

Cumulative Author – Title Index 1989 – 2000

A

- Abdou, J., Tight and Effectively Rectangular Game Forms: A Nash Solvable Class, **23**, 1, 1998.
- Abdou, Joseph, Maxmin and Minmax for Coalitional Game Forms, **3**, 267, 1991.
- Agastya, Murali, Multiplayer Bargaining Situations: A Decision Theoretic Approach, **12**, 1, 1996.
- Alcalde, José, and Romero-Medina, Antonio, Note: Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems, **31**, 294, 2000.
- Alkan, Ahmet, and Gale, David, The Core of the Matching Game, **2**, 203, 1990.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, Ania, Ana B., and Schenk-Hoppé, Klaus Reiner, An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly, **33**, 1, 2000.
- Amann, Erwin, and Leininger, Wolfgang, Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case, **14**, 1, 1996.
- Amir, Madjid, and Berninghaus, Siegfried K., Another Approach to Mutation and Learning in Games, **14**, 19, 1996.
- Amir, Rabah, Note: Endogenous Timing in Two-Player Games: A Counterexample, **9**, 234, 1995.
- Amir, Rabah, Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions, **15**, 111, 1996.
- Amir, Rabah, Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games, **15**, 132, 1996.
- Amir, Rabah, Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium, **26**, 1, 1999.
- Amir, Rabah, and Wooders, John, One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures, **31**, 1, 2000.
- Anderlini, Luca, Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games, **27**, 1, 1999.
- Anderlini, Luca, and Ianni, Antonella, Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors, **13**, 141, 1996.
- Andersson, Frederik, Carlsson, Hans, and Holm, Håkan J., Introduction: The 17th Arne Ryde Symposium, “Focal Points—Coordination, Complexity, and Communication in Strategic Contexts,” **32**, 219, 2000.
- Andreoni, James, and Miller, John H., Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents, **10**, 39, 1995.
- Angeles de Frutos, Maria, and Rosenthal, Robert W., On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions, **23**, 201, 1998.
- Ania, Ana B., *see* Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, **33**, 1, 2000.
- Aoki, Reiko, and Reitman, David, Simultaneous Signaling through Investment in an R & D Game with Private Information, **4**, 327, 1992.
- Arin, Javier, and Inarra, Elena, A Characterization of the Nucleolus for Convex Games, **23**, 12, 1998.
- Artale, Angelo, and Grüner, Hans Peter, A Model of Stability and Persistence in a Democracy, **33**, 20, 2000.
- Arya, Anil, Glover, Jonathan, and Young, Richard, Virtual Implementation in Separable Bayesian Environments Using Simple Mechanisms, **9**, 127, 1995.
- Asheim, Geir B., Extending Renegotiation-Proofness to Infinite Horizon Games, **3**, 278, 1991.
- Asheim, Geir B., A Unique Solution to n -Person Sequential Bargaining, **4**, 169, 1992.
- Aumann, Robert J., Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality, **8**, 6, 1995.
- Aumann, Robert J., Rationality and Bounded Rationality, **21**, 2, 1997.
- Aumann, Robert J., Note: On the Centipede Game, **23**, 97, 1998.



CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Aumann, Robert J., Hart, Sergiu, and Perry, Motty, *The Absent-Minded Driver*, **20**, 102, 1997.
- Aumann, Robert J., Hart, Sergiu, and Perry, Motty, *The Forgetful Passenger*, **20**, 117, 1997.
- Aumann, Robert J., and Sorin, Sylvain, *Cooperation and Bounded Recall*, **1**, 5, 1989.
- Austen-Smith, David, *Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule*, **5**, 3, 1993.
- Avery, Christopher, and Zemsky, Peter B., *Option Values and Bargaining Delays*, **7**, 139, 1994.
- Avery, Christopher, and Zemsky, Peter B., *Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining*, **7**, 154, 1994.
- B**
- Bac, Mehmet, and Raff, Horst, *Note: Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference*, **13**, 125, 1996.
- Bacharach, Michael, and Bernasconi, Michele, *The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study*, **19**, 1, 1997.
- Bacharach, Michael, and Stahl, Dale O., *Special Section Article: Variable-Frame Level- n Theory*, **32**, 220, 2000.
- Bag, Parimal Kanti, *Efficient Allocation of a "Pie": Divisible Case of King Solomon's Dilemma*, **12**, 21, 1996.
- Bagwell, Kyle, *Commitment and Observability in Games*, **8**, 271, 1995.
- Baliga, Sandeep, *Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games*, **27**, 173, 1999.
- Baliga, Sandeep, *Interactive Implementation*, **27**, 38, 1999.
- Baliga, Sandeep, and Evans, Robert, *Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments*, **33**, 159, 2000.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, and Weibull, Jörgen W., *Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games*, **32**, 1, 2000.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., and Calvert, Randall L., *A Battle-of-the-Sexes Game with Incomplete Information*, **4**, 347, 1992.
- Banks, Jeffrey, Camerer, Colin, and Porter, David, *An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games*, **6**, 1, 1994.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., and Myerson, Roger B., *Introduction*, **5**, 1, 1993.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., and Sundaram, Rangarajan K., *Repeated Games, Finite Automata, and Complexity*, **2**, 97, 1990.
- Barberà, S., and Dutta, B., *Protective Behavior in Matching Models*, **8**, 281, 1995.
- Barberà, Salvador, Jackson, Matthew O., and Neme, Alejandro, *Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules*, **18**, 1, 1997.
- Barberà, S., Massó, J., and Serizawa, S., *Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges*, **25**, 272, 1998.
- Basu, Kaushik, *Group Rationality, Utilitarianism, and Escher's Waterfall*, **7**, 1, 1994.
- Battalio, Raymond C., *see* Van Huyck, John B., **4**, 606, 1992; **5**, 485, 1993; **10**, 143, 1995.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo, *Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle*, **13**, 178, 1996.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo, *Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall*, **20**, 31, 1997.
- Baye, Michael R., Kovenock, Dan, de Vries, Casper G., *It Takes Two to Tango: Equilibria in a Model of Sales*, **4**, 493, 1992.
- Beil, Richard O., *see* Van Huyck, John B., **5**, 485, 1993.
- Belleflamme, Paul, *Stable Coalition Structures with Open Membership and Asymmetric Firms*, **30**, 1, 2000.
- Beja, Avraham, *Imperfect Equilibrium*, **4**, 18, 1992.
- Benaïm, Michel, *Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games*, **29**, 36, 1999.
- Bennett, Elaine, *Multilateral Bargaining Problems*, **19**, 151, 1997.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan, *The Complexity of Computing a Best Response Automaton in Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies*, **2**, 1, 1990.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan, Dekel, Eddie, and Rustichini, Aldo, *On the Relationship between Mutation Rates and Growth Rates in a Changing Environment*, **5**, 576, 1993.
- Bensaid, Bernard, and Gary-Bobo, Robert J., *An Exact Formula for the Lion's Share: A Model of Preplay Negotiation*, **14**, 44, 1996.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Berg, Joyce, Dickhaut, John, and McCabe, Kevin, Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, **10**, 122, 1995.
- Bergantiño, Gustavo, and García-Jurado, Ignacio, A Note on Equalization in Extensive Form Games, **3**, 157, 1991.
- Bernasconi, Michele, *see* Bacharach, Michael, **19**, 1, 1997.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Ray, Debraj, Collective Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games, **1**, 295, 1989.
- Berninghaus, Siegfried K., *see* Amir, Madjid, **14**, 19, 1996.
- Bester, Helmut, de Palma, André, Leininger, Wolfgang, Thomas, Jonathan, and von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, A Noncooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game, **12**, 165, 1996.
- Bhaskar, V., Special Section Article: Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games, **32**, 247, 2000.
- Biglaiser, Gary, Risk Sharing with Competition, **4**, 37, 1992.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil, Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects, **26**, 193, 1999.
- Binmore, Kenneth G., *see* Gale, John, **8**, 56, 1995.
- Binmore, Ken, Morgan, Peter, Shaked, Avner, and Sutton, John, Do People Exploit Their Bargaining Power? An Experimental Study, **3**, 295, 1991.
- Binmore, Kenneth G., Samuelson, Larry, and Vaughan, Richard, Musical Chairs: Modeling Noisy Evolution, **11**, 1, 1995; Erratum, **21**, 325, 1997.
- Biswas, A. K., Large Cores and Exactness, **28**, 1, 1999.
- Bloch, Francis, Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division, **14**, 90, 1996.
- Blonski, Matthias, Anonymous Games with Binary Actions, **28**, 171, 1999.
- Blume, Andreas, Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games, **6**, 181, 1994.
- Blume, Andreas, Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games, **13**, 2, 1996.
- Blume, Andreas, Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games, **22**, 171, 1998.
- Blume, Andreas, Kim, Yong-Gwan, and Sobel, Joel, Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication, **5**, 547, 1993.
- Blume, Lawrence E., The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction, **5**, 387, 1993.
- Blume, Lawrence E., The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision, **11**, 111, 1995.
- Boebel, Richard B., *see* Rapoport, Amnon, **4**, 261, 1992.
- Bolton, Gary E., and Katok, Elena, Reinterpreting Arbitration's Narcotic Effect: An Experimental Study of Learning in Repeated Bargaining, **25**, 1, 1998.
- Bolton, Gary E., and Zwick, Rami, Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining, **10**, 95, 1995.
- Bomze, Immanuel M., and Bürger, Reinhard, Stability by Mutation in Evolutionary Games, **11**, 146, 1995.
- Bomze, Immanuel M., and Weibull, Jörgen W., Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?, **11**, 173, 1995.
- Bondareva, O. N., and Driessen, T. S. H., Extensive Coverings and Exact Core Bounds, **6**, 212, 1994.
- Börgers, Tilman, and Janssen, Maarten C. W., On the Dominance Solvability of Large Cournot Games, **8**, 297, 1995.
- Borm, P. E. M., *see* Jansen, M. J. M., **6**, 400, 1994.
- Borm, P. E. M., and Tijs, S. H., Strategic Claim Games Corresponding to an NTU-Game, **4**, 58, 1992.
- Borm, Peter, *see* Hamers, Herbert, **15**, 165, 1996.
- Borm, Peter, *see* Otten, Gert-Jan, **9**, 172, 1995.
- Borm, Peter, *see* Suijs, Jeroen, **27**, 331, 1999.
- Borm, Peter, *see* Voorneveld, Mark, **28**, 146, 1999.
- Bose, Gautam, Bargaining Economies with Patient and Impatient Agents: Equilibria and Intermediation, **14**, 149, 1996.
- Bossert, Walter, Nosal, Ed, and Sadanand, Venkatraman, Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions, **14**, 173, 1996.
- Boylan, Richard T., Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation, **7**, 10, 1994.
- Boylan, Richard T., and El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments, **5**, 205, 1993.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Brams, Steven J., *Game Theory and Literature*, **6**, 32, 1994.
- Brandenburger, Adam, Dekel, Eddie, and Geanakoplos, John, *Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures*, **4**, 182, 1992.
- Brandts, Jordi, and MacLeod, W. Bentley, *Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with Recommended Play*, **11**, 36, 1995.
- Broseta, Bruno, *Adaptive Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games: An ARCH(1) Approach*, **32**, 25, 2000.
- Brown, Murray, Chiang, Shin-Hwan, and Yamamoto, Kenji, *Uniqueness of Equilibrium for Smooth Multistage Concave Games*, **3**, 393, 1991.
- Budescu, David V., Rapoport, Amnon, and Suleiman, Ramzi, *Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty: Qualitative Tests of Equilibrium Solutions*, **10**, 171, 1995.
- Bürger, Reinhard, *see* Bomze, Immanuel M., **11**, 146, 1995.
- Burguet, Roberto, and Sákovics, József, *Reserve Prices without Commitment*, **15**, 149, 1996.
- Burnell, Stephen J., *The Ultimatum Game: Optimal Strategies without Fairness*, **26**, 221, 1999.
- Busch, Lutz-Alexander, and Horstmann, Ignatius, *Note: A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations*, **19**, 144, 1997.
- C
- Cadot, Olivier, and Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, *Note: On the Computation of Randomized Markov Equilibria*, **17**, 129, 1996.
- Calvert, Randall L., *see* Banks, Jeffrey S., **4**, 347, 1992.
- Camerer, Colin, *see* Banks, Jeffrey, **6**, 1, 1994.
- Camerer, Colin F., *see* Knez, Marc J., **10**, 65, 1995.
- Cameron, Charles M., and Rosendorff, B. Peter, *A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight*, **5**, 44, 1993.
- Cannings, C., and Whittaker, J. C., *The Finite Horizon War of Attrition*, **11**, 193, 1995.
- Caputo, Michael R., *The Envelope Theorem and Comparative Statics of Nash Equilibria*, **13**, 201, 1996.
- Carlsson, Hans, *see* Andersson, Frederik, **32**, 219, 2000.
- Carreras, Francesc, *see* Vázquez-Brage, Margarita, **12**, 42, 1996.
- Carreras, Francesc, *On the Existence and Formation of Partnerships in a Game*, **12**, 54, 1996.
- Carreras, F., and Magaña, A., *The Multilinear Extension of the Quotient Game*, **18**, 22, 1997.
- Casajus, André, *Special Section Article: Focal Points in Framed Strategic Forms*, **32**, 263, 2000.
- Cech, Paula-Ann, *see* Cox, James C., **17**, 147, 1996.
- Chamberland, Marc, and Cressman, Ross, *Note: An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games*, **30**, 319, 2000.
- Chang, Chih, and Hsiaq, Fu-Chao, *An Example on Quasi-Zero-Monotonic Games*, **5**, 223, 1993.
- Chang, Chih, and Kan, Ching-Yu, *A Study on Decomposable Convex Games*, **7**, 35, 1994.
- Charness, Gary, *Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test of Aumann's Conjecture*, **33**, 177, 2000.
- Chatterjee, Kalyan, and Dutta, Bhaskar, *Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners*, **23**, 119, 1998.
- Chatterjee, Kalyan, and Lee, Ching Chyi, *Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options*, **22**, 203, 1998.
- Che, Yeon-Koo, *Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999)*, **33**, 195, 2000.
- Che, Yeon-Koo, and Gale, Ian, *Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions*, **30**, 22, 2000.
- Chen, Hsiao-Chi, Friedman, James W., and Thisse, Jacques-François, *Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach*, **18**, 32, 1997.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Chen, Kay-Yut, and Plott, Charles R., Non-linear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price Auctions, **25**, 34, 1998.
- Chen, Kong-Pin, Compensation Principle in Repeated Games, **16**, 1, 1996.
- Cheng, Leonard K., and Zhu, Min, Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Based upon Expected Utility and Quadratic Utility, **9**, 139, 1995.
- Cheung, Yin-Wong, and Friedman, Daniel, Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results, **19**, 46, 1997.
- Chiang, Shin-Hwan, *see* Brown, Murray, **3**, 393, 1991.
- Cho, In-Koo, Perceptrons Play Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring, **16**, 22, 1996.
- Choi, Jaewon, A Nonparametric, Efficient Public Good Decision Mechanism: Undominated Bayesian Implementation, **27**, 64, 1999.
- Chun, Youngsub, A New Axiomatization of the Shapley Value, **1**, 119, 1989.
- Chun, Youngsub, and Thomson, William, Nash Solution and Uncertain Disagreement Points, **2**, 213, 1990.
- Chung, Kim-Sau, On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings, **33**, 206, 2000.
- Codognato, Giulio, Note: Cournot-Nash Equilibria in Limit Exchange Economies with Complete Markets: A Comparison between Two Models, **31**, 136, 2000.
- Conley, John P., and Wilkie, Simon, An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems, **13**, 26, 1996.
- Conn, David, *see* Cox, James C., **17**, 147, 1996.
- Cooper, Russell, DeJong, Douglas V., Forsythe, Robert, and Ross, Thomas W., Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games, **12**, 187, 1996.
- Cordella, Tito, and Gabszewicz, Jean J., Note: "Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games, **22**, 162, 1998.
- Cox, James C., Isaac, R. Mark, Cech, Paula-Ann, and Conn, David, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Procurement Contracting, **17**, 147, 1996.
- Cramton, Peter C., and Palfrey, Thomas R., Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement, **10**, 255, 1995.
- Crawford, Vincent P., An "Evolutionary" Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination, **3**, 25, 1991.
- Crawford, Vincent P., Introduction. Adaptive Dynamics, Part I, **5**, 315, 1993.
- Crawford, Vincent P., Introduction. Adaptive Dynamics, Part II, **5**, 509, 1993.
- Cr mer, Jacques, The Value of Large Extensive Form Games, **7**, 309, 1994.
- Cr mer, Jacques, Manipulations by Coalitions Under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Groves Mechanisms, **13**, 39, 1996.
- Cr mer, Jacques, Khalil, Fahad, and Rochet, Jean-Charles, Contracts and Productive Information Gathering, **25**, 174, 1998.
- Cressman, R., Evolutionary Game Theory with Two Groups of Individuals, **11**, 237, 1995.
- Cressman, R., Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games, **32**, 183, 2000.
- Cressman, Ross, *see* Chamberland, Marc, **30**, 319, 2000.
- Cripps, Martin W., and Thomas, Jonathan P., Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games, **18**, 141, 1997.
- Cronshaw, Mark B., and Luenberger, David G., Strongly Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring and Discounting, **6**, 220, 1994.
- Currie, Janet, *see* Spiegel, Matthew, **7**, 104, 1994.
- Curtat, Laurent O., Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities, **17**, 177, 1996.

D

- Dagan, Nir, Serrano, Roberto, and Volij, Oscar, A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules, **18**, 55, 1997.
- d'Aspremont, Claude, Introduction, **25**, 147, 1998.
- d'Aspremont, Claude, and G rard-Varet, Louis-Andr , Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview, **25**, 311, 1998.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, Is a Unique Cournot Equilibrium Locally Stable?, **32**, 206, 2000.
- Davis, Douglas D., and Holt, Charles A., Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partner Games, **7**, 39, 1994.
- De Fraja, Gianni, After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment, **26**, 22, 1999.
- de Frutos, M. Angeles, Asymmetric Price-Benefit Auctions, **33**, 48, 2000.
- DeJong, Douglas V., *see* Cooper, Russell, **12**, 187, 1996.
- Dekel, Eddie, *see* Ben-Porath, Elchanan, **5**, 576, 1993.
- Dekel, Eddie, *see* Brandenburger, Adam, **4**, 182, 1992.
- Dekel, Eddie, and Farrell, Joseph, One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium, **2**, 299, 1990.
- DeMarzo, Peter M., Coalitions, Leadership, and Social Norms: The Power of Suggestion in Games, **4**, 72, 1992.
- de Palma, André, *see* Bester, Helmut, **12**, 165, 1996.
- de Vries, Casper G., *see* Baye, Michael R., **4**, 493, 1992.
- Dickhaut, John, *see* Berg, Joyce, **10**, 122, 1995.
- Dickhaut, John, *see* Gjerstad, Steven, **22**, 1, 1998.
- Drissen, T. S. H., *see* Bondareva, O. N., **6**, 212, 1994.
- Dror, Moshe, *see* Hartman, Bruce C., **31**, 26, 2000.
- Dufwenberg, Martin, and Gneezy, Uri, Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game, **30**, 163, 2000.
- Dutta, B., *see* Barberà, S., **8**, 281, 1995.
- Dutta, Bhaskar, *see* Chatterjee, Kalyan, **23**, 119, 1998.
- Dutta, Bhaskar, and Ray, Debraj, Constrained Egalitarian Allocations, **3**, 403, 1991.
- Eichberger, Jürgen, Bayesian Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games, **11**, 254, 1995.
- Eichberger, Jürgen, and Kelsey, David, Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria, **30**, 183, 2000.
- Einy, Ezra, On the Least Core and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set, **28**, 181, 1999.
- Einy, Ezra, and Shitovitz, Benyamin, Convex Games and Stable Sets, **16**, 192, 1996.
- El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., *see* Boylan, Richard T., **5**, 205, 1993.
- El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., and Palfrey, Thomas R., Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games, **8**, 322, 1995.
- Ellison, Glenn, Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia, **19**, 180, 1997.
- Engel, M. C., *see* van Gellekom, J. R. G., **32**, 139, 2000.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, Optimal Auctions Revisited, **5**, 227, 1993.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, Auctions with Price-Proportional Benefits to Bidders, **6**, 339, 1994.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, Auctions with Noncompetitive Sales, **16**, 54, 1996.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, and Kahn, Charles M., Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards, **23**, 25, 1998.
- Engl, Greg, Lower Hemicontinuity of the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence, **9**, 151, 1995.
- Erev, Ido, *see* Roth, Alvin E., **8**, 164, 1995.
- Erev, Ido, and Rapoport, Amnon, Coordination, "Magic," and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game, **23**, 146, 1998.
- Ermolov, Andrew N., Coalitional Manipulation in a Quasilinear Economy, **8**, 349, 1995.
- Evans, George W., and Guesnerie, Roger, Rationalizability, Strong Rationality, and Expectational Stability, **5**, 632, 1993.
- Evans, Lewis, *see* Burnell, Stephen J., **26**, 221, 1999.
- Evans, Robert A., Value, Consistency, and Random Coalition Formation, **12**, 68, 1996.
- Evans, Robert, Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers, **19**, 211, 1997.

E

- Eckel, Catherine C., and Grossman, Philip J., Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games, **16**, 181, 1996.

- Evans, Robert, and Maskin, Eric, Efficient Renegotiation—Proof Equilibria in Repeated Games, **1**, 361, 1989.
- Evans, Robert, *see* Baliga, Sandeep, **33**, 159, 2000.
- Ewerhart, Christian, Chess-like Games Are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps, **33**, 41, 2000.
- F**
- Farrell, Joseph, *see* Dekel, Eddie, **2**, 299, 1990.
- Farrell, Joseph, Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games, **5**, 514, 1993.
- Farrell, Joseph, and Maskin, Eric, Renegotiation in Repeated Games, **1**, 327, 1989.
- Faynzilberg, Peter S., and Kumar, Praveen, Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies, **21**, 15, 1997.
- Feinberg, Yossi, An Incomplete Cooperation Structure for a Voting Game Can Be Strategically Stable, **24**, 2, 1998.
- Felsenthal, Dan S., *see* Weg, Eythan, **2**, 76, 1990.
- Ferreira, José Luis, Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Noncooperative Games, **26**, 40, 1999.
- Ferreira, J.-L., Gilboa, I., and Maschler, M., Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play, **10**, 284, 1995.
- Fershtman, Chaim, A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures, **30**, 216, 2000.
- Fershtman, Chaim, The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining, **2**, 224, 1990.
- Fershtman, Chaim, Safra, Zvi, and Vincent, Daniel, Delayed Agreements and Unexpected Utility, **3**, 423, 1991.
- Fine, Charles H., and Li, Lode, Equilibrium Exit in Stochastically Declining Industries, **1**, 40, 1989.
- Fleurbay, Marc, and Maniquet, François, Cooperative Production: A Comparison of Welfare Bounds, **17**, 200, 1996.
- Forges, Françoise, Posterior Efficiency, **6**, 238, 1994.
- Forges, Françoise, and Minelli, Enrico, A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, **18**, 159, 1997.
- Forges, Françoise, and Minelli, Enrico, Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games, **25**, 292, 1998.
- Forsythe, Robert, *see* Cooper, Russell, **12**, 187, 1996.
- Forsythe, Robert, Horowitz, Joel L., Savin, N. E., and Sefton, Martin, Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments, **6**, 347, 1994.
- Foster, Dean P., A Proof of Calibration via Blackwell's Approachability Theorem, **29**, 73, 1999.
- Foster, Dean P., Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem, **29**, 7, 1999.
- Foster, Dean, *see* Vohra, Rakesh, **29**, 1, 1999.
- Foster, Dean, *see* Young, H. Peyton, **3**, 145, 1991.
- Foster, Dean P., and Vohra, Rakesh V., Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium, **21**, 40, 1997.
- Foster, Dean P., and Young, H. Peyton, On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games, **25**, 79, 1998.
- Frankel, David M., Creative Bargaining, **23**, 43, 1998.
- Freund, Yoav, Adaptive Game Playing Using Multiplicative Weights, **29**, 79, 1999.
- Friedman, Daniel, *see* Cheung, Yin-Wong, **19**, 46, 1997.
- Friedman, Eric J., Dynamics and Rationality in Ordered Externality Games, **16**, 65, 1996.
- Friedman, James W., *see* Chen, Hsiao-Chi, **18**, 32, 1997.
- Friedman, James W., and Mezzetti, Claudio, Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements, **23**, 176, 1998.
- Friedman, James W., and Samuelson, Larry, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with Continuous Reaction Functions, **2**, 304, 1990.
- Friedman, James W., and Samuelson, Larry, Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies, **6**, 55, 1994.
- Friedman, James W., and Samuelson, Larry, An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions, **6**, 83, 1994.
- Fudenberg, Drew, An Easier Way to Calibrate, **29**, 131, 1999.
- Fudenberg, Drew, Conditional Universal Consistency, **29**, 104, 1999.

- Fudenberg, Drew, and Kreps, David M., Learning Mixed Equilibria, **5**, 320, 1993.
 Fudenberg, Drew, and Kreps, David M., Learning in Extensive-Form Games. I. Self-Confirming Equilibria, **8**, 20, 1995.
 Furth, Dave, *see* Van Cayseele, Patrick, **16**, 153, 1996.

G

- Gabszewicz, Jean J., *see* Cordella, Tito, **22**, 162, 1998.
 Gale, David, *see* Alkan, Ahmet, **2**, 203, 1990.
 Gale, Ian L., and Hausch, Donald B., Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions, **7**, 318, 1994.
 Gale, Ian, *see* Che, Yeon-Koo, **30**, 22, 2000.
 Gale, John, Binmore, Kenneth G., and Samuelson, Larry, Learning To Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game, **8**, 56, 1995.
 García-Jurado, Ignacio, *see* Bergantiño, Gustavo, **3**, 157, 1991.
 García-Jurado, Ignacio, *see* Vázquez-Brage, Margarita, **12**, 42, 1996.
 Gardner, Roy, *see* Herr, Andrew, **19**, 77, 1997.
 Garratt, Rod, Note: On Bargaining for an Indivisible Good, **26**, 186, 1999.
 Garratt, Rod, and Qin, Cheng-Zhong, On Market Games When Agents Cannot Be in Two Places at Once, **31**, 165, 2000.
 Gary-Bobo, Robert J., *see* Bensaid, Bernard, **14**, 44, 1996.
 Gary-Bobo, Robert J., On the Existence of Equilibrium Points in a Class of Asymmetric Market Entry Games, **2**, 239, 1990.
 Gaunersdorfer, Andrea, and Hofbauer, Josef, Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation, **11**, 279, 1995.
 Geanakoplos, John, *see* Brandenburger, Adam, **4**, 182, 1992.
 Geanakoplos, John, Pearce, David, and Stacchetti, Ennio, Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality, **1**, 60, 1989.
 Gérard-Varet, Louis-André, *see* d'Aspremont, Claude, **25**, 311, 1998.
 Gevers, Louis, and Michel, Philippe, Economic Dynasties with Intermissions, **25**, 251, 1998.
 Gilboa, I., *see* Ferreira, J.-L., **10**, 284, 1995.

- Gilboa, Itzhak, A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox, **20**, 25, 1997.
 Gilboa, Itzhak, and Samet, Dov, Bounded versus Unbounded Rationality: The Tyranny of the Weak, **1**, 213, 1989.
 Gilboa, Itzhak, and Schmeidler, David, Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games, **6**, 370, 1994.
 Gilboa, Itzhak, and Schmeidler, David, Case-Based Optimization, **15**, 1, 1996.
 Gilboa, Itzhak, and Zemel, Eitan, Nash and Correlated Equilibria: Some Complexity Considerations, **1**, 80, 1989.
 Gilles, Robert P., *see* van den Brink, René, **12**, 113, 1996.
 Gillette, Ann B., *see* Van Huyck, John B., **4**, 606, 1992.
 Gilli, Mario, On Non-Nash Equilibria, **27**, 184, 1999.
 Gjerstad, Steven, and Dickhaut, John, Price Formation in Double Auctions, **22**, 1, 1998.
 Glazer, Jacob, and Ma, Ching-to Albert, Efficient Allocation of a "Prize"—King Solomon's Dilemma, **1**, 222, 1989.
 Glazer, Jacob, and Perry, Motty, Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction, **15**, 27, 1996.
 Glazer, Jacob, and Weiss, Andrew, Pricing and Coordination: Strategically Stable Equilibria, **2**, 118, 1990.
 Glover, Jonathan, *see* Arya, Anil, **9**, 127, 1995.
 Gneezy, Uri, *see* Dufwenberg, Martin, **30**, 163, 2000.
 Gomes, Armando, Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field, **27**, 204, 1999.
 Gossner, Olivier, Comparison of Information Structures, **30**, 44, 2000.
 Govindan, Srihari, and Wilson, Robert, Equivalence and Invariance of the Index and Degree of Nash Equilibria, **21**, 56, 1997.
 Granot, Daniel, and Rothblum, Uriel G., The Pareto Set of the Partition Bargaining Problem, **3**, 163, 1991.
 Green, Edward J., Classical Statistics as a Theory of Incentives, **2**, 13, 1990.
 Green, Gordon R., Competitively Sustainable Matching Plans with Discounting, **9**, 66, 1995.
 Green, Jerry, and Laffont, Jean-Jacques,

- Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signaling Equilibrium, **2**, 247, 1990.
 Grilo, Isabel, *see* Amir, Rabah, **26**, 1, 1999.
 Gromb, Denis, Ponssard, Jean-Pierre, and Sevy, David, Selection in Dynamic Entry Games, **21**, 62, 1997.
 Grossman, Philip J., *see* Eckel, Catherine C., **16**, 181, 1996.
 Grove, Adam J., and Halpern, Joseph Y., On the Expected Value of Games with Absentmindedness, **20**, 51, 1997.
 Grüner, Hans Peter, *see* Artale, Angelo, **33**, 20, 2000.
 Guesnerie, Roger, *see* Evans, George W., **5**, 632, 1993.
 Güth, Werner, Kirchsteiger, Georg, and Ritzberger, Klaus, Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n -Player Games, **23**, 54, 1998.

H

- Haile, Philip A., Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities, **33**, 231, 2000.
 Halpern, Joseph Y., *see* Grove, Adam J., **20**, 51, 1997.
 Halpern, Joseph Y., On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees, **20**, 66, 1997.
 Hamers, Herbert, Suijs, Jeroen, Tijs, Stef, and Borm, Peter, The Split Core for Sequencing Games, **15**, 165, 1996.
 Hamiache, Gérard, A Value with Incomplete Communication, **26**, 59, 1999.
 Hamilton, Jonathan H., and Slutsky, Steven M., Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games: Stackelberg or Cournot Equilibria, **2**, 29, 1990.
 Harrington, Joseph E., Jr., The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises, **5**, 71, 1993.
 Harrington, Joseph E., Jr., Cooperation in a One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemma, **8**, 364, 1995.
 Harrington, Joseph E., Jr., The Equilibrium Level of Rigidity in a Hierarchy, **28**, 189, 1999.
 Harrington, Joseph E., Jr., and Hess, Gregory D., A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning, **17**, 209, 1996.
 Harris, Christopher, On the Rate of Convergence of Continuous-Time Fictitious Play, **22**, 238, 1998.
 Harsanyi, John C., A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Complete Information, **8**, 91, 1995.
 Harsanyi, John C., A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information, **10**, 318, 1995.
 Hart, Sergiu, *see* Aumann, Robert J., **20**, 102, 1997; **20**, 117, 1997.
 Hart, Sergiu, *see* Gomes, Armando, **27**, 204, 1999.
 Hart, Sergiu, and Mas-Colell, Andreu, Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Nonequivalence to Competitive Equilibria, **13**, 74, 1996.
 Hartman, Bruce C., Dror, Moshe, and Shaked, Moshe, Cores of Inventory Centralization Games, **31**, 26, 2000.
 Hausch, Donald B., *see* Gale, Ian L., **7**, 318, 1994.
 Heifetz, Aviad, Non-well-founded-Type Spaces, **16**, 202, 1996.
 Heifetz, Aviad, and Samet, Dov, Knowledge Spaces with Arbitrarily High Rank, **22**, 260, 1998.
 Heijmans, Johannes G. C., Discriminatory von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions, **3**, 438, 1991.
 Hendon, Ebbe, Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen, Nielsen, Michael Teit, and Sloth, Birgitte, Learning, Tracing, and Risk Dominance, **7**, 332, 1994.
 Hendon, Ebbe, Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen, and Sloth, Birgitte, Note: The One-Shot-Deviation Principle for Sequential Rationality, **12**, 274, 1996.
 Hendon, Ebbe, Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen, and Sloth, Birgitte, Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games, **15**, 177, 1996.
 Hendon, Ebbe, and Tranæs, Torben, Sequential Bargaining in a Market with One Seller and Two Different Buyers, **3**, 453, 1991.
 Herr, Andrew, Gardner, Roy, and Walker, James M., An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons, **19**, 77, 1997.
 Hess, Gregory D., *see* Harrington, Joseph E., Jr., **17**, 209, 1996.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Hirsch, Morris W., *see* Benaïm, Michel, **29**, 36, 1999.
- Hofbauer, Josef, *see* Gaunersdorfer, Andrea, **11**, 279, 1995.
- Hoffman, Elizabeth, McCabe, Kevin, Shachat, Keith, and Smith, Vernon, Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games, **7**, 346, 1994.
- Holden, Steinar, Bargaining and Commitment in a Permanent Relationship, **7**, 169, 1994.
- Holm, Håkan J., *see* Andersson, Frederik, **32**, 219, 2000.
- Holm, Håkan J., Special Section Article: Gender-Based Focal Points, **32**, 292, 2000.
- Holt, Charles A., *see* Davis, Douglas D., **7**, 39, 1994.
- Holt, Debra J., An Empirical Model of Strategic Choice with an Application to Coordination Games, **27**, 86, 1999.
- Holzman, Ron, *see* Einy, Ezra, **28**, 181, 1999.
- Holzman, Ron, and Law-Yone, Nissan, Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games, **21**, 85, 1997.
- Hopenhayn, Hugo, *see* Lohmann, Susanne, **23**, 222, 1998.
- Hopkins, Ed, Learning, Matching, and Aggregation, **26**, 79, 1999.
- Hopkins, Ed, A Note on Best Response Dynamics, **29**, 138, 1999.
- Horowitz, Joel L., *see* Forsythe, Robert, **6**, 347, 1994.
- Horstmann, Ignatius, *see* Busch, Lutz-Alexander, **19**, 144, 1997.
- Howard, J. V., Implementing Alternative Voting in Kingmaker Trees, **2**, 325, 1990.
- Hsiao, Chih-Ru, A Note on Non-essential Players in Multichoice Cooperative Games, **8**, 424, 1995.
- Hsiao, Chih-Ru, and Raghavan, T. E. S., Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, **1**, 5, 240, 1993.
- Hsiaq, Fu-Chao, *see* Chang, Chih, **5**, 223, 1993.
- Huck, Steffen, The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations, **28**, 13, 1999.
- Huck, Steffen, and Müller, Wieland, Perfect versus Imperfect Observability—An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result, **31**, 174, 2000.
- Hurkens, Sjaak, *see* van Damme, Eric, **15**, 290, 1996; **21**, 282, 1997; **28**, 105, 1999.
- Hurkens, Sjaak, Learning by Forgetful Players, **11**, 304, 1995.

I

- Ianni, Antonella, *see* Anderlini, Luca, **13**, 141, 1996.
- Inarra, Elena, *see* Arin, Javier, **23**, 12, 1998.
- Inderst, Roman, Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda, **30**, 64, 2000.
- Isaac, R. Mark, *see* Cox, James C., **17**, 147, 1996.
- Israeli, Eitan, Sowing Doubt Optimally in Two-Person Repeated Games, **28**, 203, 1999.

J

- Jackson, Matthew O., *see* Barberà, Salvador, **18**, 1, 1997.
- Jackson, Matthew O., and Kalai, Ehud, Social Learning in Recurring Games, **21**, 102, 1997; Erratum, **25**, 146, 1998.
- Jackson, Matthew O., Palfrey, Thomas R., and Srivastava, Sanjay, Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms, **6**, 474, 1994.
- Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen, *see* Hendon, Ebbe, **7**, 332, 1994; **12**, 274, 1996; **15**, 177, 1996.
- Jansen, Mathijs, *see* Perea y Monsuwé, Andres, **21**, 238, 1997.
- Jansen, M. J. M., *see* Vermeulen, A. J., **21**, 135, 1997.
- Jansen, M. J. M., Jurg, A. P., and Borm, P. E. M., On Strictly Perfect Sets, **6**, 400, 1994.
- Janssen, Maarten C. W., *see* Börgers, Tilman, **8**, 297, 1995.
- Jéhiel, Philippe, Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria, **22**, 274, 1998.
- Jéhiel, P., and Walliser, B., How to Select a Dual Nash Equilibrium, **10**, 333, 1995.
- Joosten, Reinoud, Peters, Hans, and Thuijsman, Frank, Unlearning by Not Doing: Repeated Games with Vanishing Actions, **9**, 1, 1995.
- Jordan, J. S., Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games, **3**, 60, 1991.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Jordan, J. S., The Exponential Convergence of Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games, **4**, 202, 1992.
- Jordan, J. S., Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria, **5**, 368, 1993.
- Jordan, J. S., Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games, **9**, 8, 1995.
- Jurg, A. P., *see* Jansen, M. J. M., **6**, 400, 1994.
- K**
- Kagel, John H., Kim, Chung, and Moser, Donald, Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs, **13**, 100, 1996.
- Kahn, Charles M., *see* Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, **23**, 25, 1998.
- Kahn, Charles M., and Mookherjee, Dilip, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Coalition Proof Equilibrium in Infinite Games, **4**, 101, 1992.
- Kajii, Atsushi, and Morris, Stephen, Common p -Belief: The General Case, **18**, 73, 1997.
- Kalai, Ehud, *see* Jackson, Matthew O., **21**, 102, 1997; Erratum, **25**, 146, 1998.
- Kalai, Ehud, Calibrated Forecasting and Merging, **29**, 151, 1999.
- Kalai, Ehud, Editorial: Games and Economic Behavior, **1**, 1, 1989.
- Kalai, Ehud, Editorial, **3**, 1, 1991; **13**, 1, 1996.
- Kalai, Ehud, Editor's Note, **8**, 1, 1995; **21**, 1, 1997; **24**, 1, 1998.
- Kalai, Ehud, Editor's Note: Special Issue on Imperfect Recall, **20**, 1, 1997.
- Kalai, Ehud, and Lehrer, Ehud, Subjective Games and Equilibria, **8**, 123, 1995.
- Kambe, Shinsuke, Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment, **28**, 217, 1999.
- Kamien, Morton I., Tauman, Yair, and Zamir, Shmuel, On the Value of Information in a Strategic Conflict, **2**, 129, 1990.
- Kamien, Morton I., and Zang, Israel, Competitively Cost Advantageous Mergers and Monopolization, **3**, 323, 1991.
- Kan, Ching-Yu, *see* Chang, Chih, **7**, 35, 1994.
- Kandori, Michihiro, and Rob, Rafael, Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice, **22**, 30, 1998.
- Kaneko, Mamoru, and Kimura, Toshiyuki, Conventions, Social Prejudices and Discrimination: A Festival Game with Merry-makers, **4**, 511, 1992.
- Kaniovski, Yuri M., Kryazhinskii, Arkadii V., and Young, H. Peyton, Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations, **31**, 50, 2000.
- Kaniovski, Yuri M., and Young, H. Peyton, Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations, **11**, 330, 1995.
- Karotkin, Drora, The Network of Weighted Majority Rules and Weighted Majority Games, **22**, 299, 1998.
- Katok, Elena, *see* Bolton, Gary E., **25**, 1, 1998.
- Keiding, Hans, On the Maximal Number of Nash Equilibria in an $n \times n$ Bimatrix Game, **21**, 148, 1997.
- Kelsey, David, *see* Eichberger, Jürgen, **30**, 183, 2000.
- Khalil, Fahad, *see* Crémer, Jacques, **25**, 174, 1998.
- Kim, Chung, *see* Kagel, John H., **13**, 100, 1996.
- Kim, Taesung, *see* Choi, Jaewon, **27**, 64, 1999.
- Kim, Yong-Gwan, *see* Blume, Andreas, **5**, 547, 1993.
- Kim, Yong-Gwan, Evolutionary Analyses of Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments, **16**, 218, 1996.
- Kim, Youngse, Equilibrium Selection in n -Person Coordination Games, **15**, 203, 1996.
- Kimura, Toshiyuki, *see* Kaneko, Mamoru, **4**, 511, 1992.
- Kirchsteiger, Georg, *see* Güth, Werner, **23**, 54, 1998.
- Knez, Marc J., and Camerer, Colin F., Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments, **10**, 65, 1995.
- Knoblauch, Vicki, Computable Strategies for Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, **7**, 381, 1994.
- Kocherlakota, Narayana R., Reconsideration-Proofness: A Refinement for Infinite Horizon Time Inconsistency, **15**, 33, 1996.
- Koçkesen, Levent, Ok, Efe A., and Sethi, Rajiv, Note: Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games, **31**, 303, 2000.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Koller, Daphne, *see* von Stengel, Bernhard, **21**, 309, 1997.
- Koller, Daphne, and Megiddo, Nimrod, The Complexity of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games in Extensive Form, **4**, 528, 1992.
- Koller, Daphne, Megiddo, Nimrod, and von Stengel, Bernhard, Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games, **14**, 247, 1996.
- Kolpin, Van, Equilibrium Refinement in Psychological Games, **4**, 218, 1992.
- Kolpin, Van, Equitable Nonlinear Price Regulation: An Alternative Approach to Serial Cost Sharing, **22**, 61, 1998.
- Konishi, Hideo, Le Breton, Michel, and Weber, Shlomo, Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities, **21**, 161, 1997.
- Kovenock, Dan, *see* Baye, Michael R., **4**, 493, 1992.
- Kranich, Laurence, Cooperative Games with Hedonic Coalitions, **18**, 83, 1997.
- Kreps, David M., *see* Fudenberg, Drew, **5**, 320, 1993; **8**, 20, 1995.
- Krishna, Vijay, and Rosenthal, Robert W., Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies, **17**, 1, 1996.
- Kryazhimskii, Arkadii V., *see* Kaniovski, Yuri M., **31**, 50, 2000.
- Kukushkin, Nikolai S., A Condition for the Existence of a Nash Equilibrium in Games with Public and Private Objectives, **7**, 177, 1994.
- Kultti, Klaus, Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices, **27**, 106, 1999.
- Kultti, Klaus, and Salonen, Hannu, Undominated Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities, **18**, 98, 1997.
- Kumar, Praveen, *see* Faynzilberg, Peter S., **21**, 15, 1997.
- L
- Laffond, G., Laslier, J. F., and Le Breton, M., The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game, **5**, 182, 1993.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, *see* Green, Jerry, **2**, 247, 1990.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Rochet, Jean-Charles, Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm, **25**, 149, 1998.
- Lagunoff, Roger D., A Simple Noncooperative Core Story, **7**, 54, 1994.
- Laskowski, Michael C., An Asymptotic Solution for Sealed Bid Common-Value Auctions with Bidders Having Asymmetric Information, **28**, 238, 1999.
- Laslier, J. F., *see* Laffond, G., **5**, 182, 1993.
- Laussel, Didier, and Le Breton, Michel, Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency, **25**, 194, 1998.
- Law-Yone, Nissan, *see* Holzman, Ron, **21**, 85, 1997.
- Lazarus, Andrew J., Combinatorial Games under Auction Play, **27**, 229, 1999.
- Le Breton, Michel, *see* Konishi, Hideo, **21**, 161, 1997.
- Le Breton, M., *see* Laffond, G., **5**, 182, 1993.
- Le Breton, Michel, *see* Laussel, Didier, **25**, 194, 1998.
- Lebrun, Bernard, Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions, **25**, 97, 1998.
- Ledyard, John O., and Palfrey, Thomas R., Introduction, **10**, 1, 1995.
- Lee, Ching Chyi, *see* Chatterjee, Kalyan, **22**, 203, 1998.
- Legros, Patrick, Information Revelation in Repeated Delegation, **5**, 98, 1993; Erratum, **5**, 505, 1993.
- Legut, Jerzy, On Totally Balanced Games Arising from Cooperation in Fair Division, **2**, 47, 1990.
- Legut, J., Potters, J. A. M., and Tijs, S. H., Economies with Land—A Game Theoretical Approach, **6**, 416, 1994.
- Legut, Jerzy, Potters, Jos A. M., and Tijs, Stef H., A Transfer Property of Equilibrium Payoffs in Economies with Land, **10**, 355, 1995.
- Lehrer, Ehud, *see* Kalai, Ehud, **8**, 123, 1995; **29**, 151, 1999.
- Lehrer, Ehud, Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games, **7**, 390, 1994.
- Lehrer, Ehud, and Monderer, Dov, Discounting versus Averaging in Dynamic Programming, **6**, 97, 1994.
- Lehrer, Ehud, and Monderer, Dov, Low Discounting and the Upper Long-Run Average Value in Dynamic Programming, **6**, 262, 1994.

- Lehrer, Ehud, and Smorodinsky, Rann, Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information, **18**, 116, 1997.
- Lehrer, Ehud, and Sorin, Sylvain, One-Shot Public Mediated Talk, **20**, 131, 1997.
- Leininger, Wolfgang, *see* Amann, Erwin, **14**, 1, 1996.
- Leininger, Wolfgang, *see* Bester, Helmut, **12**, 165, 1996.
- Leininger, Wolfgang, and Yang, Chun-Lei, Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games, **7**, 406, 1994.
- Lerner, Anat, A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups, **22**, 316, 1998.
- Levin, Jonathan, An Optimal Auction for Complements, **18**, 176, 1997.
- Levine, David K., *see* Fudenberg, Drew, **29**, 104, 1999; **29**, 131, 1999.
- Levine, David K., *see* Vohra, Rakesh, **29**, 1, 1999.
- Levy, Anat, and McLean, Richard P., Weighted Coalition Structure Values, **1**, 234, 1989.
- Li, Lode, *see* Fine, Charles H., **1**, 40, 1989.
- Li, Qi, *see* Tian, Guoqiang, **7**, 441, 1994.
- Li, Qi, *see* Tian, Guoqiang, **9**, 222, 1995.
- LiCalzi, Marco, Fictitious Play by Cases, **11**, 64, 1995.
- Lipman, Barton L., A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality, **6**, 114, 1994.
- Lipman, Barton L., More Absentmindedness, **20**, 97, 1997.
- Lipman, Barton L., and Srivastava, Sanjay, Computation as a Correlation Device, **2**, 154, 1990.
- Lipman, Barton L., and Srivastava, Sanjay, Informational Requirements and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games, **2**, 273, 1990.
- Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Persico, Nicola, Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price, **30**, 83, 2000.
- Lo, Kin Chung, Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players, **28**, 256, 1999.
- Loeb, Daniel E., *see* Lazarus, Andrew J., **27**, 229, 1999.
- Lohmann, Susanne, and Hopenhayn, Hugo, Delegation and the Regulation of Risk, **23**, 222, 1998.
- Lu, Xiaohua, and McAfee, R. Preston, The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining, **15**, 228, 1996.
- Luenberger, David G., *see* Cronshaw, Mark B., **6**, 220, 1994.

M

- Ma, Ching-to Albert, *see* Glazer, Jacob, **1**, 222, 1989.
- Ma, Jinpeng, Note: An Alternative Proof of an Equilibrium Existence Theorem in Exchange Economies with Indivisibilities, **31**, 147, 2000.
- MacLeod, W. Bentley, *see* Brandts, Jordi, **11**, 36, 1995.
- Magaña, A., *see* Carreras, F., **18**, 22, 1997.
- Mailath, George J., Samuelson, Larry, and Swinkels, Jeroen M., How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?, **18**, 193, 1997; Erratum, **18**, 249, 1997.
- Mailath, George J., and Zemsky, Peter, Collusion in Second Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders, **3**, 467, 1991.
- Maniquet, François, *see* Fleurbaey, Marc, **17**, 200, 1996.
- Marinacci, Massimo, Ambiguous Games, **31**, 191, 2000.
- Mariotti, Marco, Maximum Games, Dominance Solvability, and Coordination, **31**, 97, 2000.
- Mariotti, Marco, Note: Extending Nash's Axioms to Nonconvex Problems, **22**, 377, 1998.
- Marshall, Robert C., Meurer, Michael J., Richard, Jean-Francois, and Stromquist, Walter, Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions, **7**, 193, 1994.
- Maruta, Toshimasa, Note: On the Relationship between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability, **19**, 221, 1997.
- Marx, Leslie M., Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance, **26**, 253, 1999.
- Marx, Leslie M., and Swinkels, Jeroen M., Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance, **18**, 219, 1997.
- Marx, Leslie M., and Swinkels, Jeroen M., Corrigendum: Volume 18, Number 2 (1997), in "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance", **31**, 324, 2000.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Maschler, M., *see* Ferreira, J.-L., **10**, 284, 1995.
- Maschler, Michael, *see* Reijnierse, Hans, **16**, 238, 1996.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, *see* Gomes, Armando, **27**, 204, 1999.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, *see* Hart, Sergiu, **13**, 74, 1996.
- Maskin, Eric, *see* Evans, Robert, **1**, 361, 1989.
- Maskin, Eric, *see* Farrell, Joseph, **1**, 327, 1989.
- Massó, J., *see* Barberà, S., **25**, 272, 1998.
- Massó, Jordi, A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox, **15**, 55, 1996.
- Matsui, Akihiko, Information Leakage Forces Cooperation, **1**, 94, 1989.
- Matsui, Akihiko, and Postlewaite, Andrew, Specialization of Labor and the Distribution of Income, **33**, 72, 2000.
- McAfee, R. Preston, *see* Lu, Xiaohua, **15**, 228, 1996.
- McAfee, R. Preston, and Vincent, Daniel, Sequentially Optimal Auctions, **18**, 246, 1997.
- McCabe, Kevin, *see* Berg, Joyce, **10**, 122, 1995.
- McCabe, Kevin, *see* Hoffman, Elizabeth, **7**, 346, 1994.
- McCabe, Kevin A., Rassenti, Stephen J., and Smith, Vernon L., Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining, **24**, 10, 1998.
- McClendon, J. F., On Nash Equilibrium, **6**, 283, 1994.
- McKelvey, Richard D., and Palfrey, Thomas R., Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games, **10**, 6, 1995.
- McLean, Richard P., *see* Levy, Anat, **1**, 234, 1989.
- McLean, Richard P., and Postlewaite, Andrew, Excess Functions and Nucleolus Allocations of Pure Exchange Economies, **1**, 131, 1989.
- McLennan, Andrew, Generic 4×4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria, **26**, 111, 1999.
- Megiddo, Nimrod, *see* Koller, Daphne, **4**, 528, 1992; **14**, 247, 1996.
- Megiddo, Nimrod, On Computable Beliefs of Rational Machines, **1**, 144, 1989.
- Merlo, Antonio, A Surprise-Quiz View of Learning in Economic Experiments, **28**, 25, 1999.
- Mertens, Jean-François, The Small Worlds Axiom for Stable Equilibria, **4**, 553, 1992.
- Mertens, J.-F., Two Examples of Strategic Equilibrium, **8**, 378, 1995.
- Meurer, Michael J., *see* Marshall, Robert C., **7**, 193, 1994.
- Mezzetti, Claudio, *see* Friedman, James W., **23**, 176, 1998.
- Michel, Philippe, *see* Gevers, Louis, **25**, 251, 1998.
- Milchtaich, Igal, Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions, **13**, 111, 1996.
- Milchtaich, Igal, Vector Measure Games Based on Measures with Values in an Infinite Dimensional Vector Space, **24**, 25, 1998.
- Milgrom, Paul, and Roberts, John, Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Normal Form Games, **3**, 82, 1991.
- Milgrom, Paul, and Roberts, John, Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities, **17**, 113, 1996.
- Miller, John H., *see* Andreoni, James, **10**, 39, 1995.
- Miller, Ronald I., The Role of Absolute Continuity in "Merging of Opinions" and "Rational Learning," **29**, 170, 1999.
- Minehart, Deborah, Ex Post Regret and the Decentralized Sharing of Information, **27**, 114, 1999.
- Minelli, Enrico, *see* Forges, Françoise, **18**, 159, 1997; **25**, 292, 1998.
- Mnookin, Robert, and Wilson, Robert, A Model of Efficient Discovery, **25**, 219, 1998.
- Modica, Salvatore, Unawareness and Partitioned Information Structures, **27**, 265, 1999.
- Moldovanu, Benny, Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria and the Core in Three-Player Games, **4**, 565, 1992.
- Moldovanu, Benny, and Winter, Eyal, Order Independent Equilibria, **9**, 21, 1995.
- Monahan, George E., and Sobel, Matthew J., Stochastic Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games, **6**, 130, 1994.
- Monahan, George E., and Sobel, Matthew J., Risk-Sensitive Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games, **20**, 149, 1997.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Monderer, Dov, Distributed Games, **28**, 55, 1999.
- Monderer, Dov, *see* Einy, Ezra, **28**, 181, 1999.
- Monderer, Dov, *see* Lehrer, Ehud, **6**, 97, 1994; **6**, 262, 1994.
- Monderer, Dov, and Samet, Dov, Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs, **1**, 170, 1989.
- Monderer, Dov, and Samet, Dov, Stochastic Common Learning, **9**, 161, 1995.
- Monderer, Dov, and Sela, Aner, Note: A 2×2 Game without the Fictitious Play Property, **14**, 144, 1996.
- Monderer, Dov, and Shapley, Lloyd S., Potential Games, **14**, 124, 1996.
- Monderer, Dov, and Tennenholtz, Moshe, k -Price Auctions, **31**, 220, 2000.
- Mookherjee, Dilip, *see* Kahn, Charles M., **4**, 101, 1992.
- Mookherjee, Dilip, and Sopher, Barry, Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game, **7**, 62, 1994.
- Mookherjee, Dilip, and Sopher, Barry, Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games, **19**, 97, 997.
- Moreno, Diego, and Wooders, John, Coalition-Proof Equilibrium, **17**, 80, 1996.
- Moreno, Diego, and Wooders, John, An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games, **24**, 47, 1998.
- Morgan, Peter, *see* Binmore, Ken, **3**, 295, 1991.
- Morris, Stephen, *see* Kajii, Atsushi, **18**, 73, 1997.
- Morris, Stephen, and Skiadas, Costis, Note: Rationalizable Trade, **31**, 311, 2000.
- Moser, Donald, *see* Kagel, John H., **13**, 100, 1996.
- Moshe, Adler, On Being Honest and Behaving Honestly, **4**, 1, 1992.
- Moulin, Hervé, Monotonic Surplus Sharing: Characterization Results, **1**, 250, 1989.
- Moulin, Hervé, Welfare Bounds in the Cooperative Production Problem, **4**, 373, 1992.
- Moulin, Hervé, Cost Sharing under Increasing Returns: A Comparison of Simple Mechanisms, **13**, 225, 1996.
- Moulin, Hervé, Distributive and Additive Costsharing of an Homogeneous Good, **27**, 299, 1999.
- Müller, Wieland, *see* Huck, Steffen, **31**, 174, 2000.
- Muthoo, Abhinay, Bargaining without Commitment, **2**, 291, 1990.
- Muto, Shigeo, *see* Potters, Jos, **1**, 275, 1989.
- Muto, Shigeo, Resale-Proofness and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria, **2**, 337, 1990.
- Muto, Shigeo, On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition, **5**, 257, 1993.
- Muto, Shigeo, The Banzhaf Index in Representative Systems with Multiple Political Parties, **28**, 73, 1999.
- Myerson, Roger B., *see* Banks, Jeffrey S., **5**, 1, 1993.
- Myerson, Roger B., Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, **5**, 118, 1993.
- Myerson, Roger B., Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection, **9**, 35, 1995.
- Myerson, Roger B., Dual Reduction and Elementary Games, **21**, 183, 1997.
- Myerson, Roger B., Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, **25**, 111, 1998.
- Myerson, Roger B., Pollock, Gregory B., and Swinkels, Jeroen M., Viscous Population Equilibria, **3**, 101, 1991.

N

- Nakanishi, Noritsugu, Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations, **27**, 132, 1999.
- Nakayama, Mikio, and Quintas, Luis, Stable Payoffs in Resale-Proof Trades of Information, **3**, 339, 1991.
- Neeman, Zvika, Note: Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p -Beliefs, **12**, 162, 1996.
- Neeman, Zvika, Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade, **16**, 77, 1996.
- Neme, Alejandro, *see* Barberà, Salvador, **18**, 1, 1997.
- Neyman, Abraham, Uniqueness of the Shapley Value **1**, 116, 1989.
- Neyman, Abraham, The Positive Value of Information, **3**, 350, 1991.

- Neyman, Abraham, Strategic Entropy and Complexity in Repeated Games, **29**, 191, 1999.
- Neyman, Abraham, and Okada, Daijiro, Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy, **30**, 228, 2000.
- Nielsen, Michael Teit, *see* Hendon, Ebbe, **7**, 332, 1994.
- Nöldeke, Georg, and Samuelson, Larry, An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction, **5**, 425, 1993.
- Norde, Henk, *see* Voorneveld, Mark, **19**, 235, 1997.
- Norde, Henk, Potters, Jos, Reijnierse, Hans, and Vermeulen, Dries, Equilibrium Selection and Consistency, **12**, 219, 1996.
- Nosal, Ed, *see* Bossert, Walter, **14**, 173, 1996.
- Nowak, Andrzej S., Zero-Sum Average Payoff Stochastic Games with General State Space, **7**, 221, 1994.
- Nowak, Andrzej S., and Radzik, Tadeusz, The Shapley Value for n -Person Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form, **6**, 150, 1994.
- Nowak, A. S., and Radzik, T., On Axiomatizations of the Weighted Shapley Values, **8**, 389, 1995.
- Nowak, Martin A., and Sigmund, Karl, Invasion Dynamics of the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, **11**, 364, 1995.
- O**
- Ochs, Jack, Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study, **10**, 202, 1995.
- Ockenfels, Axel, and Selten, Reinhard, An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining, **33**, 90, 2000.
- Oechssler, Jörg, An Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria, **21**, 203, 1997.
- Oechssler, Jörg, *see* Huck, Steffen, **28**, 13, 1999.
- Ohseto, Shinji, Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects, **32**, 51, 2000.
- Ok, Efe A., and Zhou, Lin, The Choquet Bargaining Solutions, **33**, 249, 2000.
- Ok, Efe A., *see* Koçkesen, Levent, **31**, 303, 2000.
- Okada, Akira, A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers, **16**, 97, 1996.
- Okada, Daijiro, *see* Neyman, Abraham, **29**, 191, 1999; **30**, 228, 2000.
- Okuguchi, Koji, *see* Szidarovszky, Ferenc, **18**, 135, 1997.
- Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro, and Postlewaite, Andrew, Social Norms and Random Matching Games, **9**, 79, 1995.
- Orshan, Gooni, and Zarzuelo, José M., The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel for NTU Games, **32**, 67, 2000.
- Osborne, Martin J., Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition, **5**, 133, 1993.
- Otten, Gert-Jan, Borm, Peter, Storcken, Ton, and Tijs, Stef, Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences, **9**, 172, 1995.
- Owen, Guillermo, and Winter, Eyal, The Multilinear Extension and the Coalition Structure Value, **4**, 582, 1992.
- P**
- Pal, Debashis, Endogenous Stackelberg Equilibria with Identical Firms, **12**, 81, 1996.
- Palfrey, Thomas R., *see* Cramton, Peter C., **10**, 255, 1995.
- Palfrey, Thomas R., *see* El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., **8**, 322, 1995.
- Palfrey, Thomas R., *see* Jackson, Matthew, O., **6**, 474, 1994.
- Palfrey, Thomas R., *see* Ledyard, John O., **10**, 1, 1995.
- Palfrey, Thomas R., *see* McKelvey, Richard D., **10**, 6, 1995.
- Palfrey, Thomas R., and Rosenthal, Howard, Testing for Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information, **3**, 183, 1991.
- Papadimitriou, Christos H., On Players with a Bounded Number of States, **4**, 122, 1992.
- Park, In-Uck, *see* McLennan, Andrew, **26**, 111, 1999.
- Parthasarathy, T., *see* Biswas, A. K., **28**, 1, 1999.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Pauzner, Ady, *see* Sandholm, William H., **22**, 84, 1998.
- Pearce, David, *see* Geanakoplos, John, **1**, 60, 1989.
- Pearce, David G., and Stacchetti, Ennio, The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency, **23**, 75, 1998.
- Peck, James, Competition in Transactions Mechanisms: The Emergence of Price Competition, **16**, 109, 1996.
- Peck, James, and Shell, Karl, Liquid Markets and Competition, **2**, 362, 1990.
- Peleg, Bezalel, and Rosenmüller, Joachim, The Least Core, Nucleolus, and Kernel of Homogeneous Weighted Majority Games, **4**, 588, 1992.
- Peleg, B., and Shmida, A., Short-Run Stable Matchings between Bees and Flowers, **4**, 232, 1992.
- Peleg, Bezalel, and Sudhölter, Peter, An Axiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic Situations, **18**, 277, 1997.
- Perea y Monsuwé, Andres, Jansen, Mathijs, and Peters, Hans, Characterization of Consistent Assessments in Extensive Form Games, **21**, 238, 1997.
- Pérez-Castrillo, J. David, Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games, **7**, 428, 1994.
- Pérez-Castrillo, David, and Wettstein, David, Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms, **31**, 106, 2000.
- Perry, Motty, *see* Aumann, Robert J., **20**, 102, 1997; **20**, 117, 1997.
- Perry, Motty, *see* Glazer, Jacob, **15**, 27, 1996.
- Perry, Motty, A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma, **26**, 279, 1999.
- Perry, Motty, Wolfstetter, Elmar, and Zamir, Shmuel, A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction, **33**, 265, 2000.
- Persico, Nicola, *see* Lizzeri, Alessandro, **30**, 83, 2000.
- Peters, Hans, *see* Joosten, Reinoud, **9**, 1, 1995.
- Peters, Hans, *see* Perea y Monsuwé, Andres, **21**, 238, 1997.
- Peters, Hans, Self-Optimality and Efficiency in Utility Distortion Games, **4**, 252, 1992.
- Piccione, Michele, and Rubinstein, Ariel, On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall, **20**, 3, 1997.
- Piccione, Michele, and Rubinstein, Ariel, The Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses, **20**, 121, 1997.
- Pitchik, Carolyn, Commitment, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, **5**, 268, 1993.
- Plott, Charles R., *see* Chen, Kay-Yut, **25**, 34, 1998.
- Pollock, Gregory B., *see* Myerson, Roger B., **3**, 101, 1991.
- Ponsati, Clara, and Sákovics, József, Multi-person Bargaining over Two Alternatives, **12**, 226, 1996.
- Ponssard, Jean-Pierre, *see* Gromb, Denis, **21**, 62, 1997.
- Ponssard, Jean-Pierre, Forward Induction and Sunk Costs Give Average Cost Pricing, **3**, 221, 1991.
- Ponti, Giovanni, Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game, **30**, 115, 2000.
- Poos, René, *see* Potters, Jos, **1**, 275, 1989.
- Porter, David, *see* Banks, Jeffrey, **6**, 1, 1994.
- Postlewaite, Andrew, *see* McLean, Richard P., **1**, 131, 1989.
- Postlewaite, Andrew, *see* Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro, **9**, 79, 1995.
- Postlewaite, Andrew, *see* Matsui, Akihiko, **33**, 72, 2000.
- Potters, J. A. M., *see* Biswas, A. K., **28**, 1, 1999.
- Potters, J. A. M., *see* van Gellekom, J. R. G., **32**, 139, 2000.
- Potters, Jos A. M., *see* Legut, Jerzy, **6**, 416, 1994; **10**, 355, 1995.
- Potters, Jos, *see* Norde, Henk, **12**, 219, 1996.
- Potters, Jos, *see* Reijnierse, Hans, **16**, 238, 1996; **24**, 77, 1998.
- Potters, Jos, Poos, René, Tijs, Stef, Muto, Shigeo, Clan Games, **1**, 275, 1989.
- Powell, Robert, Bargaining in the Shadow of Power, **15**, 255, 1996.
- Propp, James G., *see* Lazarus, Andrew J., **27**, 229, 1999.

Q

- Qin, Cheng-Zhong, The Inner Core of an n -Person Game, **6**, 431, 1994.
- Qin, Cheng-Zhong, *see* Garratt, Rod, **31**, 165, 2000.
- Quint, Thomas, The Core of an m -Sided Assignment Game, **3**, 487, 1991.

- Quint, Thomas, On One-Sided versus Two-Sided Matching Games, **16**, 124, 1996.
 Quintas, Luis, *see* Nakayama, Mikio, **3**, 339, 1991.

R

- Radner, Roy, *see* Rustichini, Aldo, **12**, 245, 1996.
 Radzik, Tadeusz, *see* Nowak, Andrzej S., **6**, 150, 1994; **8**, 389, 1995.
 Radzik, Tadeusz, Pure-Strategy ε -Nash Equilibrium in Two-Person Non-zero-Sum Games, **3**, 356, 1991.
 Raff, Horst, *see* Bac, Mehmet, **13**, 125, 1996.
 Raghavan, T. E. S., *see* Hsiao, Chih-Ru, **5**, 240, 1993.
 Rapoport, Amnon, *see* Budescu, David V., **10**, 171, 1995.
 Rapoport, Amnon, *see* Erev, Ido, **23**, 146, 1998.
 Rapoport, Amnon, *see* Weg, Eythan, **2**, 76, 1990; **14**, 260, 1996.
 Rapoport, Amnon, and Boebel, Richard B., Mixed Strategies in Strictly Competitive Games: A Further Test of the Minimax Hypothesis, **4**, 261, 1992.
 Rassenti, Stephen J., *see* McCabe, Kevin A., **24**, 10, 1998.
 Rath, Kali P., Some Refinements of Nash Equilibria of Large Games, **7**, 92, 1994.
 Rath, Kali P., Perfect and Proper Equilibria of Large Games, **22**, 331, 1998.
 Ray, Debraj, *see* Bernheim, B. Douglas, **1**, 295, 1989.
 Ray, Debraj, *see* Dutta, Bhaskar, **3**, 403, 1991.
 Ray, Debraj, Internally Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium Sets: Limit Behavior with Low Discounting, **6**, 162, 1994.
 Ray, Debraj, A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures, **26**, 286, 1999.
 Ray, Indrajit, Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition, **17**, 56, 1996.
 Reijnierse, Hans, *see* Norde, Henk, **12**, 219, 1996.
 Reijnierse, Hans, Maschler, Michael, Potters, Jos, and Tijs, Stef, Simple Flow Games, **16**, 238, 1996.
 Reijnierse, Hans, and Potters, Jos, The \mathcal{B} -Nucleolus of TU-Games, **24**, 77, 1998.
 Reijnierse, J. H., *see* van Gellekom, J. R. G., **32**, 139, 2000.
 Reitman, David, *see* Aoki, Reiko, **4**, 327, 1992.
 Renault, Régis, Privately Observed Time Horizons in Repeated Games, **33**, 117, 2000.
 Reny, Philip J., *see* Perry, Motty, **26**, 279, 1999.
 Richard, Jean-Francois, *see* Marshall, Robert C., **7**, 193, 1994.
 Rinott, Yosef, and Scarsini, Marco, On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games, **33**, 274, 2000.
 Ritzberger, Klaus, *see* Güth, Werner, **23**, 54, 1998.
 Rob, Rafael, *see* Kandori, Michihiro, **22**, 30, 1998.
 Roberts, John, *see* Milgrom, Paul, **3**, 82, 1991; **17**, 113, 1996.
 Robson, Arthur J., An "Informationally Robust Equilibrium" for Two-Person Non-zero-Sum Games, **7**, 233, 1994.
 Robson, Arthur J., The Evolution of Attitudes to Risk: Lottery Tickets and Relative Wealth, **14**, 190, 1996.
 Robson, Arthur J., Naive Adaptive Behavior and the Observability of Gambles, **24**, 97, 1998.
 Rochet, Jean-Charles, *see* Crémer, Jacques, **25**, 174, 1998.
 Rochet, Jean-Charles, *see* Laffont, Jean-Jacques, **25**, 149, 1998.
 Romero-Medina, Antonio, *see* Alcalde, José, **31**, 294, 2000.
 Rosendorff, B. Peter, *see* Cameron, Charles M., **5**, 44, 1993.
 Rosenmüller, Joachim, *see* Peleg, Bezalel, **4**, 588, 1992.
 Rosenthal, Edward C., Coalition Formation under Limited Communication, **4**, 402, 1992.
 Rosenthal, Howard, *see* Palfrey, Thomas R., **3**, 183, 1991.
 Rosenthal, Robert W., *see* Angeles de Frutos, Maria, **23**, 201, 1998.
 Rosenthal, Robert W., *see* Krishna, Vijay, **17**, 1, 1996.
 Rosenthal, Robert W., A Note on Robustness of Equilibria with Respect to Commitment Opportunities, **3**, 237, 1991.
 Rosenthal, Robert W., and Wang, Ruqu, Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values, **17**, 32, 1996.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Ross, Thomas W., *see* Cooper, Russell, **12**, 187, 1996.
- Roth, Alvin E., Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences, **1**, 191, 1989.
- Roth, Alvin E., and Erev, Ido, Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term, **8**, 164, 1995.
- Roth, David, A Theory of Partnership Dynamics, **12**, 95, 1996.
- Rothblum, Uriel G., *see* Granot, Daniel, **3**, 163, 1991.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, *see* Piccione, Michele, **20**, 3, 1997; **20**, 121, 1997.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, Reviews and Comments: Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Postclass Problem Sets as a Didactic Device, **28**, 155, 1999.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, and Wolinsky, Asher, Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability, **6**, 299, 1994.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, and Wolinsky, Asher, Remarks on Infinitely Repeated Extensive-Form Games, **9**, 110, 1995.
- Ruffle, Bradley J., More Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games, **23**, 247, 1998.
- Ruiz, Luis M., Valenciano, Federico, and Zarzuelo, José M., The Family of Least Square Values for Transferable Utility Games, **24**, 109, 1998.
- Rustichini, Aldo, *see* Ben-Porath, Elchanan, **5**, 576, 1993.
- Rustichini, Aldo, *see* Modica, Salvatore, **27**, 265, 1999.
- Rustichini, Aldo, Minimizing Regret: The General Case, **29**, 224, 1999.
- Rustichini, Aldo, Optimal Properties of Stimulus-Response Learning Models, **29**, 244, 1999.
- Rustichini, Aldo, and Radner, Roy, The Design and Performance of Sharing Rules for a Partnership in Continuous Time, **12**, 245, 1996.
- Safra, Zvi, *see* Fershtman, Chaim, **3**, 423, 1991.
- Safra, Zvi, and Zilcha, Itzhak, Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis, **5**, 288, 1993.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences, **28**, 271, 1999.
- Sákovics, József, *see* Burguet, Roberto, **15**, 149, 1996.
- Sákovics, József, *see* Ponsati, Clara, **12**, 226, 1996.
- Salant, David J., A Repeated Game with Finitely Lived Overlapping Generations of Players, **3**, 244, 1991.
- Salonen, Hannu, *see* Kultti, Klaus, **18**, 98, 1997.
- Salonen, Hannu, Entry Deterrence and Limit Pricing under Asymmetric Information about Common Costs, **6**, 312, 1994.
- Salonen, Hannu, On the Existence of Undominated Nash Equilibria in Normal Form Games, **14**, 208, 1996.
- Samet, Dov, *see* Gilboa, Itzhak, **1**, 213, 1989.
- Samet, Dov, *see* Heifetz, Aviad, **22**, 260, 1998.
- Samet, Dov, *see* Monderer, Dov, **1**, 170, 1989; **9**, 161, 1995.
- Samet, Dov, Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information, **17**, 230, 1996.
- Samet, Dov, Iterated Expectations and Common Priors, **24**, 131, 1998.
- Samet, Dov, Note: Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets, **24**, 172, 1998.
- Samuelson, Larry, *see* Binmore, Kenneth G., **11**, 1, 1995; Erratum, **21**, 325, 1997.
- Samuelson, Larry, *see* Friedman, James W., **2**, 304, 1990; **6**, 55, 1994; **6**, 83, 1994.
- Samuelson, Larry, *see* Gale, John, **8**, 56, 1995.
- Samuelson, Larry, *see* Mailath, George J., **18**, 193, 1997; Erratum, **18**, 249, 1997.
- Samuelson, Larry, *see* Nöldeke, Georg, **5**, 425, 1993.
- Samuelson, Larry, Limit Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Two-Player, Normal Form Games, **3**, 110, 1991.
- Samuelson, Larry, Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, **4**, 284, 1992.
- Sánchez, Francisco S., Balanced Contributions Axiom in the Solution of Cooperative Games, **20**, 161, 1997.
- Sanchirico, Chris William, *see* Miller, Ronald I., **29**, 170, 1999.

S

Sadanand, Venkatraman, *see* Bossert, Walter, **14**, 173, 1996.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Sandholm, William H., and Pauzner, Ady, Evolution, Population Growth, and History Dependence, **22**, 84, 1998.
- Sandroni, Alvaro, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis, **22**, 121, 1998.
- Sandroni, Alvaro, Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach, **32**, 157, 2000.
- Sarith, Bharat, Public Information Quality with Monopolistic Sellers, **16**, 261, 1996.
- Sarin, Rajiv, Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice, **28**, 294, 1999.
- Savin, N. E., *see* Forsythe, Robert, **6**, 347, 1994.
- Scarsini, Marco, *see* Rinott, Yosef, **33**, 274, 2000.
- Schapiro, Robert E., *see* Freund, Yoav, **29**, 79, 1999.
- Schenk-Hoppé, Klaus Reiner, *see* Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, **33**, 1, 2000.
- Schmeidler, David, *see* Gilboa, Itzhak, **6**, 370, 1994; **15**, 1, 1996.
- Schotter, Andrew, *see* Antonio, Merlo, **28**, 25, 1999.
- Schotter, Andrew, Weigelt, Keith, and Wilson, Charles, Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects, **6**, 445, 1994.
- Schotter, Andrew, Zheng, Wei, and Snyder, Blaine, Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment, **30**, 248, 2000.
- Schultz, Christian, A Note on Strongly Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria, **6**, 469, 1994.
- Schummer, James, Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation, **30**, 293, 2000.
- Scotchmer, Suzanne, *see* Minehart, Deborah, **27**, 114, 1999.
- Sefton, Martin, *see* Forsythe, Robert, **6**, 347, 1994.
- Sefton, Martin, and Yavaş, Abdullah, Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence, **16**, 280, 1996.
- Segendorff, Björn, Delegation and Threat in Bargaining, **23**, 266, 1998.
- Seidmann, Daniel J., Cheap Talk Games May Have Unique, Informative Equilibrium Outcomes, **4**, 422, 1992.
- Sela, Aner, *see* Monderer, Dov, **14**, 144, 1996.
- Sela, Aner, Note: Fictitious Play in 2×3 Games, **31**, 152, 2000.
- Selten, Reinhard, *see* van Damme, Eric, **2**, 188, 1990.
- Selten, Reinhard, Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior, **3**, 3, 1991.
- Selten, Reinhard, An Axiomatic Theory of a Risk Dominance Measure for Bipolar Games with Linear Incentives, **8**, 213, 1995.
- Selten, Reinhard, *see* Ockenfels, Axel, **33**, 90, 2000.
- Sen, Arunava, *see* Spiegel, Matthew, **7**, 104, 1994.
- Sengupta, Abhijit, and Sengupta, Kunal, A Property of the Core, **12**, 266, 1996.
- Sengupta, Kunal, *see* Sengupta, Abhijit, **12**, 266, 1996.
- Serizawa, S., *see* Barberà, S., **25**, 272, 1998.
- Serrano, Roberto, *see* Dagan, Nir, **18**, 55, 1997.
- Serrano, Roberto, and Zapater, Iñigo, The Three-Legged Race: Cooperating to Compete, **22**, 343, 1998.
- Sethi, Rajiv, Strategy-Specific Barriers to Learning and Nonmonotonic Selection Dynamics, **23**, 284, 1998.
- Sethi, Rajiv, Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players, **32**, 85, 2000.
- Sethi, Rajiv, *see* Koçkesen, Levent, **31**, 303, 2000.
- Sevy, David, *see* Gromb, Denis, **21**, 62, 1997.
- Shachat, Keith, *see* Hoffman, Elizabeth, **7**, 346, 1994.
- Shaked, Avner, *see* Binmore, Ken, **3**, 295, 1991.
- Shaked, Moshe, *see* Hartman, Bruce C., **31**, 26, 2000.
- Shalev, Jonathan, Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs, **7**, 246, 1994.
- Shapley, Lloyd S., *see* Monderer, Dov, **14**, 124, 1996.
- Sharkey, William W., Game Theoretic Modeling of Increasing Returns to Scale, **1**, 370, 1989.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Shell, Karl, *see* Peck, James, **2**, 362, 1990.
- Shenker, Scott, *see* Moulin, Hervé, **27**, 299, 1999.
- Shin, Hyun Song, and Williamson, Timothy, How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?, **13**, 252, 1996.
- Shitovitz, Benyamin, *see* Einy, Ezra, **16**, 192, 1996.
- Shmida, A., *see* Peleg, B., **4**, 232, 1992.
- Shubik, M., Prominence, Symmetry, or Other?, **6**, 328, 1994.
- Sigmund, Karl, *see* Nowak, Martin A., **11**, 364, 1995.
- Sigmund, Karl, and Young, H. Peyton, Introduction, **11**, 103, 1995.
- Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, *see* Cadot, Olivier, **17**, 129, 1996.
- Sjöström, Tomas, Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games, **6**, 502, 1994.
- Sjöström, Tomas, Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegotiation, **26**, 337, 1999.
- Sjöström, Tomas, *see* Baliga, Sandeep, **27**, 38, 1999.
- Skiadas, Costis, *see* Morris, Stephen, **31**, 311, 2000.
- Skyrms, Brian, Introduction: Nobel Symposium on Game Theory: Rationality and Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction, **8**, 3, 1995.
- Slonim, Robert L., *see* Laskowski, Michael C., **28**, 238, 1999.
- Sloth, Birgitte, *see* Hendon, Ebbe, **7**, 332, 1994; **12**, 274, 1996; **15**, 177, 1996.
- Sloth, Birgitte, The Theory of Voting and Equilibria in Noncooperative Games, **5**, 152, 1993.
- Slutsky, Steven M., *see* Hamilton, Jonathan H., **2**, 29, 1990.
- Smith, Lones, Folk Theorems in Overlapping Generations Games, **4**, 426, 1992.
- Smith, Vernon L., *see* McCabe, Kevin A., **24**, 10, 1998.
- Smith, Vernon, *see* Hoffman, Elizabeth, **7**, 346, 1994.
- Smorodinsky, Rann, *see* Kalai, Ehud, **29**, 151, 1999.
- Smorodinsky, Rann, *see* Lehrer, Ehud, **18**, 116, 1997.
- Snyder, Blaine, *see* Schotter, Andrew, **30**, 248, 2000.
- Sobel, Joel, *see* Blume, Andreas, **5**, 547, 1993.
- Sobel, Matthew J., *see* Monahan, George E., **6**, 130, 1994; **20**, 149, 1997.
- Solan, Eilon, Absorbing Team Games, **31**, 245, 2000.
- Somanathan, E., Evolutionary Stability of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Finite Games, **21**, 253, 1997.
- Sönmez, Tayfun, Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems, **20**, 169, 1997.
- Sonnenschein, Hugo, *see* Spiegel, Matthew, **7**, 104, 1994.
- Sonsino, Doron, "Impossibility of Speculation" Theorems with Noisy Information, **8**, 406, 1995.
- Sonsino, Doron, Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition, and Nash Equilibrium, **18**, 286, 1997.
- Sopher, Barry, *see* Mookherjee, Dilip, **7**, 62, 1994; **19**, 97, 1997.
- Sorin, Sylvain, *see* Aumann, Robert J., **1**, 5, 1989.
- Sorin, Sylvain, *see* Lehrer, Ehud, **20**, 131, 1997.
- Sorin, Sylvain, A Note on Repeated Extensive Games, **9**, 116, 1995.
- Sorin, Sylvain, Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, **29**, 274, 1999.
- Sotomayor, Marilda, Note: A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages, **13**, 135, 1996.
- Spiegel, Matthew, Currie, Janet, Sonnenschein, Hugo, and Sen, Arunava, Understanding When Agents Are Fairmen or Gamesmen, **7**, 104, 1994.
- Spiegler, Ran, Extracting Interaction-Created Surplus, **30**, 142, 2000.
- Sprumont, Yves, Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility, **2**, 378, 1990.
- Sprumont, Yves, Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules, **33**, 126, 2000.
- Srivastava, Sanjay, *see* Jackson, Matthew O., **6**, 474, 1994.
- Srivastava, Sanjay, *see* Lipman, Barton L., **2**, 154, 1990; **2**, 273, 1990.
- Stacchetti, Ennio, *see* Geanakoplos, John, **1**, 60, 1989.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Stacchetti, Ennio, *see* Pearce, David G., **23**, 75, 1998.
- Stahl, Dale O., Evolution of Smart_n Players, **5**, 604, 1993.
- Stahl, Dale O., Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game, **16**, 303, 1996.
- Stahl, Dale O., Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence, **32**, 105, 2000.
- Stahl, Dale O., and Wilson, Paul W., On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence, **10**, 218, 1995.
- Stahl, Dale O., *see* Bacharach, Michael, **32**, 220, 2000.
- Stahl, Dale O., II, Bargaining with Durable Offers and Endogenous Timing, **2**, 173, 1990.
- Stahl, Dale O., II, The Graph of Prisoners' Dilemma Supergame Payoffs as a Function of the Discount Factor, **3**, 368, 1991.
- Stanford, William, Prestable Strategies in Discounted Duopoly Games, **3**, 129, 1991.
- Stanford, William, A Note on the Probability of k Pure Nash Equilibria in Matrix Games, **9**, 238, 1995.
- Storcken, Ton, *see* Otten, Gert-Jan, **9**, 172, 1995.
- Stromquist, Walter R., *see* Lazarus, Andrew J., **27**, 229, 1999.
- Stromquist, Walter, *see* Marshall, Robert C., **7**, 193, 1994.
- Stuart, Harborne W., Jr., Common Belief of Rationality in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, **19**, 133, 1997.
- Sudhölter, Peter, *see* Peleg, Bezalel, **18**, 277, 1997.
- Sudhölter, Peter, Axiomatizations of Game Theoretical Solutions for One-Output Cost Sharing Problems, **24**, 142, 1998.
- Suijs, Jeroen, *see* Hamers, Herbert, **15**, 165, 1996.
- Suijs, Jeroen, Stochastic Cooperative Games: Superadditivity, Convexity, and Certainty Equivalents, **27**, 331, 1999.
- Suleiman, Ramzi, *see* Budescu, David V., **10**, 171, 1995.
- Sundaram, Rangarajan K., *see* Banks, Jeffrey S., **2**, 97, 1990.
- Sutton, John, *see* Binmore, Ken, **3**, 295, 1991.
- Swinkels, Jeroen M., *see* Mailath, George J., **18**, 193, 1997; Erratum, **18**, 249, 1997.
- Swinkels, Jeroen M., *see* Marx, Leslie M., **18**, 219, 1997; **31**, 324, 2000.
- Swinkels, Jeroen M., *see* Myerson, Roger B., **3**, 101, 1991.
- Swinkels, Jeroen M., Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games, **5**, 455, 1993.
- Szidarovszky, Ferenc, and Okuguchi, Koji, On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games, **18**, 135, 1997.

T

- Tadenuma, Koichi, and Thomson, William, Games of Fair Division, **9**, 191, 1995.
- Talman, Dolf, *see* van den Elzen, Antoon, **28**, 130, 1999.
- Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu, *see* Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, **28**, 271, 1999.
- Tauman, Yair, *see* Kamien, Morton I., **2**, 129, 1990.
- Taylor, Alan, and Zwicker, William, Weighted Voting, Multicameral Representation, and Power, **5**, 170, 1993.
- Taylor, Alan D., and Zwicker, William S., Quasi-weightings, Trading, and Desirability Relations in Simple Games, **16**, 331, 1996.
- Tedeschi, Piero, Bargained-Correlated Equilibria, **9**, 205, 1995.
- Telser, Lester G., Note: Sharkey's Example, **7**, 301, 1994.
- Tennenholtz, Moshe, *see* Monderer, Dov, **28**, 55, 1999; **31**, 220, 2000.
- Thisse, Jacques-François, *see* Chen, Hsiao-Chi, **18**, 32, 1997.
- Thomas, Jonathan, *see* Bester, Helmut, **12**, 165, 1996.
- Thomas, Jonathan P., *see* Cripps, Martin W., **18**, 141, 1997.
- Thomson, William, *see* Chun, Youngsub, **2**, 213, 1990.
- Thomson, William, *see* Tadenuma, Koichi, **9**, 191, 1995.
- Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, Iterative Computation of Cournot Equilibrium, **2**, 61, 1990.
- Thuijsman, Frank, *see* Joosten, Reinoud, **9**, 1, 1995.

- Tian, Guoqiang, Continuous and Feasible Implementation of Rational-Expectations Lindahl Allocations, **16**, 135, 1996.
- Tian, Guoqiang, Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships, **33**, 294, 2000.
- Tian, Guoqiang, and Li, Qi, Ratio-Lindahl and Ratio Equilibria with Many Goods, **7**, 441, 1994.
- Tian, Guoqiang, and Li, Qi, On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding, **9**, 222, 1995.
- Tijs, S. H., *see* Borm, P. E. M., **4**, 58, 1992.
- Tijs, S. H., *see* van Gellekom, J. R. G., **32**, 139, 2000.
- Tijs, Stef, *see* Hamers, Herbert, **15**, 165, 1996.
- Tijs, Stef H., *see* Legut, Jerzy, **6**, 416, 1994; **10**, 355, 1995.
- Tijs, Stef, *see* Otten, Gert-Jan, **9**, 172, 1995.
- Tijs, Stef, *see* Potters, Jos, **1**, 275, 1989.
- Tijs, Stef, *see* Reijnierse, Hans, **16**, 238, 1996.
- Tomala, Tristan, Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors, **28**, 310, 1999.
- Tranæs, Torben, *see* Hendon, Ebbe, **3**, 453, 1991.
- Tranæs, Torben, Tie-Breaking in Games of Perfect Information, **22**, 148, 1998.
- Turnbull, Stephen J., Organizations as Teams of Automata, **7**, 116, 1994.

U

- Ueda, Kaoru, On the Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities: A Note, **25**, 132, 1998.
- Ui, Takashi, A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games, **31**, 121, 2000.
- Ullman, Daniel H., *see* Lazarus, Andrew J., **27**, 229, 1999.

V

- Vahid, Farshid, *see* Sarin, Rajiv, **28**, 294, 1999.
- Valenciano, Federico, *see* Ruiz, Luis M., **24**, 109, 1998.
- Valenciano, Federico, and Zarzuelo, José M., Note: On the Interpretation of Nonsymmetric Bargaining Solutions and Their Ex-

- tension to Nonexpected Utility Preferences, **7**, 461, 1994.
- Valenciano, Federico, and Zarzuelo, José M., On Nash's Hidden Assumption, **21**, 266, 1997.
- Van Cayseele, Patrick, and Furth, Dave, Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly with Buy-outs or First Refusal Contracts, **16**, 153, 1996.
- van Damme, Eric, Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership, **28**, 105, 1999.
- van Damme, Eric, and Hurkens, Sjaak, Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing, **15**, 290, 1996.
- van Damme, Eric, and Hurkens, Sjaak, Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment, **21**, 282, 1997.
- van Damme, Eric, Selten, Reinhard, and Winter, Eyal, Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest Money Unit, **2**, 188, 1990.
- van den Brink, René, and Gilles, Robert P., Axiomatizations of the Conjunctive Permission Value for Games with Permission Structures, **12**, 113, 1996.
- van den Elzen, Antoon, An Algorithmic Approach toward the Tracing Procedure for Bi-matrix Games, **28**, 130, 1999.
- van Gellekom, J. R. G., Potters, J. A. M., Reijnierse, J. H., Engel, M. C., and Tijs, S. H., Characterization of the Owen Set of Linear Production Processes, **32**, 139, 2000.
- Van Huyck, John B., Battalio, Raymond C., and Beil, Richard O., Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication, **5**, 485, 1993.
- Van Huyck, John B., Battalio, Raymond C., and Walters, Mary F., Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game, **10**, 143, 1995.
- Van Huyck, John B., Gillette, Ann B., and Battalio, Raymond C., Credible Assignments in Coordination Games, **4**, 606, 1992.
- Vaughan, Richard, *see* Binmore, Kenneth G., **11**, 1, 1995; Erratum, **21**, 325, 1997.
- Vázquez-Brage, Margarita, García-Jurado, Ignacio, and Carreras, Francesc, The Owen Value Applied to Games with Graph-Restricted Communication, **12**, 42, 1996.
- Vega-Redondo, Fernando, Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example, **5**, 618, 1993.
- Vega-Redondo, Fernando, Expectations, Drift, and Volatility in Evolutionary Games, **11**, 391, 1995.
- Vega-Redondo, Fernando, Pollination and Reward: A Game-Theoretic Approach, **12**, 127, 1996.
- Vermeulen, A. J., and Jansen, M. J. M., Extending Invariant Solutions, **21**, 135, 1997.
- Vermeulen, Dries, *see* Norde, Henk, **12**, 219, 1996.
- Vermeulen, Dries, *see* Voorneveld, Mark, **28**, 146, 1999.
- Vincent, Daniel, *see* Fershtman, Chaim, **3**, 423, 1991.
- Vincent, Daniel, *see* McAfee, R. Preston, **18**, 246, 1997.
- Vives, Xavier, Learning from Others: A Welfare Analysis, **20**, 177, 1997.
- Vohra, Rajiv, *see* Ray, Debraj, **26**, 286, 1999.
- Vohra, Rakesh V., *see* Foster, Dean P., **21**, 40, 1997; **29**, 7, 1999.
- Vohra, Rakesh, Introduction to the Special Issue, **29**, 1, 1999.
- Volij, Oscar, *see* Dagan, Nir, **18**, 55, 1997.
- von Stengel, Bernhard, *see* Koller, Daphne, **14**, 247, 1996.
- von Stengel, Bernhard, Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies, **14**, 220, 1996.
- von Stengel, Bernhard, and Koller, Daphne, Team-Maxmin Equilibria, **21**, 309, 1997.
- von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, *see* Bester, Helmut, **12**, 165, 1996.
- von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, Optimal Pricing against a Simple Learning Rule, **4**, 627, 1992.
- Voorneveld, M., *see* Biswas, A. K., **28**, 1, 1999.
- Voorneveld, Mark, Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games, **28**, 146, 1999.
- Voorneveld, Mark, and Norde, Henk, Note: A Characterization of Ordinal Potential Games, **19**, 235, 1997.
- Walker, James M., *see* Herr, Andrew, **19**, 77, 1997.
- Walliser, B., *see* Jéhiel, P., **10**, 333, 1995.
- Walters, Mary F., *see* Van Huyck, John B., **10**, 143, 1995.
- Wang, Ruqu, *see* Rosenthal, Robert W., **17**, 32, 1996.
- Wärneryd, Karl, Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability, **5**, 532, 1993.
- Wärneryd, Karl, In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation, **33**, 145, 2000.
- Watson, Joel, Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Perturbations, **7**, 260, 1994.
- Watson, Joel, Information Transmission When the Informed Party Is Confused, **12**, 143, 1996.
- Watson, Joel, Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting, **15**, 82, 1996.
- Watts, Alison, On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games, **13**, 269, 1996.
- Weber, Robert J., Equilibrium in Non-partitioning Strategies, **7**, 286, 1994.
- Weber, Shlomo, *see* Konishi, Hideo, **21**, 161, 1997.
- Weg, Eythan, Rapoport, Amnon, and Felsenthal, Dan S., Two-Person Bargaining Behavior in Fixed Discounting Factors Games with Infinite Horizon, **2**, 76, 1990.
- Weg, Eythan, Zwick, Rami, and Rapoport, Amnon, Bargaining in Uncertain Environments: A Systematic Distortion of Perfect Equilibrium Demands, **14**, 260, 1996.
- Weibull, Jörgen W., *see* Bomze, Immanuel M., **11**, 173, 1995.
- Weibull, Jörgen W., *see* Banerjee, Abhijit, **32**, 1, 2000.
- Weibull, Jörgen W., On Self-Enforcement in Extensive-Form Games, **4**, 450, 1992.
- Weigelt, Keith, *see* Schotter, Andrew, **6**, 445, 1994.
- Weinberger, Catherine J., Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game, **31**, 262, 2000.
- Weiss, Andrew, *see* Glazer, Jacob, **2**, 118, 1990.
- Wen, Quan, On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games, **13**, 286, 1996.

W

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Wettstein, David, Continuous Implementation in Economies with Incomplete Information, **4**, 463, 1992.
- Wettstein, David, *see* Pérez-Castrillo, David, **31**, 106, 2000.
- Whittaker, J. C., *see* Cannings, C., **411**, 193, 1995.
- Wilkie, Simon, *see* Conley, John P., **13**, 26, 1996.
- Williamson, Timothy, *see* Shin, Hyun Song, **13**, 252, 1996.
- Wilson, Charles, *see* Schotter, Andrew, **6**, 445, 1994.
- Wilson, Paul W., *see* Stahl, Dale O., **10**, 218, 1995.
- Wilson, Robert, *see* Govindan, Srihari, **21**, 56, 1997.
- Wilson, Robert, *see* Mnookin, Robert, **25**, 219, 1998.
- Winter, Eyal, *see* Moldovanu, Benny, **9**, 21, 1995.
- Winter, Eyal, *see* Owen, Guillermo, **4**, 582, 1992.
- Winter, Eyal, *see* van Damme, Eric, **2**, 188, 1990.
- Winter, Eyal, The Consistency and Potential for Values of Games with Coalition Structure, **4**, 132, 1992.
- Wit, Jörgen, Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, **22**, 364, 1998.
- Wit, Jörgen, Social Learning in a Common Interest Voting Game, **26**, 131, 1999.
- Wolfstetter, Elmar, *see* Perry, Motty, **33**, 265, 2000.
- Wolinsky, Asher, *see* Rubinstein, Ariel, **6**, 299, 1994; **9**, 110, 1995.
- Wooders, John, *see* Amir, Rabah, **31**, 1, 2000.
- Wooders, John, *see* Moreno, Diego, **17**, 80, 1996; **24**, 47, 1998.
- Y**
- Yamamoto, Kenji, *see* Brown, Murray, **3**, 393, 1991.
- Yamato, Takehiko, *see* Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, **28**, 271, 1999.
- Yamato, Takehiko, On Nash Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences, **4**, 484, 1992.
- Yang, Chun-Lei, *see* Leininger, Wolfgang, **7**, 406, 1994.
- Yao, Shuntian, *see* Burnell, Stephen J., **26**, 221, 1999.
- Yavaş, Abdullah, *see* Sefton, Martin, **16**, 280, 1996.
- Yi, Sang-Seung, Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities, **20**, 201, 1997.
- Yi, Sang-Seung, On the Coalition-Proofness of the Pareto Frontier of the Set of Nash Equilibria, **26**, 353, 1999.
- Young, H. Peyton, *see* Foster, Dean P., **25**, 79, 1998.
- Young, H. Peyton, *see* Kaniovski, Yuri M., **11**, 330, 1995; **31**, 50, 2000.
- Young, H. Peyton, *see* Sigmund, Karl, **11**, 103, 1995.
- Young, H. Peyton, and Foster, Dean, Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run, **3**, 145, 1991.
- Young, Richard, *see* Arya, Anil, **9**, 127, 1995.
- Z**
- Zamir, Shmuel, *see* Kamien, Morton I., **2**, 129, 1990.
- Zamir, Shmuel, *see* Perry, Motty, **33**, 265, 2000.
- Zang, Israel, *see* Kamien, Morton I., **3**, 323, 1991.
- Zapater, Iñigo, *see* Serrano, Roberto, **22**, 343, 1998.
- Zarzuelo, José M., *see* Ruiz, Luis M., **24**, 109, 1998.
- Zarzuelo, José M., *see* Orshan, Gooni, **32**, 67, 2000.
- Zarzuelo, José M., *see* Valenciano, Federico, **7**, 461, 1994; **21**, 266, 1997.
- Zauner, Klaus G., A Payoff Uncertainty Explanation of Results in Experimental Centipede Games, **26**, 157, 1999.
- Zemel, Eitan, *see* Gilboa, Itzhak, **1**, 80, 1989.
- Zemsky, Peter B., *see* Avery, Christopher, **7**, 139, 1994; **7**, 154, 1994.
- Zemsky, Peter, *see* Mailath, George J., **3**, 467, 1991.
- Zhao, Jingang, The Hybrid Solutions of an N -Person Game, **4**, 145, 1992.
- Zhao, Jingang, A β -Core Existence Result and Its Application to Oligopoly Markets, **27**, 153, 1999.
- Zheng, Wei, *see* Schotter, Andrew, **30**, 248, 2000.

CUMULATIVE AUTHOR-TITLE INDEX 1989-2000

- Zhou, Lin, A New Beginning Set of an N -Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation, **6**, 512, 1994.
- Zhou, Lin, The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice, **7**, 295, 1994.
- Zhou, Lin, *see* Ok, Efe A., **33**, 249, 2000.
- Zhu, Min, *see* Cheng, Leonard K., **9**, 139, 1995.
- Ziad, Abderrahmane, Pure-Strategy ε -Nash Equilibrium in n -Person Nonzero-Sum Discontinuous Games, **20**, 238, 1997.
- Zilcha, Itzhak, *see* Safra, Zvi, **5**, 288, 1993.
- Zwick, Rami, *see* Bolton, Gary E., **10**, 95, 1995.
- Zwick, Rami, *see* Weg, Eythan, **14**, 260, 1996.
- Zwicker, William S., *see* Taylor, Alan D., **5**, 170, 1993; **16**, 331, 1996.