Game Theory and Applications

Game Theory and Applications

1st Edition - December 28, 1990

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  • Editor: Karl Shell
  • eBook ISBN: 9781483295053

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Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions.

Key Features

@introbul:Key Features
@bul:* Explains many of the recent central developments in game theory
* Highlights new research directions in economic theory which surpass the neoclassical paradigm
* Includes game-theoretical analyses in economics, political science, and biology
* Written by leading game theorists, economists, political scientists, and biologists


Professionals and graduate students in econometrics and game theory.

Table of Contents

  • Contributed Papers:
    E. Kohlberg, Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas.
    S. Sorin, Supergames.
    F. Forges, Infinitely Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.
    J.-F. Mertens, Repeated Games.
    E. Kalai, Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games.
    R. Aumann, The Shapley Value.
    S. Hart, Advances in Value Theory.
    B. Peleg, Axiomatizations of the Core, the Nucleolus, and the Prekernel.
    M. Maschler, Consistency.
    W. Thompson, The Consistency Principle.
    J. Rosenmüller, Discrete Concepts in n-Person Game Theory: Nondegeneracy and Homogeneity.
    A.E. Roth, Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence.
    M. Shubik, Strategic Market Game Models of Exchange Economies.
    M.I. Kamien, Y. Tauman, and S. Zamir, Information Transmission.
    H. Moulin, Monotonic Surplus Sharing and the Utilization of Common Property Resources.
    W.F. Lucas, Developments in Stable Set Theory.
    R.D. McKelvey, Game Theoretic Models of Voting in Multidimensional Issue Spaces.
    S. Mishal, D. Schmeidler, and I. Sened, Israel and the PLO: A Game with Differential Information.
    K. Fan, A Survey of Some Results Closely Related to the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz Theorem.
    Selected Abstracts:
    M.L. Balinski and D. Gale, On the Core of the Assignment Game.
    B. Cornet, The Second Welfare Theorem in Nonconvex Economies.
    S. Ellner and A. Shmida, An Evolutionary Game Theory Model for Risk-Taking.
    S. Hart and A. Neyman, Values of Nonatomic Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?
    M. Hellwig and W. Leininger, Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Discrete and Continuous Games-Does Discretization Matter?
    R. Holzman, To Vote or Not to Vote: What is the Quota?
    R. Holzman, E. Lehrer, and N. Linial, Some Bounds for the Banzhaf Index and Other Semivalues.
    T. Ichiishi, Comparative Cooperative Games Theory.
    W. Leininger, Escalation and Cooperation in International Conflicts--The Dollar-Auction Revisited.
    A. Levy and R.P. McLean, An Axiomatization of the Nonsymmetric Nontransferable Utility Value.
    D. Monderer, A Milnor Condition for Nonatomic Lipschitz Games and Its Applications.
    A.S. Nowak, Zero-Sum Nonstationary Stochastic Games with General State Space.
    A. Okada, Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination.
    A. Okada, A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts.
    H. Peters and P. Wakker, Independence of Irrelevant Alternative and Revealed Group Preferences.
    R. Radner and A. Schotter, The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study.
    M.A. Satterthwaite and S.R. Williams, Rate of Convergence to Full Efficiency in the Buyers' Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large.
    R. Telgarsky, Stationary Strategies in Deterministic Games.
    S. Tijs, "Big Boss Games, Clan Games, and Information Market Games.
    M.H. Wooders, Large Games and Economics with Near-Exhaustion of Gains to Coalition Formation.
    M.H. Wooders and W.R. Zame, Values of Large Finite Games.

Product details

  • No. of pages: 436
  • Language: English
  • Copyright: © Academic Press 1990
  • Published: December 28, 1990
  • Imprint: Academic Press
  • eBook ISBN: 9781483295053

About the Series Editor

Karl Shell

Affiliations and Expertise

Cornell University

About the Editors

Tatsuro Ichiishi

Affiliations and Expertise

The Ohio State University, Columbus, U.S.A.

Abraham Neyman

Affiliations and Expertise

Institute for Decision Sciences, State University of New York at Stony Brook, and The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

Yair Tauman

Affiliations and Expertise

The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A. and Tel Aviv University, Israel

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