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Chemical Process Safety
Learning from Case Histories
4th Edition - July 22, 2015
Author: Roy E. Sanders
Paperback ISBN:9780128044285
9 7 8 - 0 - 1 2 - 8 0 4 4 2 8 - 5
Hardback ISBN:9780128014257
9 7 8 - 0 - 1 2 - 8 0 1 4 2 5 - 7
eBook ISBN:9780128016671
9 7 8 - 0 - 1 2 - 8 0 1 6 6 7 - 1
Chemical Process Safety: Learning from Case Histories, Fourth Edition gives insight into eliminating specific classes of hazards while also providing real case histories with… Read more
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Chemical Process Safety: Learning from Case Histories, Fourth Edition
gives insight into eliminating specific classes of hazards while also providing real case histories with valuable lessons to be learned. This edition also includes practical sections on mechanical integrity, management of change, and incident investigation programs, along with a list of helpful resources.
The information contained in this book will help users stay up-to-date on all the latest OSHA requirements, including the OSHA-required Management of Change, Mechanical Integrity, and Incident Investigation regulations. Learn how to eliminate hazards in the design, operation, and maintenance of chemical process plants and petroleum refineries.
World-renowned expert in process safety, Roy Sanders, shows how to reduce risks in plants and refineries, including a summary of case histories from high profile disasters and recommendations for how to avoid repeating the same mistakes. Following the principles outlined in this text will help save lives and reduce loss.
Features additional new chapters covering safety culture, maintaining a sense of vulnerability, and additional learning opportunities from recent incidents and near misses
Contains updated information from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and the National Safety Council, with concise summaries of some of the most important case histories of the twenty-first century
Includes significantly expanded information from the US Chemical Safety Board, US OSHA, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, and the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
Provides a completely updated chapter to guide readers to a wealth of reference material available on the web and elsewhere
Employees of the chemical manufacturing industries, petroleum refineries, specialty chemical industries, engineering companies and consultants who serve the chemical and petroleum industries, and academics interested in including process safety into their curriculums.
Preface
Acknowledgments
1: Perspective, perspective, perspective
Abstract
Introduction
The media rarely focuses on the benefits of the chemical industry
A glance at the history of chemical manufacturing before the industrial revolution
The modern industrial chemical industry modifies our way of living
Risks are not necessarily how they are perceived
Natural pesticides
Plant employee safety versus life-style choices
The chemical industry’s excellent safety record
Who has the most dangerous jobs?
What events resulted in fatal occupational injuries in 2012?
Just how dangerous is it to work in a US chemical plant?
How are the chemical and refinery industries doing today when it comes to major losses? And what should we do in the future?
Process safety culture
2: Good intentions
Abstract
Modifications made with good intentions
A tank truck catastrophically fails
Siphoning destroys a tender tank
Tank roof splits from overfilling
A well-intended change yields a storage tank collapse
A water drain line is altered and a reactor explodes
An air system is improved and a vessel blows up
A new air system improved economics, but jeopardized safety
Another incident with nitrogen backup for a compressed air supply
The hazards of nitrogen asphyxiation
Concerns for safety on a refrigerated ethylene tank
Beware of impurities, stabilizers, or substitute chemicals
Good intentions on certain new protection systems lead to troubles
A gas compressor is protected from dirt, but the plant catches fire
A replacement check valve installed – one detail overlooked
What was one of the immediate causes of the fire?
What did investigators recommend?
Another good intentions project: new tanks are destroyed and the neighborhood is disrupted
Another tragic incident involving hydrogen sulfide takes the lives of two workers
Closing thoughts on sewers
Carbon absorption incidents show history repeats
The lighter side
A review of good intentions
3: Focusing on water and steam: the ever-present and sometimes evil twins
Abstract
Hydro-test goes awry
A flooded column collapses as water is being drained from the system
Water reacting with strong chemicals
Easy-to-use steam heat can push equipment beyond safe design limits
Heating water in a confined system
Steam condenses and a mega-vessel is destroyed during commissioning
A tragedy develops when hot oil is pumped upon a layer of water
Discussion and recommendations
4: Major US incidents in the twenty-first century: Some folks thirst for recent case histories
Abstract
Unfortunately – there is often a certain sameness in process incidents
Delaware City, Delaware, incident
Rouseville, Pennsylvania, incident
Buffalo, New York, incident
Learning opportunities from major incidents in the twenty-first century
President Obama signs an Executive Order relating to process safety management
An explosion in a plastics manufacturing facility in Illinois results in five deaths, plant closure and eventual tear down of the facility
A glimpse of the PVC plastic facility, the loss of life and property
PVC reactor layout and most likely incident scenario
Not learning from incidents
Key findings on the Illiopolis PVC plant incident
The CSB recommendations submitted to Formosa Plastics USA [8]
The March 2005 Texas City, Texas, refinery incident – the most tragic US refinery accident of the decade
Besides poor safety culture – what happened prior to the release?
What happened immediately after the release?
Besides poor safety culture – what are some key technical findings of the Chemical Safety Board?
Besides poor safety culture – what are some key organizational findings of the Chemical Safety Board?
BP shares their investigation findings on key issues
BP Texas City violations and settlement agreements
An independent blue ribbon panel investigates BP’s North American operations
A foreword on the findings published by the Baker Panel – broadens the impact
The summary of the Baker Panel findings
Corporate safety culture
Refinery tragedy in Anacortes, Washington
Introduction to the Anacortes refinery incident
Details on the Tesoro refinery incident
Why the catastrophic rupture? The technical focus
Other Chemical Safety Board findings
The CSB video “Tesoro Tragedy – Behind the Curve”
CSB sweeping game changing recommendations for the US environmental agency
CSB recommendations for the State of Washington
CSB recommendations for the American Petroleum Institute
The Washington Department of Labor and Industries issues citations
Ammonium nitrate catastrophe in West, Texas April 17, 2013 – fifteen perish
Major incidents in the twenty-first century
5: Two highly destructive twenty-first century vapor cloud explosions: one in the United Kingdom and the other in Venezuela: Two massive explosion incidents with some significant similarities
Abstract
Buncefield UK fuel storage and transfer depot explosion and fires 2005
Introduction to the Buncefield incident and impact in the area
A look at some details prior to the explosion and massive fire
The economic costs of the Buncefield incident
Fuel concerns after the explosion and fires
Instrumentation and control systems
Buncefield report recommendations
Recommendations for design and operation of fuel storage sites
Summary comments on the Buncefield incident
A catastrophic explosion at Amuay refinery in Venezuela
Immediate events leading up to the explosion
A closer look a details at the Amuay refinery incident
Petroleos de Venezuela (or PDVSA) leak source study
RMG presented their view promptly after the incident
“The Economist” speaks to some underlying issues
The Manufacturing Center in Energy orientation (COENER) report
One strongly critical media report speaks about the Amuay refinery operations
The Amuay refinery based upon an insurance report
Blunt recommendations by the Manufacturing Center in Energy
Conclusions and recommendations for the Amuay disaster
Vapor cloud explosions – closing comments
When it comes to vapor clouds what can you do?
6: Preparation for maintenance
Abstract
Some problems when preparing for maintenance
A tank vent is routed to a water-filled drum to “Avoid” problems
Preparing to paint large tanks
Preparing a brine sludge dissolving system for maintenance
What happened in the brine system?
A violent eruption from a tank being prepared for maintenance
An explosion while preparing to replace a valve in an ice cream plant
A chemical cleaning operation kills sparrows, but improves procedures
Other cleaning, washing, steaming, and purging operations
A tragedy when preparing for valve maintenance
A review of changes made to prepare for maintenance
7: Maintenance-induced accidents and process piping problems
Abstract
Planning and communication
Repaired reboiler passes the hydro-test and later creates a fire
A tank explodes during welding repairs after passing a flammable gas test
A phenol tank’s roof lifts as repairs are made
Catastrophic failures of storage tanks as reported by the Environmental Protection Agency
Hot work on tank catwalk results in a contractor’s death, injuries, and a costly off-site environmental insult
Sulfuric acid tank background basics
Unsafe condition report and hot work permit shortcomings
The management of change shortcomings in sulfuric acid tank incident
Root causes as defined by the CSB
Similar tragic incidents involving hot work to tanks provided within the CSB full report Delaware City
The Chemical Safety Board offers safety advice on Hot Work within a 14 min video
Another tank explosion during maintenance hot work
Repair activity to a piping spool results in a massive leak from a sphere
The Phillips 66 incident: tragedy in Pasadena, Texas
A massive fire, BLEVEs, and $5 million damages after a mechanic improperly removes a valve actuator
Misdirected precautions on a reactor system isolation plug valve result in a vapor cloud explosion
A hidden blind surprises the operators
Poor judgment by mechanics allowed a bad steam leak to result in a minor explosion
The Flixborough disaster and the lessons we should never forget
Do piping systems contribute to major accidents?
Beware of other piping issues
Specific piping system problems reported as major incidents
Four case histories of catastrophic pipe failures
An 8-in. pipeline ruptures and an explosion occurs – December 24, 1989
Piping problems review
Concluding thoughts on maintenance – induced accidents and process piping problems
8: One-minute modifications: small, quick changes in a plant can create bad memories
Abstract
Explosion occurs after an analyzer is repaired
When cooling methods were changed, a tragedy occurred
Instrument air backup is disconnected
A furnace temperature safeguard is altered
It appeared to be icicles hanging in a small plant
Another costly gasket error
While compressed asbestos gaskets are phased out, other leaks will occur
Other piping gasket substitution problems
New stud bolts fail unexpectedly
A “Repaired” hose fails triggering a major fire
Hurricane procedures are improperly applied to a tank conservation vent lid
Painters create troubles
Pipefitters can create troubles when reinstalling relief valves
Another pipefitter’s error
Lack of respect for an open vent as a vacuum-relief device results in a partial tank collapse
Just a bucket of water destroys a tank
Lack of respect for an open vent as a pressure-relief device costs two lives
One-minute modifications review
9: Accidents involving compressors, hoses, and pumps
Abstract
Reciprocating compressors
A piece of compressor water jacket is launched
The misuse of hoses can quickly create problems
The Chemical Safety Board investigates a chlorine unloading hose failure
The Chemical Safety Board investigated a phosgene hose failure with a fatality
Fatality from a ruptured hose in HF service
Hose mishaps frequently lead to loss of containment – maybe more than we think
The water hose at the Flixborough disaster
Hoses used to warm equipment
Three-Mile Island Incident involved a hose
The Bhopal Tragedy was initiated by use of a hose
Improper purge hose set up for maintenance creates major problems
High-pressure hydrogen inadvertently backs into the nitrogen system and an explosion occurs
A nitric acid delivery to the wrong tank makes front-page news
How do you prevent such an incident?
Other truck delivery incidents
An operator averts a sulfuric acid unloading tragedy
Hoses cannot take excessive abuse
What is the advice from practitioners?
Centrifugal pumps
River water pump piping explodes
Severe pump explosions surprise employees
A large condensate pump explodes
Closing thoughts on pump explosions. Courtesy of the “Beacon”
Afterthoughts
10: Failure to use, consult, or understand specifications
Abstract
Lack of well-defined, rigid operating instructions cost $100,000 in property damages
Other thoughts on fired heaters
Low-pressure tank fabrication specifications were not followed
Explosion relief for low-pressure tanks
Tinkering with pressured vessel-closure bolts ends with a harmless bang
Piping specifications were not utilized
Pump repairs potentially endanger the plant, but are corrected in time to prevent newspaper headlines
Plastic pumps installed to pump flammable liquids
Weak walls wanted – but alternate attachments contributed to the damage
11: “Imagine If” modifications and practical problem solving
Abstract
“Imagine If” modifications – let us not exaggerate the dangers as we perform safety studies
New fire-fighting agent meets opposition – “Could Kill Men as Well as Fires”
A process safety management quiz
New fiber production methods questioned
Practical problem solving
The physics student and his mischievous methods
12: The role of mechanical integrity in chemical process safety
Abstract
Mechanical integrity in a chemical plant
A regulatory view of mechanical integrity
Mechanical integrity programs must be tailored to the specific site
Mechanical integrity in design and installation
Equipment covered by mechanical integrity
Regulatory enforcement of mechanical integrity
What is all this about RAGAGEP?
Struggling with mechanical integrity
Written procedures and training
Classification of equipment by hazard potential
Mechanical integrity programs for pumps/compressors
Mechanical integrity programs for piping, pressure vessels, storage tanks, and process piping
Inspecting pressure vessels, storage tanks, and piping
Inspection of pressure vessels and storage tanks
Mechanical programs for safety-critical instruments and safety relief valves
The critical role of safety relief valves
“In-house” testing safety relief valves
Mechanical integrity program for process safety interlocks and alarms
Protective process safety interlocks at a DuPont plant
Another company – a different emphasis on safety critical instrument systems
Another approach – prooftesting at a Louisiana plant
Additional information on mechanical integrity
13: Effectively managing change within the chemical industry
Abstract
Introduction
Preliminary thoughts on managing change
Are management of change systems like snowflakes?
A reality check provided by previous chapters
Keeping MOC systems simple
Losing tribal knowledge
Some historical approaches to plant changes
The US OSHA PSM Standard addresses “management of change”
Principles of an effective management of change system that prevents uncontrolled change and satisfies OSHA
An overall process description to create or improve a management of change system
Clear definitions are imperative
Key steps for an effective management of change system for a medium or large organization
Key steps for an effective management of change system for a small company
Multidisciplined committee can provide an in-depth look when identifying hazards
Operational variances for maintenance need a close examination too
Variances, exceptions, and special cases of change
Should the MOC system be paperless?
Over two dozen plants share their MOC practices
Management of change approvals, documentation, and auditing
Closing thoughts on management of change policy
The Center for Chemical Process Safety
Recommendations and regulations after 1988
14: Investigating and sharing near misses and unfortunate accidents
Abstract
Introduction
What does the regulation say about incident investigations?
Plant cultures can affect investigations
More guidelines on the culture of incident reporting
An OSHA program coordinator’s view
Layers of incident causes
A furnace tube failure case history is revisited
Process safety incident investigation techniques
Applying root cause analysis
Some chemical manufacturers’ approaches to incident investigation
What is a root cause?
STAMP – a new accident causality model
Some thoughts on process safety incident investigation techniques
Complying with the OSHA element on incident investigation
Report approval, report distribution, sharing the findings, corrective action tracking, and report retention
Conclusions
15: Keep a sense of vulnerability for safety sake: seven recommendations for keeping a sense of vulnerability at your chemical processing or refining site
Abstract
Opening thoughts on unease and who should it impact
How do you create a sense of unease or vulnerability?
A focused effort is essential
Success can blind us of reality
Seven recommendations to reduce your vulnerability
Why not step back in time?
16: A strong safety culture is essential: it is essential to develop a strong safety culture
Abstract
Process safety culture has been recognized and accepted in recent years
Foundation for development of safety culture
About 65 companies shared to shape the earlier definition of “Safety Culture” in 2003
What is process safety culture? Perhaps – it is the root cause of the decade!
A dozen features essential to developing a durable safety culture within PSM
API RP 754 describes the “Purpose of Indicators” as [17]
Is safety culture really important?
17: Sources of helpful information for practicing chemical process safety
Abstract
Key cost free process safety resources at your finger tips
Process safety resources via consultants, professional associations and trade associations via the web
Excellent books addressing chemical process safety – from a process engineer’s viewpoint
Two of the best process safety videos which focus on learning from case histories
Index
No. of pages: 506
Language: English
Published: July 22, 2015
Imprint: Butterworth-Heinemann
Paperback ISBN: 9780128044285
Hardback ISBN: 9780128014257
eBook ISBN: 9780128016671
RS
Roy E. Sanders
Sanders recently retired from PPG Industries in Lake Charles, LA. Roy worked for PPG for 42 years and specialized in Process Safety fundamentals since 1974. He is associated with the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M, McNeese State University, Lake Charles, and is a member of the editorial boards of both the AIChE’s Process Safety Progress and Putman’s Chemical Processing. He has taught brief process safety courses across the USA, as well as, Bahrain, Canada, India, the Netherlands Saudi Arabia and Taiwan.
Affiliations and expertise
Chemical Engineer and freelance Process Safety Consultant