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Corruption: A Study in Political Economy focuses on the problem of corruptions in political economy and functional bribery.
This book is organized into four parts encompassing 11 chapters. Chapters 2 to 4 deal with the fundamental relationship among voters, legislators, and interest groups, as well as the role of the government bureaucracy in shaping legislative choices. Chapters 5 illustrates the basic relationships with an analysis of a monopolistic government official charged with allocating a benefit through a queuing system, while Chapter 6 retains the assumption of a single official with monopoly power but moves beyond the queuing model to consider alternative sanctioning strategies, a wider variety of bureaucratic tasks, and bribers who may be competitively or monopolisticly organized. Chapters 7 and 8 explore the potential of a system where officials are permitted to compete with one another in processing applications for governmental benefits. Under this system, an individual or firm rejected by one official can seek the benefit from other bureaucrats. Chapter 9 introduces a final administrative variable into the analysis, while Chapter 10 discusses the governmental corruption to analogous corrupt activities entirely within the private sector. Lastly, Chapter 11 looks into the relation between corruption and democratic theory, the possibility of reforming corrupt bureaucracies, and the link between economics and morality.
This book will be of value to public servants, legislators, economists, sociologists, and researchers.
1 Corruption as a Problem in Political Economy
1. Corruption and the Mixed Economy
2. Agency Relationships and Functional Bribery
3. An Overview of the Argument
2 Corruption and the Legislative Process: The Cost of Influence in an Individualistic Legislature
2. Corruption in a Perfect Democratic State
3. Politicians with Imperfect Information
4. The Structure of Interest Group Organization
Appendix 2.1. An Example that Generates the Utility Surfaces in Figure 2.1
Appendix 2.2. Competitive Bribery in an Individualistic Legislature
3 Interest Group Activity and the Legislature: Corruption, Campaign Contributions, and Lobbying
2. Ignorance, Apathy, and the Role of Wealth
3. Monopoly Power and Legislative Corruption
4. Interest Group Resources and Organization
4 Bureaucratic Corruption and the Legislative Process
2. Low-Level Corruption
3. High-Level Corruption
4. Trading Favors for Votes
5. Political Systems without a Separation of Powers
6. Conclusions: The Public Policy Consequences of Corruption and Political Payoffs
5 Lining Up and Paying Off
1. Low-Level Corruption: An Overview
2. The Efficiency of Bribery
3. Single Lines and Priority Queues
4. Corruption and the Risk of Detection
6 Monopolistic Bureaucracy
2. A Summary of the Results
3. Formal Models
4. Policy Implications
7 Competitive Bureaucracy: Corruption i regulatory and Social Programs
2. The Basic Model
3. Supply and Demand Functions
4. The Corrupt Market
8 Competitive Bureaucracy: Vagueness, Coersion and Market Structure
2. Choosing Those Who Qualify
3. Coercive Programs
4. Customers with Monopoly Power
9 Bureaucratic Structure and Corruption
1. Introduction: Four Models of Bureaucracy
2. The Fragmented and Sequential Models
3. The Hierarchical Model
4. Choosing the Least Corrupt Form of Bureaucracy
5. Disorganized Bureaucracies
10 Corruption and the Private Sector
2. Private Firm Organization and Corruption
3. The Corruption of Corporate Boards and Top Managers
4. Market Failure as a Cause of Corruption
5. Conclusions: Corrupt Incentives in the Public and Private Sectors
11 Conclusions: Economics, Politics, and Morality
1. Corruption and Democratic Theory
2. Low-Level Corruption
3. Morality, Corruption, and Economic Theory
- No. of pages:
- © Academic Press 1978
- 28th July 1978
- Academic Press
- eBook ISBN:
Department of Economics and Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
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