Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Edited by

  • R.J. Aumann
  • S. Hart, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines.
The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics.
For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
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Book information

  • Published: November 1992
  • Imprint: NORTH-HOLLAND
  • ISBN: 978-0-444-88098-7


... "The organisation is along the lines of the rest of the North-Holland handbooks: twenty or so 20-30-page review articles by eminent scholars. ..."The articles are generally of high quality, as one might expect given the reputation of the authors."
The Economic Journal

..."while it has become impossible for a single author to write a comprehensive updated text on game theory and applications, the need for such information has become more urgent. The first two volumes of this game theory handbook do an excellent job in meeting this need."

..."Preparing these handbooks must have been a tremendous undertaking for the editors and contributing authors. For working game theorists, these books are indispensable."
Games and Economic Behavior

Table of Contents

The Game of chess (H.A. Simon, J. Schaeffer). Games in extensive and strategic forms (S. Hart). Games with perfect information (J. Mycielski). Repeated games with complete information (S. Sorin). Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum (S. Zamir). Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum (F. Forges). Non-cooperative models of bargaining (K. Binmore, M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein). Strategic analysis of auctions (R. Wilson). Location (J.J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Thisse). Strategic models of entry deterrence (R. Wilson). Patent licensing (M.I. Kamien). The core and balancedness (Y. Kannai). Axiomatizations of the core (B. Peleg). The core in perfectly competitive economies (R.M. Anderson). The core in imperfectly competitive economies (J.J. Gabszewicz, B. Shitovitz). Two-sided matching (A.E. Roth, M. Sotomayor). Von Neumann - Morgenstern stable sets (W.F. Lucas). The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus: A survey (M. Maschler). Game and decision theoretic models in ethics (J.C. Harsanyi).