The Political Economy of Antitrust, 282

Edited By

  • Vivek Ghosal, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA
  • Johan Stennek, Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm, Sweden


Economists: Academic Researchers, Post-grad Students and some Professionals


Book information

  • Published: March 2007
  • Imprint: ELSEVIER
  • ISBN: 978-0-444-53093-6

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: ┬┐Issues in Antitrust Enforcement,┬┐ Vivek Ghosal (Georgia Institute of Technology), Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 2: ┬┐Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics.┬┐ Stephen Martin (Purdue University).Chapter 3: ┬┐The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path.┬┐ Joe Chen (University of Tokyo) and Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University).Chapter 4: ┬┐Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison?┬┐ Paolo Buccirossi (Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust and Regulation, Rome) and Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics).Chapter 5: ┬┐Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests.┬┐ C├ęcile Aubert (Universite Paris IX Dauphine).Chapter 6: ┬┐Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel.┬┐ William Kovacic (George Washington University), Robert Marshall (Pennsylvania State University), Leslie Marx (Duke University) and Matthew Raiff (Bates White).Chapter 7: ┬┐Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels┬┐ John Connor (Purdue University).Chapter 8: ┬┐The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis.┬┐ Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse).Chapter 9: ┬┐The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger.┬┐ Jay Pil Choi (Michigan State University).Chapter 10: ┬┐The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests.┬┐ Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 11: ┬┐A Consumers┬┐ Surplus Defense in Merger Control.┬┐ Sven-Olof Fridolfsson (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm).Chapter 12: ┬┐EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment.┬┐ Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and WZB), Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna) and Burcin Yurtoglu (University of Vienna).Chapter 13: ┬┐The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice.┬┐ J├ęr├┤me Foncel (GREMARS, University of Lille), Marc Ivaldi (University of Toulouse) and Val├ęrie Rabassa (DG Competition, European Commission).Chapter 14: ┬┐Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers.┬┐ Luke Froeb (Vanderbilt University), Steven Schantz (Vanderbilt University) and Gregory Werden (U.S. Department of Justice).Chapter 15: ┬┐Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator.┬┐ Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics) and David Martimort (University of Toulouse).Chapter 16: ┬┐Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law.┬┐ Timothy Brennan (University of Maryland, Baltimore).Chapter 17: ┬┐Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?┬┐ Preston McAfee (California Institute of Technology), Hugo Mialon (Emory University) and Sue Mialon (University of North Dakota).Chapter 18: ┬┐Antitrust in Open Economies.┬┐ Joseph Francois (Tinbergen Institute) Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm).