The Political Economy of Antitrust, 282 book cover

The Political Economy of Antitrust, 282

Economists: Academic Researchers, Post-grad Students and some Professionals


Published: March 2007

Imprint: Elsevier

ISBN: 978-0-444-53093-6


  • Chapter 1: ¿Issues in Antitrust Enforcement,¿ Vivek Ghosal (Georgia Institute of Technology), Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 2: ¿Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics.¿ Stephen Martin (Purdue University).Chapter 3: ¿The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path.¿ Joe Chen (University of Tokyo) and Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University).Chapter 4: ¿Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison?¿ Paolo Buccirossi (Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust and Regulation, Rome) and Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics).Chapter 5: ¿Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests.¿ Cécile Aubert (Universite Paris IX Dauphine).Chapter 6: ¿Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel.¿ William Kovacic (George Washington University), Robert Marshall (Pennsylvania State University), Leslie Marx (Duke University) and Matthew Raiff (Bates White).Chapter 7: ¿Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels¿ John Connor (Purdue University).Chapter 8: ¿The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis.¿ Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse).Chapter 9: ¿The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger.¿ Jay Pil Choi (Michigan State University).Chapter 10: ¿The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests.¿ Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 11: ¿A Consumers¿ Surplus Defense in Merger Control.¿ Sven-Olof Fridolfsson (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 12: ¿EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment.¿ Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and WZB), Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna) and Burcin Yurtoglu (University of Vienna).Chapter 13: ¿The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice.¿ Jérôme Foncel (GREMARS, University of Lille), Marc Ivaldi (University of Toulouse) and Valérie Rabassa (DG Competition, European Commission).Chapter 14: ¿Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers.¿ Luke Froeb (Vanderbilt University), Steven Schantz (Vanderbilt University) and Gregory Werden (U.S. Department of Justice).Chapter 15: ¿Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator.¿ Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics) and David Martimort (University of Toulouse).Chapter 16: ¿Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law.¿ Timothy Brennan (University of Maryland, Baltimore).Chapter 17: ¿Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?¿ Preston McAfee (California Institute of Technology), Hugo Mialon (Emory University) and Sue Mialon (University of North Dakota).Chapter 18: ¿Antitrust in Open Economies.¿ Joseph Francois (Tinbergen Institute) Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm).


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