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| HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, 1
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Edited By
R.J. Aumann
S. Hart, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
Included in series
Handbooks in Economics,
Description
This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory
has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover
the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science,
and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines.
The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers,
an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the
cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics.
For more information on the Handbooks in
Economics series, please see our home page on  http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Contents
The Game of chess (H.A. Simon, J. Schaeffer). Games in extensive and strategic forms (S. Hart). Games with perfect information (J. Mycielski).
Repeated games with complete information (S. Sorin). Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum (S. Zamir). Repeated games of
incomplete information: Non-zero-sum (F. Forges). Non-cooperative models of bargaining (K. Binmore, M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein).
Strategic analysis of auctions (R. Wilson). Location (J.J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Thisse). Strategic models of entry deterrence (R. Wilson).
Patent licensing (M.I. Kamien). The core and balancedness (Y. Kannai). Axiomatizations of the core (B. Peleg). The core in perfectly
competitive economies (R.M. Anderson). The core in imperfectly competitive economies (J.J. Gabszewicz, B. Shitovitz). Two-sided matching
(A.E. Roth, M. Sotomayor). Von Neumann - Morgenstern stable sets (W.F. Lucas). The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus: A survey (M.
Maschler). Game and decision theoretic models in ethics (J.C. Harsanyi).
| Bibliographic details |
Hardbound, 760 pages, publication date: NOV-1992
ISBN-13: 978-0-444-88098-7
ISBN-10: 0-444-88098-4
Imprint: NORTH-HOLLAND
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| Price and Ordering |
Price:
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USD 160
EUR 115.95
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Last update: 10 Sep 2009
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