The Strategy of Social Choice

The Strategy of Social Choice

1st Edition - January 1, 1983

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  • Author: H. Moulin
  • eBook ISBN: 9781483256887

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Description

Advanced Textbooks in Economics, Volume 18: The Strategy of Social Choice focuses on the social, economics, and political implications of social choice. The publication first surveys introduction, social choice functions and correspondences, and monotonicity and the arrow theorem. Discussions focus on efficiency, anonymity and neutrality, classifying voting methods, normative versus positive approach to voting, voting and the non-strategic theory of social choice, and development of the strategic theory of voting. The text then ponders on strategy-proofness and monotonicity and sophisticated voting. Topics include sophisticated implementation, voting by binary choices, strategy-proof social choice functions and game forms, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, and restricted domains. The manuscript examines cooperative voting and voting by veto, including the minority principle, proportional veto core, voting by integer veto, effectivity functions, maximal and stable effectivity functions, and implementation by Nash equilibrium. The text is a dependable source of data for researchers interested in the process of social choice.

Table of Contents


  • Introduction to the Series

    Preface

    1. Introduction

    1 Prescriptive Judgements or Descriptive Analysis

    2. Normative versus Positive Approach to Voting

    3. The Implementation Problem

    4. Classifying Voting Methods

    5. Voting and the Non-Strategic Theory of Social Choice

    6. Development of the Strategic Theory of Voting

    7. Relation to the Economics of Incentives

    References

    2. Social Choice Functions and Correspondences

    1. Summary of the Results

    2. Basic Definitions and Notation

    3. Efficiency

    4. Anonymity and Neutrality

    5. The Condorcet Winner and Related s.c.c.

    References

    3. Monotonicity and the Arrow Theorem

    1. Summary of the Results

    2. Monotonic s.c.c.

    3. Strongly Monotonic s.c.c.

    4. Examples of a Strongly Monotonic s.c.c.

    5. Strongly Monotonic s.c.f.: Impossibility Result

    6. Social Welfare Functions: Arrow's Theorem

    References

    4. Strategy-Proofness and Monotonicity

    1. Summary of the Results

    2. Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions and Game Forms

    3. The Case of a Binary Choice

    4. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

    5. Restricted Domains

    References

    5. Sophisticated Voting

    1. Summary of the Results

    2. Sophisticated Implementation

    3. Voting by Binary Choices

    4. A Necessary Condition

    References

    6. Voting by Veto

    1. Summary of the Results

    2. The Minority Principle

    3. The Proportional Veto Core

    4. Proof of Theorem 1

    5. Voting by Integer Veto

    6. General Voting by Veto

    References

    7. Cooperative Voting

    1. Summary of the Results

    2. Effectivity Functions

    3. Maximal Effectivity Functions

    4. Stable Effectivity Functions

    5. Implementation by Strong Equilibrium

    6. Implementation by Nash Equilibrium

    References

    Index

Product details

  • No. of pages: 226
  • Language: English
  • Copyright: © North Holland 1983
  • Published: January 1, 1983
  • Imprint: North Holland
  • eBook ISBN: 9781483256887

About the Author

H. Moulin

About the Editors

C.J. Bliss

Affiliations and Expertise

Nuffield College, Oxford, UK

M.D. Intriligator

Affiliations and Expertise

University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

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