Bidding Strategies, Financing and Control
Modern Empirical Developments
By- B. Espen Eckbo, Center for Corporate Governance Tuck School at Dartmouth, Hanover, NH, USA
A selection of republished corporate finance articles and book chapters that can serve as an advanced corporate finance supplementary text for courses that use no textbooks. Combining convenience and an affordable price with retypeset pages and a high-quality index, the 600 pages of volume two, "Bidding Strategies, Financing, and Corporate Control", focus on a range of special topics, ranging from theories and evidence on strategic bidding behavior (offer premiums, toeholds, bidder competition, winners curse adjustments, and managerial overconfidence), issues arising when bidding for targets in bankruptcy auctions, effects of deal protection devices (termination agreements, poison pills), role of large shareholder voting in promoting takeover gains, deal financing issues (such as raising the cash used to pay for the target), managerial incentive effects of takeovers, governance spillovers from cross-border mergers, and returns to merger arbitrage. Including an index and new introduction, this volume will simplify and facilitate students interaction with new concepts and applications.
Audience
Graduate and post graduate students in Finance and Economics looking for an introduction to the empirical literature on corporate takeovers; Professors looking for a comprehensive way to teach students about contemporary trends by introducing them to key journal articles and book chapters
Paperback, 1088 Pages
Published: March 2010
Imprint: Academic Press
ISBN: 978-0-12-381982-6
Contents
Introduction to Corporate Takeovers: Modern Empirical Evidence
Mergers and Acquisitions: Strategic and Informational Issues
Auctions in Corporate Finance
Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A ReviewMerger Negotiations and the Toehold Puzzle
Negotiations under the threat of an AuctionDo Auctions Induce a Winners Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market
Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Markets ReactionAcquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11
Effects of Bankruptcy Court Protection on Asset SalesAutomatic Bankruptcy Auctions and Fire-Sales
Creditor Financing and Overbidding in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and TestsTermination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions
Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Anti-Takeover MeasuresBoard Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control
Lets Make a Deal! How Shareholder Control Impacts Merger PayoffsCross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in Mergers
Investor Activism and TakeoversValuation Effects of Bank Financing in Acquisitions
Financing Decisions and Bidder GainsDo Firms have Leverage Targets? Evidence from Acquisitions
CEO Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A BonusesTakeover Bids and Target Directors Incentives: Retention, Experience, and Settling Up
Managerial Discipline and Corporate Restructuring following Performance DeclinesCross-Country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions
Spillover of Corporate Governance Standards as a Takeover Synergy in Cross-Border Mergers and AcquisitionsAdopting Better Corporate Governance: Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers
Determinants and Implications of Arbitrage Holdings in AcquisitionsLimited Arbitrage in Mergers and Acquisitions
