Local Provision of Public Services

The Tiebout Model After Twenty-Five Years

1st Edition - June 28, 1983
Editor: George R. Zodrow
Language: English
eBook ISBN:
9 7 8 - 1 - 4 8 3 2 - 6 0 5 8 - 7

Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model after Twenty-Five Years describes several theoretical and empirical branches of economic research related to Charles Tiebout's… Read more

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Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model after Twenty-Five Years describes several theoretical and empirical branches of economic research related to Charles Tiebout's provocative hypothesis that consumer mobility and interjurisdictional competition result in an efficient allocation of resources to the local public sector. The book provides insights on the issues being considered in policy debates regarding the appropriate means of providing essential public services. Chapters in the book include an overview of the Tiebout model; income redistribution in a federal system; empirical relationships in the political economy of local public finance; and two conflicting views of the incidence of the property tax. Economists, local government leaders, and experts in public finance will find the book very insightful.

Contents

Contributors

Preface

1. The Tiebout Model after TWenty-Five Years: An Overview

I. Introduction

II. An Overview

III. Conclusion

References

2. The Theory of Local Public Goods TWenty-Five Years after Tiebout: A Perspective

I. Introduction

II. The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics with Local Public Goods

III. Sufficient Conditions for the Efficiency of Local Public Goods Equilibrium

IV. Inefficient Local Public Goods Equilibrium

V. Land Capitalization

VI. Rental Capitalization

VII. Redistribution

VIII. The Decentralization of Pareto Efficient Allocations

IX. Conclusion

References

3. Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political Economy of Local Government

I. Introduction

II. The Limits of Tiebout Models: How Far Can One Push the Competitive Analogy?

III. Exit and Voting in Local Government Models

IV. Toward a Political Economy of Local Government

References

4. A Review: Is the Property Tax a Benefit Tax?

I. Introduction

II. The Tiebout Orthodoxy

III. Challenges to the Orthodoxy

References

5. The Incidence of the Property Tax: The Benefit View versus the New View

I. Introduction

II. Zoning, Capitalization and the Allocative Effects of the Property Tax

III. Interjurisdictional Competition and the New View of the Property Tax

IV. General Evaluation and Conclusions

References

6. Income Redistribution in a Federal System

I. Introduction

II. The Model

III. Optimal Federal Redistribution

IV. Deductibility of Local Taxes

V. Regional Cost of Living or Amenity Differentials

VI. Tax Avoidance or Elastic Labor Supply

VII. Conclusion

References

7. Are Property Taxes Capitalized into House Values?

I. Introduction

II. Studies Based on Aggregate Data

III. Studies Based on Cross-Sectional Micro-Data

IV. Studies Based on Micro-Data Representing Tax Changes

V. Conclusions and Suggested Further Research

References

8. Voting and Spending: Some Empirical Relationships in the Political Economy of Local Public Finance

I. Introduction

II. Perception and Intergovernmental Aid

III. Budget Cuts and Learning

IV. The Size of Majorities

V. Voter Turnout in Budget Elections

VI. SMSA vs. Other Districts

VII. Conclusion

References