The Political Economy of Antitrust, 282
- Vivek Ghosal, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA
- Johan Stennek, Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm, Sweden
Economists: Academic Researchers, Post-grad Students and some Professionals
- Published: March 2007
- Imprint: ELSEVIER
- ISBN: 978-0-444-53093-6
Table of ContentsChapter 1: Â¿Issues in Antitrust Enforcement,Â¿ Vivek Ghosal (Georgia Institute of Technology), Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 2: Â¿Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics.Â¿ Stephen Martin (Purdue University).Chapter 3: Â¿The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path.Â¿ Joe Chen (University of Tokyo) and Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University).Chapter 4: Â¿Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison?Â¿ Paolo Buccirossi (Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust and Regulation, Rome) and Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics).Chapter 5: Â¿Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests.Â¿ CÃ©cile Aubert (Universite Paris IX Dauphine).Chapter 6: Â¿Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel.Â¿ William Kovacic (George Washington University), Robert Marshall (Pennsylvania State University), Leslie Marx (Duke University) and Matthew Raiff (Bates White).Chapter 7: Â¿Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International CartelsÂ¿ John Connor (Purdue University).Chapter 8: Â¿The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis.Â¿ Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse).Chapter 9: Â¿The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger.Â¿ Jay Pil Choi (Michigan State University).Chapter 10: Â¿The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests.Â¿ Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 11: Â¿A ConsumersÂ¿ Surplus Defense in Merger Control.Â¿ Sven-Olof Fridolfsson (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 12: Â¿EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment.Â¿ Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and WZB), Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna) and Burcin Yurtoglu (University of Vienna).Chapter 13: Â¿The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice.Â¿ JÃ©rÃ´me Foncel (GREMARS, University of Lille), Marc Ivaldi (University of Toulouse) and ValÃ©rie Rabassa (DG Competition, European Commission).Chapter 14: Â¿Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers.Â¿ Luke Froeb (Vanderbilt University), Steven Schantz (Vanderbilt University) and Gregory Werden (U.S. Department of Justice).Chapter 15: Â¿Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator.Â¿ Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics) and David Martimort (University of Toulouse).Chapter 16: Â¿Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law.Â¿ Timothy Brennan (University of Maryland, Baltimore).Chapter 17: Â¿Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?Â¿ Preston McAfee (California Institute of Technology), Hugo Mialon (Emory University) and Sue Mialon (University of North Dakota).Chapter 18: Â¿Antitrust in Open Economies.Â¿ Joseph Francois (Tinbergen Institute) Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm).