Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition

Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition

1st Edition - November 28, 1982

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  • Editor: Andreu Mas-Colell
  • eBook ISBN: 9781483271606

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Description

Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics: A Series of Monographs and Textbooks: Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition focuses on the application of noncooperative approaches to the theory of perfect competition, including Cournot game, no-surplus condition, and Nash equilibria. The selection first elaborates on collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives and noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets. Discussions focus on noncooperative equilibria which support the monopoly allocation, alternative definition of perfect epsilon-equilibrium, one-period Cournot game, fixed-demand case, and replication case. The book takes a look at noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets, no-surplus condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium, perfect competition, profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity. Topics include profits to individually improving welfare, structure of firms, competitive allocations as no surplus allocations, profits as rents, Walrasian and perfectly competitive equilibrium, and no-surplus and core equivalence as alternative characterizations of perfectly competitive equilibrium. The manuscript ponders on Nash equilibria of market games and efficiency properties of strategic market games, as well as commodities, agents, assignments, strategic markets games, proper and full Cournot-Nash equilibria, and finiteness and inefficiency. The selection is a valuable source of data for researchers interested in noncooperative approaches to the theory of perfect competition.

Table of Contents


  • Contributors

    Preface

    Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition: Presentation

    Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives

    Noncooperative Price Taking in Large Dynamic Markets

    The No-Surplus Condition as a Characterization of Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium

    A Characterization of Perfectly Competitive Economies with Production

    Perfect Competition, the Profit Criterion, and the Organization of Economic Activity

    Small Efficient Scale as a Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium

    The Limit Points of Monopolistic Competition

    Perfect Competition and Optimal Product Differentiation

    Equilibrium in Simple Spatial (or Differentiated Product) Models

    Entry (and Exit) in a Differentiated Industry

    Efficiency Properties of Strategic Market Games: An Axiomatic Approach

    Nash Equilibria of Market Games: Finiteness and Inefficiency

    Index

Product details

  • No. of pages: 280
  • Language: English
  • Copyright: © Academic Press 1982
  • Published: November 28, 1982
  • Imprint: Academic Press
  • eBook ISBN: 9781483271606

About the Editor

Andreu Mas-Colell

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