Bidding Strategies, Financing and Control

Modern Empirical Developments

By

  • B. Espen Eckbo, Center for Corporate Governance Tuck School at Dartmouth, Hanover, NH, USA

A selection of republished corporate finance articles and book chapters that can serve as an advanced corporate finance supplementary text for courses that use no textbooks. Combining convenience and an affordable price with retypeset pages and a high-quality index, the 600 pages of volume two, "Bidding Strategies, Financing, and Corporate Control", focus on a range of special topics, ranging from theories and evidence on strategic bidding behavior (offer premiums, toeholds, bidder competition, winner’s curse adjustments, and managerial overconfidence), issues arising when bidding for targets in bankruptcy auctions, effects of deal protection devices (termination agreements, poison pills), role of large shareholder voting in promoting takeover gains, deal financing issues (such as raising the cash used to pay for the target), managerial incentive effects of takeovers, governance spillovers from cross-border mergers, and returns to merger arbitrage. Including an index and new introduction, this volume will simplify and facilitate students’ interaction with new concepts and applications.
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Audience

Graduate and post graduate students in Finance and Economics looking for an introduction to the empirical literature on corporate takeovers; Professors looking for a comprehensive way to teach students about contemporary trends by introducing them to key journal articles and book chapters

 

Book information

  • Published: March 2010
  • Imprint: ACADEMIC PRESS
  • ISBN: 978-0-12-381982-6


Table of Contents

Introduction to Corporate Takeovers: Modern Empirical Evidence

Mergers and Acquisitions: Strategic and Informational Issues

Auctions in Corporate Finance

Bidding Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A Review

Merger Negotiations and the Toehold Puzzle

Negotiations under the threat of an Auction

Do Auctions Induce a Winner’s Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market

Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction

Acquisitions as a Means of Restructuring Firms in Chapter 11

Effects of Bankruptcy Court Protection on Asset Sales

Automatic Bankruptcy Auctions and Fire-Sales

Creditor Financing and Overbidding in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests

Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions

Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Anti-Takeover Measures

Board Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control

Let’s Make a Deal! How Shareholder Control Impacts Merger Payoffs

Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in Mergers

Investor Activism and Takeovers

Valuation Effects of Bank Financing in Acquisitions

Financing Decisions and Bidder Gains

Do Firms have Leverage Targets? Evidence from Acquisitions

CEO Compensation and Incentives: Evidence from M&A Bonuses

Takeover Bids and Target Directors’ Incentives: Retention, Experience, and Settling Up

Managerial Discipline and Corporate Restructuring following Performance Declines

Cross-Country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions

Spillover of Corporate Governance Standards as a Takeover Synergy in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions

Adopting Better Corporate Governance: Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers

Determinants and Implications of Arbitrage Holdings in Acquisitions

Limited Arbitrage in Mergers and Acquisitions