Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

1st Edition - November 19, 1992

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  • Editors: R.J. Aumann, S. Hart
  • Hardcover ISBN: 9780444880987

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Description

This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines.The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics.For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

Table of Contents

  • The Game of chess (H.A. Simon, J. Schaeffer). Games in extensive and strategic forms (S. Hart). Games with perfect information (J. Mycielski). Repeated games with complete information (S. Sorin). Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum (S. Zamir). Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum (F. Forges). Non-cooperative models of bargaining (K. Binmore, M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein). Strategic analysis of auctions (R. Wilson). Location (J.J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Thisse). Strategic models of entry deterrence (R. Wilson). Patent licensing (M.I. Kamien). The core and balancedness (Y. Kannai). Axiomatizations of the core (B. Peleg). The core in perfectly competitive economies (R.M. Anderson). The core in imperfectly competitive economies (J.J. Gabszewicz, B. Shitovitz). Two-sided matching (A.E. Roth, M. Sotomayor). Von Neumann - Morgenstern stable sets (W.F. Lucas). The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus: A survey (M. Maschler). Game and decision theoretic models in ethics (J.C. Harsanyi).

Product details

  • No. of pages: 760
  • Language: English
  • Copyright: © North Holland 1992
  • Published: November 19, 1992
  • Imprint: North Holland
  • Hardcover ISBN: 9780444880987

About the Editors

R.J. Aumann

S. Hart

Affiliations and Expertise

The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

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