Description

A selection of republished corporate finance articles and book chapters that can serve as an advanced corporate finance supplementary text for courses that use no textbooks. Combining convenience and an affordable price with retypeset pages and a high-quality index, these two 600-page paperback volumes will introduce students to modern scientific evidence about corporate takeovers. The quality of Elsevier’s holdings in these subjects is high enough and broad enough to cover important subjects in detail.  With indexes and new introductions, these volumes will simplify and facilitate students’ interaction with new concepts and applications.

Key Features

  • Provides a status report about modern scientific evidence on corporate takeovers
  • Exposes students to new methods and empirical evidence while reading high quality primary material
  • Offers a concise and cost-efficient package of journal and book articles for advanced corporate finance students

Readership

Graduate and post graduate students in Finance and Economics looking for an introduction to the empirical literature on corporate takeovers; Professors looking for a comprehensive way to teach students about contemporary trends by introducing them to key journal articles and book chapters

Table of Contents

Introduction to Corporate Takeovers: Modern Empirical Evidence

Corporate Takeovers

Econometrics of Event Studies

Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance

Investigating the Economic Role of Mergers

Valuation Waves and Merger Activity: The Empirical Evidence

What Drives Merger Waves

Firm Size and the Gains from Acquisitions

Why do Private Acquirers Pay so Little Compared to Public

The Underpricing of Private Targets

Gains in Bank Mergers: Evidence from the Bond Markets

Do Tender Offers Create Value? New Methods and Evidence

Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth

Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers: Evidence from Customers, Supplier, and Rival Firms

Industry Structure and Horizontal Takeovers: Analysis of Wealth Effects on Rivals, Suppliers, and Corporate Customers

Abnormal Returns to Rivals of Acquisition Targets: A Test of the Acquisition Probability Hypothesis

Where do Merger Gains Come From? Bank Mergers from the Perspective of Insiders and Outsiders

Corporate Restructuring: Breakups and LBOs

Introduction to Corporate Takeovers: Modern Developments

Mergers and Acquisitions: Strategic and Informational Issues

Auctions in Corporate Finance

Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review

Merger Negotiations and the Toehold Puzzle

Negotiations under the threat of an Auction

Do Auctions Induce a Winner’s Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market

Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction

Acquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11

Effects of Bankruptcy Court Protection on Asset Sales

Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions and Fire-Sales

Creditor Financing and Overbidding in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests

Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisit

Details

No. of pages:
1200
Language:
English
Copyright:
© 2010
Published:
Imprint:
Academic Press
Print ISBN:
9780123820167
Electronic ISBN:
9780123820174

About the author

B. Espen Eckbo

Professor B. Espen Eckbo holds the Tuck Centennial Chair in Finance. He is also Faculty Director of Tuck's Lindenauer Center for Corporate Governance, which he founded in 1999. He teaches advanced MBA courses in the areas of corporate finance, corporate takeovers and international corporate governance. Professor Eckbo, who received a PhD in financial economics from the University of Rochester in 1981, has published extensively in the top finance journals in the areas of corporate finance, investment banking, and the market for corporate control. He is a recipient of an honorary doctoral degree from the Norwegian School of Economics, the prestigious Batterymarch Fellowship, as well as several outstanding-paper awards. He is a research Associate of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), and a frequent keynote and invited seminar speaker. He was called in 2009 by the U.S. Congress to testify on issues concerning the government’s large equity ownership positions in companies rescued under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).