Game Theory and Experimental Games - 1st Edition - ISBN: 9780080260693, 9781483137148

Game Theory and Experimental Games

1st Edition

The Study of Strategic Interaction

Authors: Andrew M. Colman
eBook ISBN: 9781483137148
Imprint: Pergamon
Published Date: 1st January 1982
Page Count: 314
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Description

Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction focuses on the development of game theory, taking into consideration empirical research, theoretical formulations, and research procedures involved. The book proceeds with a discussion on the theory of one-person games. The individual decision that a player makes in these kinds of games is noted as influential as to the outcome of these games. This discussion is followed by a presentation of pure coordination games and minimal situation. The ability of players to anticipate the choices of others to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome is emphasized. A favorable social situation is also influential in these kinds of games. The text moves forward by presenting studies on various kinds of competitive games. The research studies presented are coupled with empirical evidence and discussion designed to support the claims that are pointed out. The book also discusses several kinds of approaches in the study of games. Voting as a way to resolve multi-person games is also emphasized, including voting procedures, the preferences of voters, and voting strategies. The book is a valuable source of data for readers and scholars who are interested in the exploration of game theories.

Table of Contents


Background

1 Introduction

1.1 Intuitive Background

1.2 Abstract Models: Basic Terminology

1.3 Skill, Chance, and Strategy

1.4 Historical Background

1.5 Summary

2 One-Person Games

2.1 Games Against Nature

2.2 Certainty

2.3 Risk

2.4 Utility Theory

2.5 Uncertainty

2.6 Summary

3 Pure Coordination Games and the Minimal Social Situation

3.1 Strategic Collaboration

3.2 Pure Coordination Games

3.3 The Minimal Social Situation

3.4 Summary

Theory and Empirical Evidence

4 Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games

4.1 Strictly Competitive Games

4.2 Extensive and Normal Forms

4.3 Games with Saddle-Points

4.4 Games without Saddle-Points

4.5 Dominance and Admissibility

4.6 Methods for Finding Solutions

4.7 Ordinal Pay-offs and Incomplete Information

4.8 Summary

5 Experiments with Strictly Competitive Games

5.1 Ideas Behind Experimental Games

5.2 Review of Research on Non-Saddle-Point Games

5.3 Review of Research on Saddle-Point Games

5.4 Critic of Experimental Gaming

5.5 Experiment I: Abstract and Lifelike Strictly Competitive Games

5.6 Summary

6 Two-Person, Mixed-Motive Games: Informal Game Theory

6.1 Mixed-Motive Games

6.2 Classification of 2 x 2 Mixed-Motive Games

6.3 Leader

6.4 Battle of the Sexes

6.5 Chicken

6.6 Prisoner's Dilemma

6.7 Comparison of the Archetypal 2 x 2 Games

6.8 Meta-game Theory

6.9 Summary

7 Experiments With Prisoner's Dilemma and Related Games

7.1 The Experimental Gaming Literature

7.2 Strategic Structure

7.3 Pay-offs and Incentives

7.4 Circumstances of Play

7.5 Responses to Programmed Strategies

7.6 Sex Differences

7.7 Attribution Effects

7.8 Investigations of Ecological Validity

7.9 Experiment II: Abstract and Lifelike Prisoner's Dilemma Games

7.10 Experiment III: Abstract and Lifelike Chicken Games

7.11 Summary

8 Multi-Person Games: Social Dilemmas

8.1 Multi-Person Game Theory

8.2 Non-Cooperative Games: Equilibrium Points

8.3 Cooperative Games: Characteristic Functions

8.4 Harold Pinter's "The Caretaker"

8.5 The Shapley Value

8.6 The Dollar Auction Game and the Concorde Fallacy

8.7 Multi-Person Prisoner's Dilemma

8.8 General Theory of Compound Games

8.9 Summary

9 Experiments with Coalition, Auction, & Social Dilemma Games

9.1 Multi-Person Experimental Games

9.2 Coalition Formation

9.3 Auction Games and Psychological Traps

9.4 N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma

9.5 Experiment IV: Abstract and Lifelike N-Person Prisoner's Dilemmas

9.6 Summary

Applications

10 Sincere Voting and Collective Choice Theory

10.1 Background

10.2 Alternatives, Voters, Preferences

10.3 Axioms Concerning Individual Preferences

10.4 Voting Procedures

10.5 Condorcet's Paradox

10.6 Probabilities of Cyclic Majorities

10.7 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

10.8 The Borda Effect

10.9 Summary

11 Strategic Voting

11.1 Optimal Voting Strategies

11.2 Historical Background

11.3 Insincere Voting and Equilibrium Points

11.4 The Classical Solution: Dominance and Admissibility

11.5 Sophisticated Voting

11.6 Anticipated Decisions and Multi-Stage Solutions

11.7 General Results on Strategic Voting

11.8 Is Strategic Voting Unfair

11.9 Empirical Evidence

11.10 Summary

12 Theory of Evolution: Strategic Aspects

12.1 Historical Background

12.2 Strategic Evolution

12.3 Animal Conflicts and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

12.4 An Improved Multi-Person Game Model

12.5 Empirical Evidence

12.6 Summary

13 Moral Philosophy and Practical Problems of Strategy

13.1 Game Theory and the Conduct of Life

13.2 Rationality and Self-Interest

13.3 Kant's Categorical Imperative

13.4 Rousseau's Social Contract

13.5 Evolution and Stability of Moral Principles

13.6 Summary

Appendix A: A Simple Proof of the Minimax Theorem

A.l Introductory Remarks

A.2 Preliminary Formalization

A.3 The Minimax Theorem

A.4 Proof

References

Index

Details

No. of pages:
314
Language:
English
Copyright:
© Pergamon 1982
Published:
Imprint:
Pergamon
eBook ISBN:
9781483137148

About the Author

Andrew M. Colman