Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance

Empirical Corporate Finance

Edited by

  • B. Espen Eckbo, Center for Corporate Governance Tuck School at Dartmouth, Hanover, NH, USA

This second volume of a two-part series examines three major topics. First, it devotes five chapters to the classical issue of capital structure choice. Second, it focuses on the value-implications of major corporate investment and restructuring decisions, and then concludes by surveying the role of pay-for-performance type executive compensation contracts on managerial incentives and risk-taking behavior. In collaboration with the first volume, this handbook takes stock of the main empirical findings to date across an unprecedented spectrum of corporate finance issues. The surveys are written by leading empirical researchers that remain active in their respective areas of interest. With few exceptions, the writing style makes the chapters accessible to industry practitioners. For doctoral students and seasoned academics, the surveys offer dense roadmaps into the empirical research landscape and provide suggestions for future work.
View full description


Primary: university, research, and major public libraries with finance and economics holdings.Secondary: academics in finance and economics


Book information

  • Published: October 2008
  • Imprint: NORTH-HOLLAND
  • ISBN: 978-0-444-53090-5


“Espen Eckbo has assembled an excellent team of researchers to survey the most important areas of corporate finance. This handbook will serve as a very useful reference for both new and experienced corporate finance scholars.” David Scharfstein Harvard University "The last 20 years have witnessed an explosion of work in empirical corporate finance. This handbook represents a monumental effort in systematizing and analyzing the most important areas of this work. The quality and depth of the analysis make it a must for researchers and practitioners in corporate finance." Professor Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes EDHEC Business School

Table of Contents

Part 3Dividends, Capital Structure, and Financial DistressPart 4Takeovers, Restructurings, and Managerial Incentives