Safety Design for Space Systems

Safety Design for Space Systems

1st Edition - March 17, 2009

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  • Authors: Gary Musgrave Ph.D, Axel Larsen, Tommaso Sgobba
  • eBook ISBN: 9780080559223
  • Hardcover ISBN: 9780750685801

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Progress in space safety lies in the acceptance of safety design and engineering as an integral part of the design and implementation process for new space systems. Safety must be seen as the principle design driver of utmost importance from the outset of the design process, which is only achieved through a culture change that moves all stakeholders toward front-end loaded safety concepts. This approach entails a common understanding and mastering of basic principles of safety design for space systems at all levels of the program organisation. Fully supported by the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS), written by the leading figures in the industry, with frontline experience from projects ranging from the Apollo missions, Skylab, the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station, this book provides a comprehensive reference for aerospace engineers in industry. It addresses each of the key elements that impact on space systems safety, including: the space environment (natural and induced); human physiology in space; human rating factors; emergency capabilities; launch propellants and oxidizer systems; life support systems; battery and fuel cell safety; nuclear power generators (NPG) safety; habitat activities; fire protection; safety-critical software development; collision avoidance systems design; operations and on-orbit maintenance.

Key Features

* The only comprehensive space systems safety reference, its must-have status within space agencies and suppliers, technical and aerospace libraries is practically guaranteed
* Written by the leading figures in the industry from NASA, ESA, JAXA, (et cetera), with frontline experience from projects ranging from the Apollo missions, Skylab, the Space Shuttle, small and large satellite systems, and the International Space Station.
* Superb quality information for engineers, programme managers, suppliers and aerospace technologists; fully supported by the IAASS (International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety)


Aerospace engineers in industry, space agencies and consulting firms, and also be suitable for use as a reference for senior and graduate level courses. In terms of sales the market is expected to be aerospace and high technology companies, space agencies, consulting firms and the academic market in that order of importance

Table of Contents

  • About the Editors
    1 Introduction to Space Safety
    1.1 NASA and Safety
    1.2 Definition of Safety and Risk
    1.3 Managing Safety and Risk
    1.4 The Book
    2 The Space Environment: Natural and Induced
    2.1 The Atmosphere
    2.1.1 Composition
    2.1.2 Atomic Oxygen
    2.1.3 The Ionosphere
    2.2 Orbital Debris and Meteoroids
    2.2.1 Orbital Debris
    2.2.2 Meteoroids
    2.3 Microgravity
    2.3.1 Microgravity Defined
    2.3.2 Methods of Attainment
    2.3.3 Effects on Biological Processes and Astronaut Health
    2.3.4 Unique Aspects of Travel to the Moon and Planetary Bodies
    Recommended Reading
    2.4 Acoustics
    2.4.1 Acoustics Safety Issues
    2.4.2 Acoustic Requirements
    2.4.3 Compliance and Verification
    2.4.4 Conclusion and Recommendations
    Recommended Reading
    2.5 Radiation
    2.5.1 Ionizing Radiation
    2.5.2 Radio-Frequency Radiation
    2.6 Natural and Induced Thermal Environments
    2.6.1 Introduction to the Thermal Environment
    2.6.2 Spacecraft Heat0Transfer Considerations
    2.6.3 The Natural Thermal Environment
    2.6.4 The Induced Thermal Environment
    2.6.5 Other Lunar and Planetary Environment Considerations
    2.7 Combined Environmental Effects
    2.7.1 Introduction to Environmental Effects
    2.7.2 Combined Environments
    2.7.3 Combined Effects
    2.7.4 Ground Testing for Space Simulation
    3 Overview of Bioastronautics
    3.1 Space Physiology
    3.1.1 Muscular System
    3.1.2 Skeletal System
    3.1.3 Cardiovascular and Respiratory Systems
    3.1.4 Neurovestibular System
    3.1.5 Radiation
    3.1.6 Nutrition
    3.1.7 Immune System
    3.1.8 Extravehicular Activity
    3.2 Short- and Long-Duration Mission Effects
    3.2.1 Muscular System
    3.2.2 Skeletal System
    3.2.3 Cardiovascular and Respiratory Systems
    3.2.4 Neurovestibular System
    3.2.5 Radiation
    3.2.6 Nutrition
    3.2.7 Immune System
    3.2.8 Extravehicular Activity
    3.3 Health Maintenance
    3.3.1 Preflight Preparation
    3.3.2 In-Flight Measures
    3.3.3 In-Flight Medical Monitoring
    3.3.4 Postflight Recovery
    3.4 Crew Survival
    3.4.1 Overview of Health Threats in Spaceflight
    3.4.2 Early Work
    3.4.3 Crew Survival on the Launch Pad, at Launch, and during Ascent
    3.4.4 On-Orbit Safe Haven and Crew Transfer
    3.4.5 Entry, Landing, and Postlanding
    3.5 Conclusion
    4 Basic Principles of Space Safety
    4.1 The Cause of Accidents
    4.2 Principles and Methods
    4.2.1 Hazard Elimination and Limitation
    4.2.2 Barriers and Interlocks
    4.2.3 Fail-Safe Design
    4.2.4 Failure and Risk Minimization
    4.2.5 Monitoring, Recovery, and Escape
    4.2.6 Crew Survival Systems
    4.3 The Safety Review Process
    4.3.1 Safety Requirements
    4.3.2 The Safety Panels
    4.3.3 The Safety Reviews
    4.3.4 Nonconformances
    5 Human-Rating Concepts
    5.1 Human Rating Defined
    5.1.1 Human-Rated Systems
    5.1.2 The NASA Human-Rating and Process
    5.1.3 The Human-Rating Plan
    5.1.4 The NASA Human-Rating Certification Process
    5.1.5 Human Rating in Commercial Human Spaceflight
    5.2 Human-Rating Requirements and Approaches
    5.2.1 Key Human-Rating Technical Requirements
    5.2.2 Programmatic Requirements
    5.2.3 Test Requirements
    5.2.4 Data Requirements
    6 Life-Support Systems Safety
    6.1 Atmospheric Conditioning and Control
    6.1.1 Monitoring Is the Key to Control
    6.1.2 Atmospheric Conditioning
    6.1.3 Carbon Dioxide Removal
    6.2 Trace-Contaminant Control
    6.2.1 Of Tight Buildings and Spacecraft Cabins
    6.2.2 Trace-Contaminant Control Methodology
    6.2.3 Trace-Contaminant Control Design Considerations
    6.3 Assessment of Water Quality in the Spacecraft Environment:
    Mitigating Health and Safety Concerns
    6.3.1 Scope of Water Resources Relevant to Spaceflight
    6.3.2 Spacecraft Water Quality and the Risk-Assessment Paradigm
    6.3.3 Water-Quality Monitoring
    6.3.4 Conclusions and Future Directions
    6.4 Waste Management
    6.5 Summary of Life-Support Systems
    7 Emergency Systems
    7.1 Space Rescue
    7.1.1 Legal and Diplomatic Basis
    7.1.2 The Need for Rescue Capability
    7.1.3 Rescue Modes and Probabilities
    7.1.4 Hazards in the Different Phases of Flight
    7.1.5 Historic Distribution of Failures
    7.1.6 Historic Rescue Systems
    7.1.7 Space Rescue Is Primarily Self-Rescue
    7.1.8 Limitations of Ground-Based Rescue
    7.1.9 The Crew Return Vehicle as a Study in Space Rescue
    7.1.10 Safe Haven
    7.1.11 Conclusions
    7.2 Personal Protective Equipment
    7.2.1 Purpose of Personal Protective Equipment
    7.2.2 Types of Personal Protective Equipment
    8 Collision Avoidance Systems
    8.1 Docking Systems and Operations
    8.1.1 Docking Systems as a Means for Spacecraft Orbital Mating
    8.1.2 Design Approaches Ensuring Docking Safety and Reliability
    8.1.3 Design Features Ensuring the Safety and Reliability of
    Russian Docking Systems
    8.1.4 Analyses and Tests Performed for the Verification of Safety and
    Reliability of Russian Docking Systems
    8.2 Descent and Landing Systems
    8.2.1 Parachute Systems
    8.2.2 Known Parachute Anomolies and Lessons Learned
    9 Robotic-Systems Safety
    9.1 Generic Robotic Systems
    9.1.1 Controller and Operator Interface
    9.1.2 Arms and Joints
    9.1.3 Drive System
    9.1.4 Sensors
    9.1.5 End Effector
    9.2 Space Robotics Overview
    9.3 Identification of Hazards and Their Causes
    9.3.1 Electrical and Electromechanical Malfunctions
    9.3.2 Mechanical and Structural Failures
    9.3.3 Failure in the Control Path
    9.3.4 Operator Error
    9.3.5 Other Hazards
    9.4 Hazard Mitigation in Design
    9.4.1 Electrical and Mechanical Design and Redundancy
    9.4.2 Operator Error
    9.4.3 System Health Checks
    9.4.4 Emergency Motion Arrest
    9.4.5 Proximity Operations
    9.4.6 Built-in Test
    9.4.7 Safety Algorithms
    9.5 Hazard Mitigation through Training
    9.6 Hazard Mitigation for Operations
    9.7 Case Study: Understanding Canadarm2 and Space Safety
    9.7.1 The Canadarm2
    9.7.2 Cameras
    9.7.3 Force Moment Sensor
    9.7.4 Training
    9.7.5 Hazard Concerns and Associated Hazard Mitigation
    9.8 Summary
    10 Meteoroid and Debris Protection
    10.1 Risk-Control Measures
    10.1.1 Maneuvering
    10.1.2 Shielding
    10.2 Emergency-Repair Considerations for Spacecraft Pressure-Wall Damage
    10.2.1 Balanced Mitigation of Program Risks
    10.2.2 Leak-Location System and Operational-Design Considerations
    10.2.3 Ability to Access the Damaged Area
    10.2.4 Kit Design and Certification Considerations (1 Is Too Many,
    100 Are Not Enough)
    10.2.5 Recertification of the Repaired Pressure Compartment for
    Use by the Crew
    11 Noise-Control Design
    11.1 Introduction
    11.2 Noise-Control Plan
    11.2.1 Noise-Control Strategy
    11.2.2 Acoustic Analysis
    11.2.3 Testing and Verification
    11.3 Noise-Control Design Applications
    11.3.1 Noise Control at the Source
    11.3.2 Path-Noise Control
    11.3.3 Noise Control in the Receiving Space
    11.3.4 Postdesign Noise Mitigation
    11.4 Conclusions and Recommendations
    Recommended Reading
    12 Materials Safety
    12.1 Toxic Off-Gassing
    12.1.1 Materials Off-Gassing Controls
    12.1.2 Materials Testing
    12.1.3 Spacecraft Module Testing
    12.2 Stress-Corrosion Cracking
    12.2.1 What Is Stress-Corrosion Cracking?
    12.2.2 Prevention of Stress-Corrosion Cracking
    12.2.3 Testing Materials for Stress-Corrosion Cracking
    12.2.4 Design for Stress-Corrosion Cracking
    12.4.5 Requirements for Spacecraft Hardware
    12.4.6 Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Propulsion Systems
    12.3 Conclusions
    13 Oxygen-Systems Safety
    13.1 Oxygen Pressure System Design
    13.1.1 Introduction
    13.1.2 Design Approach
    13.1.3 Oxygen-Compatibility Assessment Process
    13.2 Oxygen Generators
    13.2.1 Electrochemical Systems for Oxygen Production
    13.2.2 Solid Fuel Oxygen Generators (Oxygen Candles)
    14 Avionics Safety
    14.1 Introduction to Avionics Safety
    14.2 Electrical Grounding and Electrical Bonding
    14.2.1 Defining Characteristics of an Electrical-Ground Connection
    14.2.2 Control of Electric Current
    14.2.3 Electrical Grounds Can Be Signal-Return Paths
    14.2.4 Where and How Electrical Grounds Should Be Connected
    14.2.5 Defining Characteristics of an Electrical Bond
    14.2.6 Types of Electrical Bonds
    14.2.7 Electrical-Bond Considerations for Dissimilar Metals
    14.2.8 Electrical-Ground and -Bond Connections for Shields
    Recommended Reading
    14.3 Safety-Critical Computer Control
    14.3.1 Partial Computer Control
    14.3.2 Total Computer Control: Fail Safe
    14.4 Circuit Protection: Fusing
    14.4.1 Circuit-Protection Methods
    14.4.2 Circuit Protectors
    14.4.3 Design Guidance
    14.5 Electrostatic-Discharge Control
    14.5.1 Fundamentals
    14.5.2 Various Levels of Electrostatic Discharge Concern
    14.6 Arc Tracking
    14.6.1 A New Failure Mode
    14.6.2 Characteristics of Arc Tracking
    14.6.3 Likelihood of an Arc-Tracking Event
    14.6.4 Prevention of Arc Tracking
    14.6.5 Verification of Protection and Management of Hazards
    14.6.6 Summary
    14.7 Corona Control in High-Voltage Systems
    14.7.1 Associated Environments
    14.7.2 Design Criteria
    14.7.3 Verification and Testing
    14.8 Extravehicular-Activity Considerations
    14.8.1 Displays and Indicators Used in Space
    14.8.2 Mating and Demating of Powered Connectors
    14.8.3 Single-Strand Melting Points
    14.8.4 Battery Removal and Installation
    14.8.5 Computer or Operational Control of Inhibits
    14.9 Spacecraft Electromagnetic-Interference and Electromagnetic-
    Compatibility Control
    14.9.1 Electromagnetic-Compatibility Needs for Space Applications
    14.9.2 Basic Electromagnetic-Compatibility Interactions and a
    Safety Margin
    14.9.3 Mission-Driven Electromagnetic-Interference Design:
    The Case for Grounding
    14.9.4 Electromagnetic-Compatibility Program for Spacecraft
    14.10 Design and Testing of Safety-Critical Circuits
    14.10.1 Safety-Critical Circuits: Conducted Mode
    14.10.2 Safety-Critical Circuits: Radiated Mode
    14.11 Electrical Hazards
    14.11.1 Introduction
    14.11.2 Electrical Shock
    14.11.3 Physiological Considerations
    14.11.4 Electrical Hazard Classification
    14.11.5 Leakage Current
    14.11.6 Bioinstrumentation
    14.11.7 Electrical-Hazard Controls
    14.11.8 Verification of Electrical-Hazard Controls
    14.11.9 Electrical-Safety Design Considerations
    14.12 Avionics Lessons Learned
    14.12.1 Electronic Design
    14.12.2 Physical Design
    14.12.3 Materials and Sources
    14.12.4 Damage Avoidance
    14.12.5 System Aspects
    15 Software-System Safety
    15.1 Introduction
    15.2 The Software Safety Problem
    15.2.1 System Accidents
    15.2.2 The Power and Limitations of Abstraction from Physical Design
    15.2.3 Reliability versus Safety for Software
    15.2.4 Inadequate System Engineering
    15.2.5 Characteristics of Embedded Software
    15.3 Current Practice
    15.3.1 System Safety
    15.4 Best Practice
    15.4.1 Management of Software-Intensive, Safety-Critical Projects
    15.4.2 Basic System Safety-Engineering Practices and Their
    Implications for Software-Intensive Systems
    15.4.3 Specifications
    15.4.4 Requirements Analysis
    15.4.5 Model-Based Software Engineering and Software Reuse
    15.4.6 Software Architecture
    15.4.7 Software Design
    15.4.8 Design of Human-Computer Interaction
    15.4.9 Software Reviews
    15.4.10 Verification and Assurance
    15.4.11 Operations
    15.5 Summary
    16 Battery Safety
    16.1 Introduction
    16.2 General Design and Safety Guidelines
    16.3 Battery Types
    16.4 Battery Models
    16.5 Hazard and Toxicity Categorization
    16.6 Battery Chemistry
    16.6.1 Alkaline Batteries
    16.6.2 Lithium Batteries
    16.6.3 Silver Zinc Batteries
    16.6.4 Lead Acid Batteries
    16.6.5 Nickel Cadmium Batteries
    16.6.6 Nickel Metal Hydride Batteries
    16.6.7 Nickel Hydrogen Batteries
    16.6.8 Lithium-Ion Batteries
    16.7 Storage, Transportation, and Handling
    17 Mechanical-Systems Safety
    17.1 Safety Factors
    17.1.1 Types of Safety Factors
    17.1.2 Safety Factors Typical of Human-Rated Space Programs
    17.1.3 Things That Influence the Choice of Safety Factors
    17.2 Spacecraft Structures
    17.2.1 Mechanical Requirements
    17.2.2 Space-Mission Environment and Mechanical Loads
    17.2.3 Project Overview: Successive Designs and Iterative
    Verification of Structural Requirements
    17.2.4 Analytical Evaluations
    17.2.5 Structural Test Verification
    17.2.6 Spacecraft Structural-Model Philosophy
    17.2.7 Materials and Processes
    17.2.8 Manufacturing of Spacecraft Structures
    17.3 Fracture Control
    17.3.1 Basic Requirements
    17.3.2 Implementation
    17.3.3 Summary
    17.4 Pressure Vessels, Lines, and Fittings
    17.4.1 Pressure Vessels
    17.4.2 Lines and Fittings
    17.4.3 Space Pressure-Systems Standards
    17.4.4 Summary
    17.5 Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels
    17.5.1 The Composite Overwrapped Pressure-Vessel System
    17.5.2 Monolithic Metallic Pressure-Vessel Failure Modes
    17.5.3 Composite Overwrapped Pressure-Vessel Failure Modes
    17.5.4 Composite Overwrapped Pressure-Vessel Impact Sensitivity
    17.5.5 Summary
    17.6 Structural Design of Glass and Ceramic Components for
    Space-System Safety
    17.6.1 Strength Characteristics of Glass and Ceramics
    17.6.2 Defining Loads and Environments
    17.6.3 Design Factors
    17.6.4 Meeting Life Requirements with Glass and Ceramics
    17.7 Safety Critical Mechanisms
    17.7.1 Designing for Failure Tolerance
    17.7.2 Design and Verification of Safety-Critical Mechanisms
    17.7.3 Reduced Failure Tolerance
    17.7.4 Review of Safety-Critical Mechanisms
    18 Containment of Hazardous Materials
    18.1 Toxic Materials
    18.1.1 Fundamentals of Toxicology
    18.1.2 Toxicological Risks to Air Quality in Spacecraft
    18.1.3 Risk-Management Strategies
    18.2 Biohazardous Materials
    18.2.1 Microbiological Risks Associated with Spaceflight
    18.2.2 Risk-Mitigation Approaches
    18.2.3 Major Spaceflight-Specific Microbiological Risks
    18.3 Shatterable Materials
    18.3.1 Shatterable Materials in a Habitable Compartment
    18.3.2 Program Implementation
    18.3.3 Containment Concepts for Internal Equipment
    18.3.4 Containment Concepts for Exterior Equipment
    18.3.5 General Comments about Working with Shatterable Materials
    18.4 Containment Design Approach
    18.4.1 Fault Tolerance
    18.4.2 Design for Minimum Risk
    18.5 Containment Design Methods
    18.5.1 Containment Environments
    18.5.2 Design of Containment Systems
    18.6 Safety Controls
    18.6.1 Proper Design
    18.6.2 Materials Selection
    18.6.3 Materials Compatibility
    18.6.4 Proper Workmanship
    18.6.5 Proper Loading or Filling
    18.6.6 Fracture Control
    18.7 Safety Verifications
    18.7.1 Strength Analysis
    18.7.2 Qualification Tests
    18.7.3 Acceptance Tests
    18.7.4 Proof-Tests
    18.7.5 Qualification of Procedures
    18.8 Conclusions
    19 Failure-Tolerance Design
    19.1 Safe
    19.1.1 Order of Precedence
    19.2 Hazard
    19.2.1 Hazard Controls
    19.2.2 Design to Tolerate Failures
    19.3 Hazardous Functions
    19.3.1 Must-Not-Work Hazardous Function
    19.3.2 Must-Work Hazardous Function
    19.4 Design for Minimum Risk
    19.5 Conclusions
    20 Propellant-Systems Safety
    20.1 Solid-Propulsion Systems Safety
    20.1.1 Solid Propellants
    20.1.2 Solid-Propellant Systems for Space Applications
    20.1.3 Safety Hazards
    20.1.4 Handling, Transport, and Storage
    20.1.5 Inadvertent Ignition
    20.1.6 Safe Ignition-Systems Design
    20.1.7 Conclusions
    20.2 Liquid-Propellant Propulsion-Systems Safety
    20.2.1 Planning
    20.2.2 Containment Integrity
    20.2.3 Thermal Control
    20.2.4 Materials Compatibility
    20.2.5 Contamination Control
    20.2.6 Environmental Considerations
    20.2.7 Engine and Thruster Firing Inhibits
    20.2.8 Heightened Risk (Risk Creep)
    20.2.9 Instrumentation and Telemetry Data
    20.2.10 End-to-End Integrated Instrumentation, Controls and
    Redundancy Verification
    20.2.11 Qualification
    20.2.12 Total Quality Management (ISO 9001 or Equivalent)
    20.2.13 Preservicing Integrity Verification
    20.2.14 Propellants Servicing
    20.2.15 Conclusions
    20.3 Hypergolic Propellants
    20.3.1 Materials Compatibility
    20.3.2 Material Degradation
    20.3.3 Hypergolic-Propellant Degradation
    20.4 Propellant Fire
    20.4.1 Hydrazine and Monomethylhydrazine Vapor
    20.4.2 Liquid Hydrazine and Monomethylhydrazine
    20.4.3 Hydrazine and Monomethylhydrazine Mists,
    Droplets, and Sprays
    21 Pyrotechnic Safety
    21.1 Pyrotechnic Devices
    21.1.1 Explosives
    21.1.2 Initiators
    21.2 Electroexplosive Devices
    21.2.1 Safe Handling of Electroexplosive Devices
    21.2.2 Designing for Safe Electroexplosive-Device Operation
    21.2.3 Pyrotechnic Safety of Mechanically Initiated
    Explosive Devices
    22 Extravehicular-Activity Safety
    22.1 Extravehicular-Activity Environment
    22.1.1 Definitions
    22.1.2 Extravehicular-Activity Space Suit
    22.1.3 Sensory Degradation
    22.1.4 Maneuvering and Weightlessness
    22.1.5 Glove Restrictions
    22.1.6 Crew Fatigue
    22.1.7 Thermal Environment
    22.1.8 Extravehicular-Activity Tools
    22.2 Suit Hazards
    22.2.1 Inadvertent Contact Hazards
    22.2.2 Area of Effect Hazards
    22.3 Crew Hazards
    22.3.1 Contamination of the Habitable Environment
    22.3.2 Thermal Extremes
    22.3.3 Lasers
    22.3.4 Electrical Shock and Molten Metal
    22.3.5 Entrapment
    22.3.6 Emergency Ingress
    22.3.7 Collision
    22.3.8 Inadvertent Loss of Crew
    22.4 Conclusions
    23 Emergency, Caution, and Warning System
    23.1 System Overview
    23.2 Historic NASA Emergency, Caution, and Warning Systems
    23.3 Emergency, Caution, and Warning System Measures
    23.3.1 Event-Classification Measures
    23.3.2 Sensor Measures
    23.3.3 Data-System Measures
    23.3.4 Annunciation Measures
    23.4 Failure Isolation and Recovery
    24 Laser Safety
    24.1 Background
    24.1.1 Optical Spectrum
    24.1.2 Biological Effects
    24.2 Lasers Characteristics
    24.2.1 Laser Principles
    24.2.2 Laser Types
    24.3 Laser Standards
    24.3.1 NASA Johnson Space Center Requirements
    24.3.2 ANSI Standard Z136-1
    24.3.3 Russian Standard
    24.4 Lasers Used in Space
    24.4.1 Radars
    24.4.2 Illumination
    24.4.3 Sensors
    24.5 Design Considerations for Laser Safety
    24.5.1 Ground Testing
    24.5.2 Unique Space Environment
    24.6 Conclusions
    25 Crew Training Safety: An Integrated Process
    25.1 Training the Crew for Safety
    25.1.1 Typical Training Flow
    25.1.2 Principles of Safety Training for the Different
    Training Phases
    25.1.3 Specific Safety Training for Different
    Equipment Categories
    25.1.4 Safety Training for Different Operations Categories
    25.2 Safety during Training
    25.2.1 Overview
    25.2.2 Training-, Test-, or Baseline-Data Collection Model versus
    Flight Model: Type, Fidelity, Source, Origin, and Category
    25.2.3 Training Environments and Facilities
    25.2.4 Training Models, Test Models, and Safety Requirements
    25.2.5 Training-Model, Test-Model, and Baseline-Data Collection
    Equipment-Utilization Requirements
    25.2.6 Qualification and Certification of Training Personnel
    25.2.7 Training- and Test-Model Documentation
    25.3 Training Development and Validation Process
    25.3.1 The Training Development Process
    25.3.2 Training-Review Process
    25.3.3 The Role of Safety in the Training Development and
    Validation Processes
    25.3.4 Feedback to the Safety Community from the Training Development and
    Validation Processes
    25.4 Conclusion
    26 Safety Considerations in the Ground Environment
    26.1 A Word about Ground Support Equipment
    26.2 Documentation and Reviews
    26.3 Roles and Responsibilities
    26.4 Contingency Planning
    26.5 Failure Tolerance
    26.6 Training
    26.7 Hazardous Operations
    26.8 Tools
    26.9 Human Factors
    26.10 Biological Systems and Materials
    26.11 Electrical
    26.12 Radiation
    26.13 Pressure Systems
    26.14 Ordinance
    26.15 Mechanical and Eelectromechanical Devices
    26.16 Propellants
    26.17 Cryogenics
    26.18 Oxygen
    26.19 Ground Handling
    26.20 Software Safety
    26.21 Summary
    27 Fire Safety
    27.1 Characteristics of Fire in Space
    27.1.1 Overview of Low-Gravity Fire
    27.1.2 Fuel and Oxidizer Supply and Flame Behavior
    27.1.3 Fire Appearance and Signatures
    27.1.4 Flame Ignition and Spread
    27.1.5 Summary of Low-Gravity Fire Characteristics
    27.2 Design for Fire Prevention
    27.2.1 Materials Flammability
    27.2.2 Ignition Sources
    27.3 Spacecraft Fire Detection
    27.3.1 Prior Spacecraft Systems
    27.3.2 Review of Low-Gravity Smoke
    27.3.3 Spacecraft Atmospheric Dust
    27.3.4 Sensors for Fire Detection
    27.4 Spacecraft Fire Suppression
    27.4.1 Spacecraft Fire-Suppression Methods
    27.4.2 Considerations for Spacecraft Fire Suppression
    28 Safe-without-Services Design
    29 Probabilistic Risk Assessment with Emphasis on Design
    29.1 Basic Elements of Probabilistic Risk Assessment
    29.1.1 Identification of Initiating Events
    29.1.2 Application of Event-Sequence Diagrams and Event Trees
    29.1.3 Modeling of Pivotal Events
    29.1.4 Linkage and Quantification of Accident Scenarios
    29.2 Construction of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment for
    Design Evaluations
    29.2.1 Uses of Probabilistic Risk Assessment
    2.9.2 Reference Mission
    29.3 Relative-Risk Evaluations
    29.3.1 Absolute- versus Relative-Risk Assessments
    29.3.2 Roles of Relative-Risk Assessments in Design Evaluations
    29.3.3 Quantitative Evaluations
    29.4 Evaluations of the Relative Risks of Alternative Designs
    29.4.1 Overview of the Probabilistic Risk-Assessment
    Models Developed
    29.4.2 Relative-Risk Comparisons of the Alternative Designs

Product details

  • No. of pages: 992
  • Language: English
  • Copyright: © Butterworth-Heinemann 2009
  • Published: March 17, 2009
  • Imprint: Butterworth-Heinemann
  • eBook ISBN: 9780080559223
  • Hardcover ISBN: 9780750685801

About the Authors

Gary Musgrave Ph.D

Dr. Gary Eugene Musgrave received his undergraduate training at Auburn University, where he received the Baccalaureate in Biological Sciences in 1969, and at the Georgia Institute of Technology, where he studied Electrical Engineering from 1971 until 1973. He received his graduate education at Auburn University, receiving the Master of Science in the field of Pharmacology/Toxicology from the School of Pharmacy in 1976, and the Doctor of Philosophy in the fields of Cardiovascular Physiology and Autonomic Neuropharmacology from the School of Veterinary Medicine in 1979. After completing his postdoctoral research, Dr. Musgrave was appointed Research Assistant Professor in the Department of Medicine at the Medical College of Virginia where he was Co-Investigator and the Engineering Project Director for a NASA sponsored investigation of the baroreflex regulation of blood pressure in astronauts during and after missions in space. This experiment ultimately was flown on the Spacelab “Space Life Sciences-1” mission. In 1982, Dr. Musgrave joined the NASA team at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, as an employee of the Management and Technical Services Company (MATSCO), a subsidiary of the General Electric Corporation, as the contractor manager for NASA’s Detailed Science Objective Program, where he was responsible for the development, certification, testing, and flight support for numerous items of medical hardware flown on various Space Shuttle missions. Dr. Musgrave retired from NASA during 2008 and presently resides in Tennessee, where he works as a consultant and educator. He is a member of the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety, and its Academic Committee, and is Chief Editor of the 1st edition of Safety Design for Space Systems.

Axel Larsen

Tommaso Sgobba

Tommaso Sgobba is Executive Director and Board Secretary of IAASS (International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety). Tommaso Sgobba has been IAASS first President in the period 2005-2013. Until June 2013 Tommaso Sgobba has been responsible for flight safety at the European Space Agency (ESA), including human-rated systems, spacecraft re-entries, space debris, use of nuclear power sources, and planetary protection. He joined the European Space Agency in 1989, after 13 years in the aeronautical industry. Initially he supported the developments of the Ariane 5 launcher, several earth observation and meteorological satellites, and the early phase of the European Hermes spaceplane. Later he became _Product Assurance and Safety Manager for all European manned missions on Shuttle, MIR station, and for the European research facilities of the International Space Station. He chaired for 10 years the ESA ISS Payload Safety Review Panel. He was also instrumental in setting up the ESA Re-entry Safety Review Panel. Tommaso Sgobba holds an M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from the Polytechnic of Turin (Italy), where he was also professor of space system safety (1999-2001). He has published several articles and papers on space safety, and co-edited the text book “Safety Design for Space Systems”, published in 2009 by Elsevier, that was also published later in Chinese. He was the Editor-in-Chief of the books “Safety Design for Space Operations” (2013) and “Space Safety and Human Performance” (2017) also published by Elsevier. He is Managing Editor of the Journal of Space Safety Engineering and member of the editorial board of the Space Safety Magazine. Tommaso Sgobba is the inventor (patent pending) of the R-DBAS (Re-entry, Direct Broadcasting Alert System), to alert the air traffic of falling fragments from uncontrolled space system re-entry. Tommaso Sgobba received the NASA recognition for outstanding contribution to the International Space Station in 2004, and the prestigious NASA Space Flight Awareness (SFA) Award in 2007.

Affiliations and Expertise

President, International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) and former Head of the Independent Safety Office, European Space Agency (ESA), Noordwijk, The Netherlands

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