Game Theory and Experimental Games

Game Theory and Experimental Games

The Study of Strategic Interaction

1st Edition - January 1, 1982

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  • Author: Andrew M. Colman
  • eBook ISBN: 9781483154671

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Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction is a critical survey of the essential ideas of game theory and the findings of empirical research on strategic interaction. Some experiments using lifelike simulations of familiar kinds of strategic interactions are presented, and applications of game theory to the study of voting, the theory of evolution, and moral philosophy are discussed. Comprised of 13 chapters, this volume begins with an informal definition of game theory and an outline of the types of social situations to which it applies. Games of skill, games of chance, and games of strategy are considered. Games of strategy are further subdivided into coordination, zero-sum, and mixed-motive varieties. Subsequent chapters deal with one-person games in which a solitary decision maker is pitted against Nature; the competitive nature of two-person, zero-sum games; the relationship between game theory and experimental games; and the mixed-motive character of variable-sum games that generate intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts. Experiments with prisoner's dilemma as well as coalition, auction, and social dilemma games are also considered. Finally, some applications of game theory are described. This book is designed for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and relevant practitioners in social psychology, sociology, economics, and politics, and in some cases for a rather broader public.

Table of Contents

  • Background

    1 Introduction

    1.1 Intuitive Background

    1.2 Abstract Models: Basic Terminology

    1.3 Skill, Chance, and Strategy

    1.4 Historical Background

    1.5 Summary

    2 One-Person Games

    2.1 Games Against Nature

    2.2 Certainty

    2.3 Risk

    2.4 Utility Theory

    2.5 Uncertainty

    2.6 Summary

    3 Pure Coordination Games and the Minimal Social Situation

    3.1 Strategic Collaboration

    3.2 Pure Coordination Games

    3.3 The Minimal Social Situation

    3.4 Summary

    Theory and Empirical Evidence

    4 Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games

    4.1 Strictly Competitive Games

    4.2 Extensive and Normal Forms

    4.3 Games With Saddle-Points

    4.4 Games Without Saddle-Points

    4.5 Dominance and Admissibility

    4.6 Methods for Finding Solutions

    4.7 Ordinal Payoffs and Incomplete Information

    4.8 Summary

    5 Experiments With Strictly Competitive Games

    5.1 Ideas Behind Experimental Games

    5.2 Review of Research on Non-Saddle-Point Games

    5.3 Review of Research on Saddle-Point Games

    5.4 Critique of Experimental Gaming

    5.5 Experiment I: Abstract and Lifelike Strictly Competitive Games

    5.6 Summary

    6 Two-Person, Mixed-Motive Games: Informal Game Theory

    6.1 Mixed-Motive Games

    6.2 Classification of 2 x 2 Mixed-Motive Games

    6.3 Leader

    6.4 Battle of the Sexes

    6.5 Chicken

    6.6 Prisoner's Dilemma

    6.7 Comparison of the Archetypal 2 x 2 Games

    6.8 Metagame Theory

    6.9 Summary

    7 Experiments With Prisoner's Dilemma and Related Games

    7.1 The Experimental Gaming Literature

    7.2 Strategic Structure

    7.3 Payoffs and Incentives

    7.4 Circumstances of Play

    7.5 Responses to Programmed Strategies

    7.6 Sex Differences

    7.7 Attribution Effects

    7.8 Investigations of Ecological Validity

    7.9 Experiment II: Abstract and Lifelike Prisoner's Dilemma Games

    7.10 Experiment III: Abstract and Lifelike Chicken Games

    7.11 Summary

    8 Multi-Person Games: Social Dilemmas

    8.1 Multi-Person Game Theory

    8.2 Non-Cooperative Games: Equilibrium Points

    8.3 Cooperative Games: Characteristic Functions

    8.4 Harold Pinter's "The Caretaker"

    8.5 The Shapley Value

    8.6 The Dollar Auction Game and the Concorde Fallacy

    8.7 Multi-Person Prisoner's Dilemma

    8.8 General Theory of Compound Games

    8.9 Summary

    9 Experiments with Coalition, Auction, & Social Dilemma Games

    9.1 Multi-Person Experimental Games

    9.2 Coalition Formation

    9.3 Auction Games and Psychological Traps

    9.4 N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma

    9.5 Experiment IV: Abstract and Lifelike N-Person Prisoner's Dilemmas

    9.6 Summary


    10 Sincere Voting and Collective Choice Theory

    10.1 Background

    10.2 Alternatives, Voters, Preferences

    10.3 Axioms Concerning Individual Preferences

    10.4 Voting Procedures

    10.5 Condorcet's Paradox

    10.6 Probabilities of Cyclic Majorities

    10.7 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

    10.8 The Borda Effect

    10.9 Summary

    11 Strategic Voting

    11.1 Optimal Voting Strategies

    11.2 Historical Background

    11.3 Insincere Voting and Equilibrium Points

    11.4 The Classical Solution: Dominance and Admissibility

    11.5 Sophisticated Voting

    11.6 Anticipated Decisions and Multistage Solutions

    11.7 General Results on Strategic Voting

    11.8 Is Strategic Voting Unfair?

    11.9 Empirical Evidence

    11.10 Summary

    12 Theory of Evolution: Strategic Aspects

    12.1 Historical Background

    12.2 Strategic Evolution

    12.3 Animal Conflicts and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

    12.4 An Improved Multi-Person Game Model

    12.5 Empirical Evidence

    12.6 Summary

    13 Moral Philosophy and Practical Problems of Strategy

    13.1 Game Theory and the Conduct of Life

    13.2 Rationality and Self-Interest

    13.3 Kant's Categorical Imperative

    13.4 Rousseau's Social Contract

    13.5 Evolution and Stability of Moral Principles

    13.6 Summary

    Appendix A: A Simple Proof of the Minimax Theorem

    A.1 Introductory Remarks

    A.2 Preliminary Formalization

    A.3 The Minimax Theorem

    A.4 Proof



Product details

  • No. of pages: 314
  • Language: English
  • Copyright: © Pergamon 1982
  • Published: January 1, 1982
  • Imprint: Pergamon
  • eBook ISBN: 9781483154671

About the Author

Andrew M. Colman

About the Editor

Michael Argyle

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