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| HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, 3
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To order this title, and for more information, click here
Edited By
R.J. Aumann
S. Hart, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
Included in series
Handbooks in Economics,
Description
This is the third volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1
a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three
volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications
to political science and individual chapters on applications to disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law,
psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners.
The topics
covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative
games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value
and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism
design; and game experimentation.
Contents
Preface (R.J. Aumann, S. Hart). Strategic equilibrium (E. van Damme). Foundations of strategic equilibrium (J. Hillas, E. Kohlberg). Incomplete
information (R.J. Aumann, A. Heifetz). Non-zero-sum two-person games (T.E.S. Raghavan). Computing equilibria for two-person games (B.
von Stengel). Non-cooperative games with many players (M. Ali Khan, Y. Sun). Stochastic games (J-F. Mertens). Stochastic games: recent
results (N. Vieille). Game theory and industrial organization (K. Bagwell, A. Wolinsky). Bargaining with incomplete information (L.M.
Ausubel, P. Cramton, R.J. Deneckere). Inspection Games (R. Avenhaus, B.V. Stengel, S. Zamir). Economic history and game theory (A.
Greif). The shapley value (E. Winter). Variations on the shapley value (D. Monderer, D. Samet). Values of non-transferable utility
games (R. McLean). Values of games with infinitely many players (A. Neyman). Values of perfectly competitive economies (S. Hart).
Some other economic applications of the value (J-F. Mertens). Strategic aspects of political systems (J. Banks). Game-theoretic analysis
of legal rules and institutions (J-P. Benoit, L.A. Kornhauser). Implementation Theory (T. Palfrey). Game Theory and experimental Gaming
(M. Shubik).
| Bibliographic details |
Hardbound, 890 pages, publication date: AUG-2002
ISBN-13: 978-0-444-89428-1
ISBN-10: 0-444-89428-4
Imprint: NORTH-HOLLAND
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| Price and Ordering |
Price:
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USD 160
EUR 115.95
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Last update: 10 Sep 2009
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