Bidding Strategies, Financing and Control
1st Edition
Modern Empirical Developments
Description
A selection of republished corporate finance articles and book chapters that can serve as an advanced corporate finance supplementary text for courses that use no textbooks. Combining convenience and an affordable price with retypeset pages and a high-quality index, the 600 pages of volume two, "Bidding Strategies, Financing, and Corporate Control", focus on a range of special topics, ranging from theories and evidence on strategic bidding behavior (offer premiums, toeholds, bidder competition, winner’s curse adjustments, and managerial overconfidence), issues arising when bidding for targets in bankruptcy auctions, effects of deal protection devices (termination agreements, poison pills), role of large shareholder voting in promoting takeover gains, deal financing issues (such as raising the cash used to pay for the target), managerial incentive effects of takeovers, governance spillovers from cross-border mergers, and returns to merger arbitrage. Including an index and new introduction, this volume will simplify and facilitate students’ interaction with new concepts and applications.
Key Features
- Provides a status report about modern scientific evidence on corporate takeovers
- Exposes students to new methods and empirical evidence while reading high quality primary material
- Offers a concise and cost-efficient package of journal and book articles for advanced corporate finance students
Readership
Graduate and post graduate students in Finance and Economics looking for an introduction to the empirical literature on corporate takeovers; Professors looking for a comprehensive way to teach students about contemporary trends by introducing them to key journal articles and book chapters
Table of Contents
Introduction to Corporate Takeovers: Modern Empirical Evidence
Mergers and Acquisitions: Strategic and Informational Issues
Auctions in Corporate Finance
Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review
Merger Negotiations and the Toehold Puzzle
Negotiations under the threat of an Auction
Do Auctions Induce a Winner’s Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market
Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction
Acquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11
Effects of Bankruptcy Court Protection on Asset Sales
Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions and Fire-Sales
Creditor Financing and Overbidding in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests
Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions
Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Anti-Takeover Measures
Board Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control
Let’s Make a Deal! How Shareholder Control Impacts Merger Payoffs
Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in Mergers
Investor Activism and Takeovers
Valuation Effects of Bank Financing in Acquisitions
Financing Decisions and Bidder Gains
Do Firms have Leverage Targets? Evidence from Acquisitions
CEO Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses
Takeover Bids and Target Directors’ Incentives: Retention, Experience, and Settling Up
Managerial Discipline and Corporate Restructuring following Performance Declines
Cross-Country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions
Spillover of Corporate Governance Standards as a Takeover Synergy in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
Adopting Better Corporate Governance: Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers
Determinants and Implications of Arbitrage Holdings in Acquisitions
Limited Arbitrage in Mergers and Acquisitions
Details
- No. of pages:
- 1088
- Language:
- English
- Copyright:
- © Academic Press 2010
- Published:
- 12th March 2010
- Imprint:
- Academic Press
- eBook ISBN:
- 9780123846907
- Paperback ISBN:
- 9780123819826
About the Author
B. Espen Eckbo
Professor B. Espen Eckbo holds the Tuck Centennial Chair in Finance. He is also Faculty Director of Tuck's Lindenauer Center for Corporate Governance, which he founded in 1999. He teaches advanced MBA courses in the areas of corporate finance, corporate takeovers and international corporate governance. Professor Eckbo, who received a PhD in financial economics from the University of Rochester in 1981, has published extensively in the top finance journals in the areas of corporate finance, investment banking, and the market for corporate control. He is a recipient of an honorary doctoral degree from the Norwegian School of Economics, the prestigious Batterymarch Fellowship, as well as several outstanding-paper awards. He is a research Associate of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), and a frequent keynote and invited seminar speaker. He was called in 2009 by the U.S. Congress to testify on issues concerning the government’s large equity ownership positions in companies rescued under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
Affiliations and Expertise
Center for Corporate Governance, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA