Editorial foreword, E Y Rodin. Formal theories of politics: the scope of mathematical modelling in political science, P E Johnson. Multidimensional Models of Legislative Decision. Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games, S L Feld, B Grofman & N R Miller. Smooth social choice, N Schofield. Spatial Competition Among Candidates for Public Office. A model of party constraints on optimal candidate positions, J H Aldrich & M D McGinnis. Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules, G W Cox. The location of American Presidential candidates: an empirical test of a new spatial model of elections, J M Enelow & M J Hinich. A model of candidate convergence under uncertainty about voter preferences, A Glazer, B Grofman & G Owen. Reputational dynamics in spatial competition, D E Ingberman. Game and Decision Theory. Political decision making with costly and imperfect information, R L Calvert. Advantageous multiple rent seeking, M Gradstein & S Nitzan. The geographical imperatives of the balance of power in 3-country systems, E M S Niou & P C Ordeshook. Dynamic Models. Noncompliance and the limits of coercion: the problematic enforcement of unpopular laws, R Huckfeldt. Coercion and revolution: variations on a predator-prey model, G Tsebelis & J Sprague. Probability Models. Mathematical contributions to the scientific understanding of war, C Cioffi-Revilla. A distribution of extreme inequality with applications to conflict behavior: a geometric derivation of the Pareto distribution, M I Midlarsky. Artificial Intelligence. Short-term prediction of international behavior using a Holland classifier, P A Schrodt.
Formal Theories of Politics demonstrates the role of formal mathematical models in political science, and aims to convey a sense of the questions and methods which govern the political science research agenda. While there is still much interest in empirical patterns of voting behaviour and public opinion data, there has been substantial growth in emphasis on mathematical theory as a technique for the derivation of testable hypotheses. Topics discussed include: optimal candidate strategies and equilibria in competitive elections; voting agendas and parliamentary procedure in the multidimensional events; revolution, repression and inequality as outputs of dynamics systems. The mathematical techniques are widely varied, including game theory, functional analysis, differential equations, expert systems, stochastic processes and statistical models.
For graduates and lecturers in political science and economics, and certain undergraduates courses in political science which are mathematically oriented.
- No. of pages:
- © Pergamon 1989
- 22nd May 1989
- eBook ISBN:
Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA