Home | Site map | Elsevier websites | Alerts
Elsevier
Product information search
Search all Elsevier sites
Search
Advanced Product Search
Go to Elsevier home page
SiteStat.jsp
HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, 1
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 1To order this title, and for more information, click here

Edited By
R.J. Aumann
S. Hart, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

Included in series
Handbooks in Economics,

Description
This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines.
The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics.
For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on External link http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

Contents
The Game of chess (H.A. Simon, J. Schaeffer). Games in extensive and strategic forms (S. Hart). Games with perfect information (J. Mycielski). Repeated games with complete information (S. Sorin). Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum (S. Zamir). Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum (F. Forges). Non-cooperative models of bargaining (K. Binmore, M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein). Strategic analysis of auctions (R. Wilson). Location (J.J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Thisse). Strategic models of entry deterrence (R. Wilson). Patent licensing (M.I. Kamien). The core and balancedness (Y. Kannai). Axiomatizations of the core (B. Peleg). The core in perfectly competitive economies (R.M. Anderson). The core in imperfectly competitive economies (J.J. Gabszewicz, B. Shitovitz). Two-sided matching (A.E. Roth, M. Sotomayor). Von Neumann - Morgenstern stable sets (W.F. Lucas). The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus: A survey (M. Maschler). Game and decision theoretic models in ethics (J.C. Harsanyi).

Bibliographic & ordering Information
Hardbound, 760 pages, publication date: NOV-1992
ISBN-13: 978-0-444-88098-7
ISBN-10: 0-444-88098-4
Imprint: NORTH-HOLLAND
Price: Order form
GBP 85
EUR 125
USD 150

Books and book related electronic products are priced in US dollars (USD), euro (EUR), and Great Britain Pounds (GBP). USD prices apply to the Americas and Asia Pacific. EUR prices apply in Europe and the Middle East. GBP prices apply to the UK and all other countries.

See also information about conditions of sale & ordering procedures, and links to our regional sales offices.

081/860
Last update: 29 Aug 2008
Book contents
Table of contents
Reviews
View other people's reviews
Submit your review
Bookmark this page
Recommend this publication
Overview of all books
Printer-friendly version   Printer-friendly version
 Home | Site map | Privacy policy | Terms and Conditions | Feedback | A Reed Elsevier company
 Copyright © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.