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HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, 2
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2To order this title, and for more information, click here

Edited By
S. Hart, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
R.J. Aumann

Included in series
Handbooks in Economics,

Description
This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology.
For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on External link http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

Contents
Zero-sum two-person games (T.E.S. Raghavan). Game theory and statistics (G. Schwarz). Differential games (A. Friedman). Differential games - economic applications (S. Clemhout, H.Y. Wan, Jr.). Communication, correlated equilibria, and incentive compatibility (R.B. Myerson). Signalling (D.M. Kreps, J. Sobel). Moral hazard (P.K. Dutta, R. Radner). Search (J. McMillan, M. Rothschild). Game theory and evolutionary biology (P. Hammerstein, R. Selten). Game theory models of peace and war (B. O'Neill). Voting procedures (S.J. Brams). Social choice (H. Moulin). Power and stability in politics (P.D. Straffin, Jr.). Game theory and public economics (M. Kurz). Cost allocation (H.P. Young). Cooperative models of bargaining (W. Thomson). Games in coalitional form (R.J. Weber). Coalition structures (J. Greenberg). Game-theoretic aspects of computing (N. Linial). Utility and subjective probability (P.C. Fishburn). Common knowledge (J. Geanakoplos). Index.

Bibliographic & ordering Information
Hardbound, 818 pages, publication date: DEC-1994
ISBN-13: 978-0-444-89427-4
ISBN-10: 0-444-89427-6
Imprint: NORTH-HOLLAND
Price: Order form
GBP 85
USD 150
EUR 125

Books and book related electronic products are priced in US dollars (USD), euro (EUR), and Great Britain Pounds (GBP). USD prices apply to the Americas and Asia Pacific. EUR prices apply in Europe and the Middle East. GBP prices apply to the UK and all other countries.

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Last update: 13 Jul 2008
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