Safety Design for Space Systems - 1st Edition - ISBN: 9780750685801, 9780080559223

Safety Design for Space Systems

1st Edition

Authors: Gary Musgrave Ph.D Axel Larsen Tommaso Sgobba
Hardcover ISBN: 9780750685801
eBook ISBN: 9780080559223
Imprint: Butterworth-Heinemann
Published Date: 17th March 2009
Page Count: 992
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Progress in space safety lies in the acceptance of safety design and engineering as an integral part of the design and implementation process for new space systems. Safety must be seen as the principle design driver of utmost importance from the outset of the design process, which is only achieved through a culture change that moves all stakeholders toward front-end loaded safety concepts. This approach entails a common understanding and mastering of basic principles of safety design for space systems at all levels of the program organisation.

Fully supported by the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS), written by the leading figures in the industry, with frontline experience from projects ranging from the Apollo missions, Skylab, the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station, this book provides a comprehensive reference for aerospace engineers in industry.

It addresses each of the key elements that impact on space systems safety, including: the space environment (natural and induced); human physiology in space; human rating factors; emergency capabilities; launch propellants and oxidizer systems; life support systems; battery and fuel cell safety; nuclear power generators (NPG) safety; habitat activities; fire protection; safety-critical software development; collision avoidance systems design; operations and on-orbit maintenance.

Key Features

  • The only comprehensive space systems safety reference, its must-have status within space agencies and suppliers, technical and aerospace libraries is practically guaranteed
  • Written by the leading figures in the industry from NASA, ESA, JAXA, (et cetera), with frontline experience from projects ranging from the Apollo missions, Skylab, the Space Shuttle, small and large satellite systems, and the International Space Station.
  • Superb quality information for engineers, programme managers, suppliers and aerospace technologists; fully supported by the IAASS (International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety)


Aerospace engineers in industry, space agencies and consulting firms, and also be suitable for use as a reference for senior and graduate level courses. In terms of sales the market is expected to be aerospace and high technology companies, space agencies, consulting firms and the academic market in that order of importance

Table of Contents

About the Editors Foreword Preface Contributors 1 Introduction to Space Safety 1.1 NASA and Safety 1.2 Definition of Safety and Risk 1.3 Managing Safety and Risk 1.4 The Book References 2 The Space Environment: Natural and Induced 2.1 The Atmosphere 2.1.1 Composition 2.1.2 Atomic Oxygen 2.1.3 The Ionosphere 2.2 Orbital Debris and Meteoroids 2.2.1 Orbital Debris 2.2.2 Meteoroids 2.3 Microgravity 2.3.1 Microgravity Defined 2.3.2 Methods of Attainment 2.3.3 Effects on Biological Processes and Astronaut Health 2.3.4 Unique Aspects of Travel to the Moon and Planetary Bodies Recommended Reading 2.4 Acoustics 2.4.1 Acoustics Safety Issues 2.4.2 Acoustic Requirements 2.4.3 Compliance and Verification 2.4.4 Conclusion and Recommendations Recommended Reading 2.5 Radiation 2.5.1 Ionizing Radiation 2.5.2 Radio-Frequency Radiation 2.6 Natural and Induced Thermal Environments 2.6.1 Introduction to the Thermal Environment 2.6.2 Spacecraft Heat0Transfer Considerations 2.6.3 The Natural Thermal Environment 2.6.4 The Induced Thermal Environment 2.6.5 Other Lunar and Planetary Environment Considerations 2.7 Combined Environmental Effects 2.7.1 Introduction to Environmental Effects 2.7.2 Combined Environments 2.7.3 Combined Effects 2.7.4 Ground Testing for Space Simulation References 3 Overview of Bioastronautics 3.1 Space Physiology 3.1.1 Muscular System 3.1.2 Skeletal System 3.1.3 Cardiovascular and Respiratory Systems 3.1.4 Neurovestibular System 3.1.5 Radiation 3.1.6 Nutrition 3.1.7 Immune System 3.1.8 Extravehicular Activity 3.2 Short- and Long-Duration Mission Effects 3.2.1 Muscular System 3.2.2 Skeletal System 3.2.3 Cardiovascular and Respiratory Systems 3.2.4 Neurovestibular System 3.2.5 Radiation 3.2.6 Nutrition 3.2.7 Immune System 3.2.8 Extravehicular Activity 3.3 Health Maintenance 3.3.1 Preflight Preparation 3.3.2 In-Flight Measures 3.3.3 In-Flight Medical Monitoring 3.3.4 Postflight Recovery 3.4 Crew Survival 3.4.1 Overview of Health Threats in Spaceflight 3.4.2 Early Work 3.4.3 Crew Survival on the Launch Pad, at Launch, and during Ascent 3.4.4 On-Orbit Safe Haven and Crew Transfer 3.4.5 Entry, Landing, and Postlanding 3.5 Conclusion References 4 Basic Principles of Space Safety 4.1 The Cause of Accidents 4.2 Principles and Methods 4.2.1 Hazard Elimination and Limitation 4.2.2 Barriers and Interlocks 4.2.3 Fail-Safe Design 4.2.4 Failure and Risk Minimization 4.2.5 Monitoring, Recovery, and Escape 4.2.6 Crew Survival Systems 4.3 The Safety Review Process 4.3.1 Safety Requirements 4.3.2 The Safety Panels 4.3.3 The Safety Reviews 4.3.4 Nonconformances References 5 Human-Rating Concepts 5.1 Human Rating Defined 5.1.1 Human-Rated Systems 5.1.2 The NASA Human-Rating and Process 5.1.3 The Human-Rating Plan 5.1.4 The NASA Human-Rating Certification Process 5.1.5 Human Rating in Commercial Human Spaceflight 5.2 Human-Rating Requirements and Approaches 5.2.1 Key Human-Rating Technical Requirements 5.2.2 Programmatic Requirements 5.2.3 Test Requirements 5.2.4 Data Requirements References 6 Life-Support Systems Safety 6.1 Atmospheric Conditioning and Control 6.1.1 Monitoring Is the Key to Control 6.1.2 Atmospheric Conditioning 6.1.3 Carbon Dioxide Removal 6.2 Trace-Contaminant Control 6.2.1 Of Tight Buildings and Spacecraft Cabins 6.2.2 Trace-Contaminant Control Methodology 6.2.3 Trace-Contaminant Control Design Considerations 6.3 Assessment of Water Quality in the Spacecraft Environment: Mitigating Health and Safety Concerns 6.3.1 Scope of Water Resources Relevant to Spaceflight 6.3.2 Spacecraft Water Quality and the Risk-Assessment Paradigm 6.3.3 Water-Quality Monitoring 6.3.4 Conclusions and Future Directions 6.4 Waste Management 6.5 Summary of Life-Support Systems References 7 Emergency Systems 7.1 Space Rescue 7.1.1 Legal and Diplomatic Basis 7.1.2 The Need for Rescue Capability 7.1.3 Rescue Modes and Probabilities 7.1.4 Hazards in the Different Phases of Flight 7.1.5 Historic Distribution of Failures 7.1.6 Historic Rescue Systems 7.1.7 Space Rescue Is Primarily Self-Rescue 7.1.8 Limitations of Ground-Based Rescue 7.1.9 The Crew Return Vehicle as a Study in Space Rescue 7.1.10 Safe Haven 7.1.11 Conclusions 7.2 Personal Protective Equipment 7.2.1 Purpose of Personal Protective Equipment 7.2.2 Types of Personal Protective Equipment References 8 Collision Avoidance Systems 8.1 Docking Systems and Operations 8.1.1 Docking Systems as a Means for Spacecraft Orbital Mating 8.1.2 Design Approaches Ensuring Docking Safety and Reliability 8.1.3 Design Features Ensuring the Safety and Reliability of Russian Docking Systems 8.1.4 Analyses and Tests Performed for the Verification of Safety and Reliability of Russian Docking Systems 8.2 Descent and Landing Systems 8.2.1 Parachute Systems 8.2.2 Known Parachute Anomolies and Lessons Learned References 9 Robotic-Systems Safety 9.1 Generic Robotic Systems 9.1.1 Controller and Operator Interface 9.1.2 Arms and Joints 9.1.3 Drive System 9.1.4 Sensors 9.1.5 End Effector 9.2 Space Robotics Overview 9.3 Identification of Hazards and Their Causes 9.3.1 Electrical and Electromechanical Malfunctions 9.3.2 Mechanical and Structural Failures 9.3.3 Failure in the Control Path 9.3.4 Operator Error 9.3.5 Other Hazards 9.4 Hazard Mitigation in Design 9.4.1 Electrical and Mechanical Design and Redundancy 9.4.2 Operator Error 9.4.3 System Health Checks 9.4.4 Emergency Motion Arrest 9.4.5 Proximity Operations 9.4.6 Built-in Test 9.4.7 Safety Algorithms 9.5 Hazard Mitigation through Training 9.6 Hazard Mitigation for Operations 9.7 Case Study: Understanding Canadarm2 and Space Safety 9.7.1 The Canadarm2 9.7.2 Cameras 9.7.3 Force Moment Sensor 9.7.4 Training 9.7.5 Hazard Concerns and Associated Hazard Mitigation 9.8 Summary References 10 Meteoroid and Debris Protection 10.1 Risk-Control Measures 10.1.1 Maneuvering 10.1.2 Shielding 10.2 Emergency-Repair Considerations for Spacecraft Pressure-Wall Damage 10.2.1 Balanced Mitigation of Program Risks 10.2.2 Leak-Location System and Operational-Design Considerations 10.2.3 Ability to Access the Damaged Area 10.2.4 Kit Design and Certification Considerations (1 Is Too Many, 100 Are Not Enough) 10.2.5 Recertification of the Repaired Pressure Compartment for Use by the Crew References 11 Noise-Control Design 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Noise-Control Plan 11.2.1 Noise-Control Strategy 11.2.2 Acoustic Analysis 11.2.3 Testing and Verification 11.3 Noise-Control Design Applications 11.3.1 Noise Control at the Source 11.3.2 Path-Noise Control 11.3.3 Noise Control in the Receiving Space 11.3.4 Postdesign Noise Mitigation 11.4 Conclusions and Recommendations Recommended Reading References 12 Materials Safety 12.1 Toxic Off-Gassing 12.1.1 Materials Off-Gassing Controls 12.1.2 Materials Testing 12.1.3 Spacecraft Module Testing 12.2 Stress-Corrosion Cracking 12.2.1 What Is Stress-Corrosion Cracking? 12.2.2 Prevention of Stress-Corrosion Cracking 12.2.3 Testing Materials for Stress-Corrosion Cracking 12.2.4 Design for Stress-Corrosion Cracking 12.4.5 Requirements for Spacecraft Hardware 12.4.6 Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Propulsion Systems 12.3 Conclusions References 13 Oxygen-Systems Safety 13.1 Oxygen Pressure System Design 13.1.1 Introduction 13.1.2 Design Approach 13.1.3 Oxygen-Compatibility Assessment Process 13.2 Oxygen Generators 13.2.1 Electrochemical Systems for Oxygen Production 13.2.2 Solid Fuel Oxygen Generators (Oxygen Candles) References 14 Avionics Safety 14.1 Introduction to Avionics Safety 14.2 Electrical Grounding and Electrical Bonding 14.2.1 Defining Characteristics of an Electrical-Ground Connection 14.2.2 Control of Electric Current 14.2.3 Electrical Grounds Can Be Signal-Return Paths 14.2.4 Where and How Electrical Grounds Should Be Connected 14.2.5 Defining Characteristics of an Electrical Bond 14.2.6 Types of Electrical Bonds 14.2.7 Electrical-Bond Considerations for Dissimilar Metals 14.2.8 Electrical-Ground and -Bond Connections for Shields Recommended Reading 14.3 Safety-Critical Computer Control 14.3.1 Partial Computer Control 14.3.2 Total Computer Control: Fail Safe 14.4 Circuit Protection: Fusing 14.4.1 Circuit-Protection Methods 14.4.2 Circuit Protectors 14.4.3 Design Guidance 14.5 Electrostatic-Discharge Control 14.5.1 Fundamentals 14.5.2 Various Levels of Electrostatic Discharge Concern 14.6 Arc Tracking 14.6.1 A New Failure Mode 14.6.2 Characteristics of Arc Tracking 14.6.3 Likelihood of an Arc-Tracking Event 14.6.4 Prevention of Arc Tracking 14.6.5 Verification of Protection and Management of Hazards 14.6.6 Summary 14.7 Corona Control in High-Voltage Systems 14.7.1 Associated Environments 14.7.2 Design Criteria 14.7.3 Verification and Testing 14.8 Extravehicular-Activity Considerations 14.8.1 Displays and Indicators Used in Space 14.8.2 Mating and Demating of Powered Connectors 14.8.3 Single-Strand Melting Points 14.8.4 Battery Removal and Installation 14.8.5 Computer or Operational Control of Inhibits 14.9 Spacecraft Electromagnetic-Interference and Electromagnetic- Compatibility Control 14.9.1 Electromagnetic-Compatibility Needs for Space Applications 14.9.2 Basic Electromagnetic-Compatibility Interactions and a Safety Margin 14.9.3 Mission-Driven Electromagnetic-Interference Design: The Case for Grounding 14.9.4 Electromagnetic-Compatibility Program for Spacecraft 14.10 Design and Testing of Safety-Critical Circuits 14.10.1 Safety-Critical Circuits: Conducted Mode 14.10.2 Safety-Critical Circuits: Radiated Mode 14.11 Electrical Hazards 14.11.1 Introduction 14.11.2 Electrical Shock 14.11.3 Physiological Considerations 14.11.4 Electrical Hazard Classification 14.11.5 Leakage Current 14.11.6 Bioinstrumentation 14.11.7 Electrical-Hazard Controls 14.11.8 Verification of Electrical-Hazard Controls 14.11.9 Electrical-Safety Design Considerations 14.12 Avionics Lessons Learned 14.12.1 Electronic Design 14.12.2 Physical Design 14.12.3 Materials and Sources 14.12.4 Damage Avoidance 14.12.5 System Aspects References 15 Software-System Safety 15.1 Introduction 15.2 The Software Safety Problem 15.2.1 System Accidents 15.2.2 The Power and Limitations of Abstraction from Physical Design 15.2.3 Reliability versus Safety for Software 15.2.4 Inadequate System Engineering 15.2.5 Characteristics of Embedded Software 15.3 Current Practice 15.3.1 System Safety 15.4 Best Practice 15.4.1 Management of Software-Intensive, Safety-Critical Projects 15.4.2 Basic System Safety-Engineering Practices and Their Implications for Software-Intensive Systems 15.4.3 Specifications 15.4.4 Requirements Analysis 15.4.5 Model-Based Software Engineering and Software Reuse 15.4.6 Software Architecture 15.4.7 Software Design 15.4.8 Design of Human-Computer Interaction 15.4.9 Software Reviews 15.4.10 Verification and Assurance 15.4.11 Operations 15.5 Summary References 16 Battery Safety 16.1 Introduction 16.2 General Design and Safety Guidelines 16.3 Battery Types 16.4 Battery Models 16.5 Hazard and Toxicity Categorization 16.6 Battery Chemistry 16.6.1 Alkaline Batteries 16.6.2 Lithium Batteries 16.6.3 Silver Zinc Batteries 16.6.4 Lead Acid Batteries 16.6.5 Nickel Cadmium Batteries 16.6.6 Nickel Metal Hydride Batteries 16.6.7 Nickel Hydrogen Batteries 16.6.8 Lithium-Ion Batteries 16.7 Storage, Transportation, and Handling References 17 Mechanical-Systems Safety 17.1 Safety Factors 17.1.1 Types of Safety Factors 17.1.2 Safety Factors Typical of Human-Rated Space Programs 17.1.3 Things That Influence the Choice of Safety Factors 17.2 Spacecraft Structures 17.2.1 Mechanical Requirements 17.2.2 Space-Mission Environment and Mechanical Loads 17.2.3 Project Overview: Successive Designs and Iterative Verification of Structural Requirements 17.2.4 Analytical Evaluations 17.2.5 Structural Test Verification 17.2.6 Spacecraft Structural-Model Philosophy 17.2.7 Materials and Processes 17.2.8 Manufacturing of Spacecraft Structures 17.3 Fracture Control 17.3.1 Basic Requirements 17.3.2 Implementation 17.3.3 Summary 17.4 Pressure Vessels, Lines, and Fittings 17.4.1 Pressure Vessels 17.4.2 Lines and Fittings 17.4.3 Space Pressure-Systems Standards 17.4.4 Summary 17.5 Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels 17.5.1 The Composite Overwrapped Pressure-Vessel System 17.5.2 Monolithic Metallic Pressure-Vessel Failure Modes 17.5.3 Composite Overwrapped Pressure-Vessel Failure Modes 17.5.4 Composite Overwrapped Pressure-Vessel Impact Sensitivity 17.5.5 Summary 17.6 Structural Design of Glass and Ceramic Components for Space-System Safety 17.6.1 Strength Characteristics of Glass and Ceramics 17.6.2 Defining Loads and Environments 17.6.3 Design Factors 17.6.4 Meeting Life Requirements with Glass and Ceramics 17.7 Safety Critical Mechanisms 17.7.1 Designing for Failure Tolerance 17.7.2 Design and Verification of Safety-Critical Mechanisms 17.7.3 Reduced Failure Tolerance 17.7.4 Review of Safety-Critical Mechanisms References 18 Containment of Hazardous Materials 18.1 Toxic Materials 18.1.1 Fundamentals of Toxicology 18.1.2 Toxicological Risks to Air Quality in Spacecraft 18.1.3 Risk-Management Strategies 18.2 Biohazardous Materials 18.2.1 Microbiological Risks Associated with Spaceflight 18.2.2 Risk-Mitigation Approaches 18.2.3 Major Spaceflight-Specific Microbiological Risks 18.3 Shatterable Materials 18.3.1 Shatterable Materials in a Habitable Compartment 18.3.2 Program Implementation 18.3.3 Containment Concepts for Internal Equipment 18.3.4 Containment Concepts for Exterior Equipment 18.3.5 General Comments about Working with Shatterable Materials 18.4 Containment Design Approach 18.4.1 Fault Tolerance 18.4.2 Design for Minimum Risk 18.5 Containment Design Methods 18.5.1 Containment Environments 18.5.2 Design of Containment Systems 18.6 Safety Controls 18.6.1 Proper Design 18.6.2 Materials Selection 18.6.3 Materials Compatibility 18.6.4 Proper Workmanship 18.6.5 Proper Loading or Filling 18.6.6 Fracture Control 18.7 Safety Verifications 18.7.1 Strength Analysis 18.7.2 Qualification Tests 18.7.3 Acceptance Tests 18.7.4 Proof-Tests 18.7.5 Qualification of Procedures 18.8 Conclusions References 19 Failure-Tolerance Design 19.1 Safe 19.1.1 Order of Precedence 19.2 Hazard 19.2.1 Hazard Controls 19.2.2 Design to Tolerate Failures 19.3 Hazardous Functions 19.3.1 Must-Not-Work Hazardous Function 19.3.2 Must-Work Hazardous Function 19.4 Design for Minimum Risk 19.5 Conclusions References 20 Propellant-Systems Safety 20.1 Solid-Propulsion Systems Safety 20.1.1 Solid Propellants 20.1.2 Solid-Propellant Systems for Space Applications 20.1.3 Safety Hazards 20.1.4 Handling, Transport, and Storage 20.1.5 Inadvertent Ignition 20.1.6 Safe Ignition-Systems Design 20.1.7 Conclusions 20.2 Liquid-Propellant Propulsion-Systems Safety 20.2.1 Planning 20.2.2 Containment Integrity 20.2.3 Thermal Control 20.2.4 Materials Compatibility 20.2.5 Contamination Control 20.2.6 Environmental Considerations 20.2.7 Engine and Thruster Firing Inhibits 20.2.8 Heightened Risk (Risk Creep) 20.2.9 Instrumentation and Telemetry Data 20.2.10 End-to-End Integrated Instrumentation, Controls and Redundancy Verification 20.2.11 Qualification 20.2.12 Total Quality Management (ISO 9001 or Equivalent) 20.2.13 Preservicing Integrity Verification 20.2.14 Propellants Servicing 20.2.15 Conclusions 20.3 Hypergolic Propellants 20.3.1 Materials Compatibility 20.3.2 Material Degradation 20.3.3 Hypergolic-Propellant Degradation 20.4 Propellant Fire 20.4.1 Hydrazine and Monomethylhydrazine Vapor 20.4.2 Liquid Hydrazine and Monomethylhydrazine 20.4.3 Hydrazine and Monomethylhydrazine Mists, Droplets, and Sprays References 21 Pyrotechnic Safety 21.1 Pyrotechnic Devices 21.1.1 Explosives 21.1.2 Initiators 21.2 Electroexplosive Devices 21.2.1 Safe Handling of Electroexplosive Devices 21.2.2 Designing for Safe Electroexplosive-Device Operation 21.2.3 Pyrotechnic Safety of Mechanically Initiated Explosive Devices References 22 Extravehicular-Activity Safety 22.1 Extravehicular-Activity Environment 22.1.1 Definitions 22.1.2 Extravehicular-Activity Space Suit 22.1.3 Sensory Degradation 22.1.4 Maneuvering and Weightlessness 22.1.5 Glove Restrictions 22.1.6 Crew Fatigue 22.1.7 Thermal Environment 22.1.8 Extravehicular-Activity Tools 22.2 Suit Hazards 22.2.1 Inadvertent Contact Hazards 22.2.2 Area of Effect Hazards 22.3 Crew Hazards 22.3.1 Contamination of the Habitable Environment 22.3.2 Thermal Extremes 22.3.3 Lasers 22.3.4 Electrical Shock and Molten Metal 22.3.5 Entrapment 22.3.6 Emergency Ingress 22.3.7 Collision 22.3.8 Inadvertent Loss of Crew 22.4 Conclusions References 23 Emergency, Caution, and Warning System 23.1 System Overview 23.2 Historic NASA Emergency, Caution, and Warning Systems 23.3 Emergency, Caution, and Warning System Measures 23.3.1 Event-Classification Measures 23.3.2 Sensor Measures 23.3.3 Data-System Measures 23.3.4 Annunciation Measures 23.4 Failure Isolation and Recovery References 24 Laser Safety 24.1 Background 24.1.1 Optical Spectrum 24.1.2 Biological Effects 24.2 Lasers Characteristics 24.2.1 Laser Principles 24.2.2 Laser Types 24.3 Laser Standards 24.3.1 NASA Johnson Space Center Requirements 24.3.2 ANSI Standard Z136-1 24.3.3 Russian Standard 24.4 Lasers Used in Space 24.4.1 Radars 24.4.2 Illumination 24.4.3 Sensors 24.5 Design Considerations for Laser Safety 24.5.1 Ground Testing 24.5.2 Unique Space Environment 24.6 Conclusions References 25 Crew Training Safety: An Integrated Process 25.1 Training the Crew for Safety 25.1.1 Typical Training Flow 25.1.2 Principles of Safety Training for the Different Training Phases 25.1.3 Specific Safety Training for Different Equipment Categories 25.1.4 Safety Training for Different Operations Categories 25.2 Safety during Training 25.2.1 Overview 25.2.2 Training-, Test-, or Baseline-Data Collection Model versus Flight Model: Type, Fidelity, Source, Origin, and Category 25.2.3 Training Environments and Facilities 25.2.4 Training Models, Test Models, and Safety Requirements 25.2.5 Training-Model, Test-Model, and Baseline-Data Collection Equipment-Utilization Requirements 25.2.6 Qualification and Certification of Training Personnel 25.2.7 Training- and Test-Model Documentation 25.3 Training Development and Validation Process 25.3.1 The Training Development Process 25.3.2 Training-Review Process 25.3.3 The Role of Safety in the Training Development and Validation Processes 25.3.4 Feedback to the Safety Community from the Training Development and Validation Processes 25.4 Conclusion References 26 Safety Considerations in the Ground Environment 26.1 A Word about Ground Support Equipment 26.2 Documentation and Reviews 26.3 Roles and Responsibilities 26.4 Contingency Planning 26.5 Failure Tolerance 26.6 Training 26.7 Hazardous Operations 26.8 Tools 26.9 Human Factors 26.10 Biological Systems and Materials 26.11 Electrical 26.12 Radiation 26.13 Pressure Systems 26.14 Ordinance 26.15 Mechanical and Eelectromechanical Devices 26.16 Propellants 26.17 Cryogenics 26.18 Oxygen 26.19 Ground Handling 26.20 Software Safety 26.21 Summary 27 Fire Safety 27.1 Characteristics of Fire in Space 27.1.1 Overview of Low-Gravity Fire 27.1.2 Fuel and Oxidizer Supply and Flame Behavior 27.1.3 Fire Appearance and Signatures 27.1.4 Flame Ignition and Spread 27.1.5 Summary of Low-Gravity Fire Characteristics 27.2 Design for Fire Prevention 27.2.1 Materials Flammability 27.2.2 Ignition Sources 27.3 Spacecraft Fire Detection 27.3.1 Prior Spacecraft Systems 27.3.2 Review of Low-Gravity Smoke 27.3.3 Spacecraft Atmospheric Dust 27.3.4 Sensors for Fire Detection 27.4 Spacecraft Fire Suppression 27.4.1 Spacecraft Fire-Suppression Methods 27.4.2 Considerations for Spacecraft Fire Suppression References 28 Safe-without-Services Design 29 Probabilistic Risk Assessment with Emphasis on Design 29.1 Basic Elements of Probabilistic Risk Assessment 29.1.1 Identification of Initiating Events 29.1.2 Application of Event-Sequence Diagrams and Event Trees 29.1.3 Modeling of Pivotal Events 29.1.4 Linkage and Quantification of Accident Scenarios 29.2 Construction of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Design Evaluations 29.2.1 Uses of Probabilistic Risk Assessment
2.9.2 Reference Mission 29.3 Relative-Risk Evaluations 29.3.1 Absolute- versus Relative-Risk Assessments 29.3.2 Roles of Relative-Risk Assessments in Design Evaluations 29.3.3 Quantitative Evaluations 29.4 Evaluations of the Relative Risks of Alternative Designs 29.4.1 Overview of the Probabilistic Risk-Assessment Models Developed 29.4.2 Relative-Risk Comparisons of the Alternative Designs References Index


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About the Author

Gary Musgrave Ph.D

Axel Larsen

Tommaso Sgobba

Until October 2012 Tommaso Sgobba has been responsible for flight safety at the European Space Agency (ESA), including human-rated systems, spacecraft re-entries, space debris, use of nuclear power sources, and planetary protection. He joined the European Space Agency in 1989, after 13 years in the aeronautical industry. Initially he supported the developments of the Ariane 5 launcher, several earth observation and meteorological satellites, and the early phase of the Hermes spaceplane. Later he became product assurance and safety manager for all European manned missions on Shuttle, MIR station, and for the European research facilities for the International Space Station. He chaired for 10 years the ESA ISS Payload Safety Review Panel, He was also instrumental in setting up the ESA Re-entry Safety Review Panel.

Tommaso Sgobba holds an M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from the Polytechnic of Turin (Italy), where he was also professor of space system safety (1999-2001). He has published several articles and papers on space safety, and co-edited the text book “Safety Design for Space Systems”, published in 2009 by Elsevier, that was also published later in Chinese. He co-edited the book entitled “The Need for an Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space”, published by Springer in 2011. He is member of the editorial board of the Space Safety Magazine.

Tommaso Sgobba received the NASA recognition for outstanding contribution to the International Space Station in 2004, and the prestigious NASA Space Flight Awareness (SFA) Award in 2007.

Affiliations and Expertise

President, International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) and former Head of the Independent Safety Office, European Space Agency (ESA), Noordwijk, The Netherlands