Handbook of Social Choice & WelfareEdited by
- Kenneth Arrow, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
- A. Sen, Harvard University
- Kotaro Suzumura, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods.
Graduate students and professors worldwide working in all subdisciplines of economics and finance.
Handbooks in Economics
Hardbound, 992 Pages
Published: September 2010
This volume continues the strong tradition of volume I (2002), supplementing it with foundational material and new results on Arrovian social choice. It also includes new material on fairness, rights, and manipulation, making the two volumes a masterful presentation of all the important topics in the field by its leading experts, including three Nobel laureates.
Steven Brams, New York UniversityThis much awaited volume provides authoritative surveys of some of the most important aspects of the theory of social choice and welfare economics. It will be a highly valuable resource for scholars interested in this area.
Prasanta K. Pattanaik, University of California, Riverside Social choice theory has produced some of the most powerful (and beautiful) findings in theoretical social science. This long-awaited volume will be a valuable resource to both students and scholars interested in exploring this important field.
Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics
Preface to Volume 2.
Part 5: Foundations.
13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow).
14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen).
15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond).
16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. López-Calva).
Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes.
17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark).
18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent).
19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb).
Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice.
20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett).
21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson)
22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet).
23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura)
24. Freedom, opportunity and well-being (J. Foster).
Part 8: Voting, manipulation and fairness.
25. Strategy proofness (S. Barbera).
26. Probabilistic and spatial models of voting (P. Coughlin).
27. Geometry of voting (D. Saari).