Chapter 1: “Issues in Antitrust Enforcement,” Vivek Ghosal (Georgia Institute of Technology), Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).
Chapter 2: “Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics.” Stephen Martin (Purdue University).
Chapter 3: “The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path.” Joe Chen (University of Tokyo) and Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University).
Chapter 4: “Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison?” Paolo Buccirossi (Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust and Regulation, Rome) and Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics).
Chapter 5: “Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests.” Cécile Aubert (Universite Paris IX Dauphine).
Chapter 6: “Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel.” William Kovacic (George Washington University), Robert Marshall (Pennsylvania State University), Leslie Marx (Duke University) and Matthew Raiff (Bates White).
Chapter 7: “Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels” John Connor (Purdue University).
Chapter 8: “The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis.” Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse).
Chapter 9: “The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger.” Jay Pil Choi (Michigan State University).
Chapter 10: “The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests.” Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm) and Johan Stennek (Res