The Political Economy of Antitrust, 282

Edited By

  • Vivek Ghosal, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA
  • Johan Stennek, Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm, Sweden

Audience

Economists: Academic Researchers, Post-grad Students and some Professionals

 

Book information

  • Published: March 2007
  • Imprint: ELSEVIER
  • ISBN: 978-0-444-53093-6


Table of Contents

Chapter 1: ├é┬┐Issues in Antitrust Enforcement,├é┬┐ Vivek Ghosal (Georgia Institute of Technology), Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 2: ├é┬┐Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics.├é┬┐ Stephen Martin (Purdue University).Chapter 3: ├é┬┐The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path.├é┬┐ Joe Chen (University of Tokyo) and Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University).Chapter 4: ├é┬┐Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison?├é┬┐ Paolo Buccirossi (Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust and Regulation, Rome) and Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics).Chapter 5: ├é┬┐Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests.├é┬┐ C├â┬ęcile Aubert (Universite Paris IX Dauphine).Chapter 6: ├é┬┐Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel.├é┬┐ William Kovacic (George Washington University), Robert Marshall (Pennsylvania State University), Leslie Marx (Duke University) and Matthew Raiff (Bates White).Chapter 7: ├é┬┐Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels├é┬┐ John Connor (Purdue University).Chapter 8: ├é┬┐The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis.├é┬┐ Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse).Chapter 9: ├é┬┐The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger.├é┬┐ Jay Pil Choi (Michigan State University).Chapter 10: ├é┬┐The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests.├é┬┐ Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 11: ├é┬┐A Consumers├é┬┐ Surplus Defense in Merger Control.├é┬┐ Sven-Olof Fridolfsson (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 12: ├é┬┐EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment.├é┬┐ Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and WZB), Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna) and Burcin Yurtoglu (University of Vienna).Chapter 13: ├é┬┐The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice.├é┬┐ J├â┬ęr├â┬┤me Foncel (GREMARS, University of Lille), Marc Ivaldi (University of Toulouse) and Val├â┬ęrie Rabassa (DG Competition, European Commission).Chapter 14: ├é┬┐Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers.├é┬┐ Luke Froeb (Vanderbilt University), Steven Schantz (Vanderbilt University) and Gregory Werden (U.S. Department of Justice).Chapter 15: ├é┬┐Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator.├é┬┐ Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics) and David Martimort (University of Toulouse).Chapter 16: ├é┬┐Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law.├é┬┐ Timothy Brennan (University of Maryland, Baltimore).Chapter 17: ├é┬┐Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?├é┬┐ Preston McAfee (California Institute of Technology), Hugo Mialon (Emory University) and Sue Mialon (University of North Dakota).Chapter 18: ├é┬┐Antitrust in Open Economies.├é┬┐ Joseph Francois (Tinbergen Institute) Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm).