Handbook of Social Choice & Welfare
- Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Arrow, Joan Kenney Professor of Economics and Professor of Operations Research, Emeritus, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
- A. Sen, Harvard University
- Kotaro Suzumura, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
AudienceGraduate students and professors worldwide working in all subdisciplines of economics and finance.
- Published: September 2010
- Imprint: NORTH-HOLLAND
- ISBN: 978-0-444-50894-2
This volume continues the strong tradition of volume I (2002), supplementing it with foundational material and new results on Arrovian social choice. It also includes new material on fairness, rights, and manipulation, making the two volumes a masterful presentation of all the important topics in the field by its leading experts, including three Nobel laureates.
Steven Brams, New York University This much awaited volume provides authoritative surveys of some of the most important aspects of the theory of social choice and welfare economics. It will be a highly valuable resource for scholars interested in this area.
Prasanta K. Pattanaik, University of California, Riverside Social choice theory has produced some of the most powerful (and beautiful) findings in theoretical social science. This long-awaited volume will be a valuable resource to both students and scholars interested in exploring this important field.
Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics
Table of Contents
Preface to Volume 2.
Part 5: Foundations.
13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow).
14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen).
15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond).
16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. López-Calva).
Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes.
17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark).
18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent).
19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb).
Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice.
20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett).
21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson)
22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet).
23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura)
24. Freedom, opportunity and well-being (J. Foster).
Part 8: Voting, manipulation and fairness.
25. Strategy proofness (S. Barbera).
26. Probabilistic and spatial models of voting (P. Coughlin).
27. Geometry of voting (D. Saari).