
    • 18.2 Terminology and Notation
    • 18.3 Examples
    • 18.4 Calibration
    • 18.5 Negative Results
    • 18.5.2 Prequential Principle
    • 18.5.3 Interpretations
    • 18.6 Positive Results
    • 18.7 Restricting the Class of Allowed Data-Generating Processes
    • 18.8 Multiple Experts
    • 18.9 Bayesian and Decision-Theoretic Approaches to Testing Experts
    • 18.10 Related Topics
    • Acknowledgment
  • Index

Description

The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s.

Key Features

  • Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior
  • Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory
  • Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics

Readership

Graduate students and professors worldwide working in all subdisciplines of economics and finance.


Details

No. of pages:
1024
Language:
English
Copyright:
© North Holland 2015
Published:
Imprint:
North Holland
eBook ISBN:
9780444537676
Hardcover ISBN:
9780444537669

Reviews

"...Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory... Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics..."- Zentralblatt MATH

"Volume 4 of the Handbook of Game Theory is a remarkable collection of exceptional review articles on the most active areas in this rapidly growing field. It will be an essential reference for researchers in this area, and a high-level but accessible tour d'horizon for other scholars." --Vincent Crawford, All Souls College, Oxford University, and University of California, San Diego

"This handbook offers complete updates on the most-exciting recent developments in areas such as networks, reputation, dynamics, auctions, epistemology, computational complexity, ambiguity and expert testing; and it is written by leading game theorists such as Dekel, Jackson, Karni, Laraki, Mailath, Marinacci, Nisan, Olszewski, Papadimitriou, Samuelson, Siniscalchi, Sorin, Vohra, Young and Zamir.   It should be read by any theorist who wants to keep up with the current, rapidly evolving research in game theory" --Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University

"Game Theory is a most active and constantly expanding field. Young and Zamir, top game theorists, have selected world-leading specialists to provide excellent surveys of most relevant topics in recent theoretical research in game theory and its applications." --Sergiu Hart, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem


About the Editors

Petyon Young Editor

Affiliations and Expertise

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA

Shmuel Zamir Editor

Affiliations and Expertise

Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel