Key Features

  • Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions
  • New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications 
  • New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points


Graduate students and professors working in finance, economics, and industrial organization, and professionals learning about or developing auctions, either in a university setting or in industry.

Table of Contents


I Single Object Auctions

 Private Value Auctions, The Revenue Equivalence Principle, Qualifications and Extensions, Mechanism Design, Auctions with Interdependent Values, The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle, Asymmetries and Other Complications, Efficiency and the English Auction, Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, Bidding Rings

II Multiple Object Auctions

An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions, Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values, Some Revenue Considerations, Sequential Sales, Nonidentical Objects, Packages and Positions, Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values

III Appendices

Continuous Distributions, Stochastic Orders, Order Statistics, Affiliated Random Variables, Some Linear Algebra


No. of pages:
© 2010
Academic Press
eBook ISBN:
Print ISBN:
Print ISBN:

About the author

Vijay Krishna

Affiliations and Expertise

Pennsylvania State University, University Park, U.S.A.


"Krishna’s superb Auction Theory is an ideal text and reference because his clear and precise exposition distills the vast literature and provides excellent motivation, examples, exercises, and connections to commercial applications."-- Robert B. Wilson, Stanford University

"On its publication in 2002, Vijay Krishna's book immediately became a central reference in auction theory. But the subject has continued to develop, and so we're very fortunate that Krishna has now updated the text." -- Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study, Nobel Laureate in Economics