Description

This volume comprises papers presented at the Symposium on Collective Choice, by leading experts in this field. It presents recent advances in Social Choice Theory and Welfare Economics. The papers are classified in two broad groups: (1) those dealing with the ethical aspects of the theory of social choice and (2) those concerned with the positive aspects. The papers in the first part are concerned with the Arrow-type aggregation problem or aspects of it and with more specific questions relating to optimality, justice and welfare. In part II several papers discuss the problem of strategic misrevelation of preferences by individuals, others discuss simple voting games, social choice-correspondences and electoral competition. The main features are: - Recent advances in social choice theory and welfare economics - New mathematical approaches to social choice theory (differential and algebraic topology) -New aspects of the concepts of justice and optimality in welfare economics and social choice.

Table of Contents


Introduction to the Series

Preface

List of Participants

Introduction

Part IA. The Ethical Aspects Of Social Choice: The Aggregation Problem

Chapter 1. Arrow's Theorem: Unusual Domains and Extended Co-Domains

Chapter 2. Pivotal Voters: A Simple Proof of Arrow's Theorem

Chapter 3. The Structure of General Probabilistic Group Decision Rules

Chapter 4. Positive Association and its Relatives

Chapter 5. On the Use of Ultrafilters in Social Choice Theory

Chapter 6. Social Choice and Game Theory: Recent Results with a Topological Approach

Chapter 7. Contractibility and Public Decision-Making

Part IB. The Ethical Aspects Of Social Choice: Justice, Optimality, and Welfare

Chapter 8. Resolving Conflicting Views of Justice in Social Choice

Chapter 9. Some Broader Issues of Social Choice

Chapter 10. Ex-Post Optimality as a Dynamically Consistent Objective for Collective Choice Under Uncertainty

Chapter 11. Welfare Aspects of Naive and Sophisticated Decision-Making

Part II. The Positive Aspects of Social Choice

Chapter 12. Strategic Voting for Weakly Binary Group Decision Functions: The Case of Linear Individual Orderings

Chapter 13. Further Results on Voting with Veto

Chapter 14. On Simple Games and Social Choice Correspondences

Chapter 15. Equilibria in Simple Dynamic Games

Chapter 16. Directional and Local Electoral Equilibria with Probabilistic Voting

Chapter 17. λ-Transfer Value and Fixed-Price Equilibrium in Two-Sided Markets

Details

Language:
English
Copyright:
© 1983
Published:
Imprint:
North Holland
Electronic ISBN:
9781483290591
Print ISBN:
9780444864871

About the editors