Cooperation

An Experimental Analysis

1st Edition - January 28, 1975
Authors: Gerald Marwell, David R. Schmitt
Language: English
eBook ISBN:
9 7 8 - 1 - 4 8 3 2 - 7 4 7 6 - 8

Cooperation: An Experimental Analysis presents the results of an experimental analysis that sought to identify the factors that inhibit, maintain, or promote cooperation. Two of… Read more

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Cooperation: An Experimental Analysis presents the results of an experimental analysis that sought to identify the factors that inhibit, maintain, or promote cooperation. Two of these factors are given particular attention: inequity and interpersonal risk between potential cooperators. Using a molar approach, the book applies some of the key methodological and theoretical insights of behavioral analysis to a group response that reflects the main conceptual characteristics of cooperation. The extent to which this behavioral response could be controlled by relevant environmental contingencies is also examined. Comprised of nine chapters, this book begins with an overview of the concept of cooperation and the measurement and experimental design used in the study. It then summarizes the results of the first experiments that focus on the link between inequity and cooperation, followed by a discussion on the effect of interpersonal risk on cooperation. Subsequent chapters focus on the role of protection and communication in promoting cooperation despite the presence of risk; the effects of the relationships between partners on the likelihood of cooperating under risk; and how a strategy of "pacifism" could facilitate cooperation. The final chapter summarizes the results of the experiments. This monograph will be of interest to social psychologists and sociologists.

PrefaceAcknowledgmentsCreditsChapter 1 Introduction: The Study of CooperationChapter 2 Methods: Measurement and Experimental Design Previous Settings Setting Characteristics and ProceduresChapter 3 The First Experiments: Inequity and Cooperation Inequity Size and Withdrawal from Cooperation Inequity, Reward Transfers, and Cooperation A Replication with Children ConclusionChapter 4 Cooperation and Interpersonal Risk The Effects of Interpersonal Risk: The Small-Risk Experiment Increasing Risk's Size: The Large-Risk Experiment Durability of the Risk Effect: The Large-Risk, Extended Experiment ConclusionChapter 5 Cooperation and Interpersonal Risk: Tests for Generality Part I: Variation in Rewards Increasing the Rewards for Cooperation: The Large-Risk, Large-Pay Experiment Eliminating the Rewards for Taking: The Destroy Experiment Part II: Varying Other Characteristics of Risk The Effects of Scheduling: The Intermittent Availability of Risk Experiment Distributing the Ability to Take: The Asymmetric Risk Experiment Part III: Cross-Procedural and Cross-Population Replications A Cross-Procedural Replication: The Simplified Setting Experiment Comparison with Methods of Standard Risk Experiment A Cross-Cultural Replication: The Basic Norwegian Experiment The Effect of Sex Roles: The Mixed-Sex ExperimentChapter 6 Achieving Cooperation Under Risk: Protection and Communication Removing the "Safe" Alternative—The Large-Risk, No-Protection Experiment Counteracting Risk through Warning: The Signaled Avoidance Experiment Creating Nonrisk Conditions: The Free-Operant Avoidance Experiment Preventing Conflict through Talking: The Open Communication Experiment Ending Conflict through Talking: The Delayed Communication ExperimentChapter 7 Achieving Cooperation under Risk: Relations between People Part I: Minimal Relations The Other Person Is Real: The Pre-Session Visibility Experiment Increasing the Contact: The Pre-Session Communication Experiment Still More Exposure: The Visibility Experiment Part II: Maximal Relations Common Resources: The Married Couples Experiment Close Past Relationships but Separate Economies: The Best Friends Experiment Part III: The Invocation of Group Norms Invoking Outside Norms: The "Steal" Experiment Using Community Norms: The Rip-Off Experiment The Demand Characteristics of the Instructions Part IV: Inequity and Interpersonal RiskChapter 8 Achieving Cooperation Under Risk: Pacifism Unconditional Cooperation: The Total Pacifism Experiment Defining the Situation: Two Delayed-Pacifism Experiments Reducing Hostilities: The Pacifism Conflict Experiment A Cross-Cultural Replication: The American Pacifism Experiment Conclusions: Comparison with Previous ResearchChapter 9 Conclusion and Speculations Inequity Interpersonal Risk Structuring the Environment for Cooperative Behavior: Some ImplicationsAppendix An Experiment Comparing Social Coordination in the Cohen-Lindsley and Modified SettingsReferencesAuthor IndexSubject Index