Bidding Strategies, Financing and Control book cover

Bidding Strategies, Financing and Control

Modern Empirical Developments

A selection of republished corporate finance articles and book chapters that can serve as an advanced corporate finance supplementary text for courses that use no textbooks. Combining convenience and an affordable price with retypeset pages and a high-quality index, the 600 pages of volume two, "Bidding Strategies, Financing, and Corporate Control", focus on a range of special topics, ranging from theories and evidence on strategic bidding behavior (offer premiums, toeholds, bidder competition, winner’s curse adjustments, and managerial overconfidence), issues arising when bidding for targets in bankruptcy auctions, effects of deal protection devices (termination agreements, poison pills), role of large shareholder voting in promoting takeover gains, deal financing issues (such as raising the cash used to pay for the target), managerial incentive effects of takeovers, governance spillovers from cross-border mergers, and returns to merger arbitrage. Including an index and new introduction, this volume will simplify and facilitate students’ interaction with new concepts and applications.

Audience

Graduate and post graduate students in Finance and Economics looking for an introduction to the empirical literature on corporate takeovers; Professors looking for a comprehensive way to teach students about contemporary trends by introducing them to key journal articles and book chapters

Paperback, 1088 Pages

Published: March 2010

Imprint: Academic Press

ISBN: 978-0-12-381982-6

Contents

  • Introduction to Corporate Takeovers: Modern Empirical Evidence

    Mergers and Acquisitions: Strategic and Informational Issues

    Auctions in Corporate Finance

    Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review

    Merger Negotiations and the Toehold Puzzle

    Negotiations under the threat of an Auction

    Do Auctions Induce a Winner’s Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market

    Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction

    Acquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11

    Effects of Bankruptcy Court Protection on Asset Sales

    Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions and Fire-Sales

    Creditor Financing and Overbidding in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests

    Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions

    Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Anti-Takeover Measures

    Board Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control

    Let’s Make a Deal! How Shareholder Control Impacts Merger Payoffs

    Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in Mergers

    Investor Activism and Takeovers

    Valuation Effects of Bank Financing in Acquisitions

    Financing Decisions and Bidder Gains

    Do Firms have Leverage Targets? Evidence from Acquisitions

    CEO Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses

    Takeover Bids and Target Directors’ Incentives: Retention, Experience, and Settling Up

    Managerial Discipline and Corporate Restructuring following Performance Declines

    Cross-Country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions

    Spillover of Corporate Governance Standards as a Takeover Synergy in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions

    Adopting Better Corporate Governance: Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers

    Determinants and Implications of Arbitrage Holdings in Acquisitions

    Limited Arbitrage in Mergers and Acquisitions

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