- Vijay Krishna
Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.
Professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory. Graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives.
Published: March 2002
Imprint: Academic Press
"Vijay Krishna's book provides a very thorough and patient presentation of auction theory, starting from the most basic analysis and graduating to sophisticated, state of the art theory, including multi-unit auctions. This book covers a very wide range of auction topics, providing a clear and accessible treatment. The theory is presented in a careful and easily understood style accessible to honors undergraduates as well as all economics graduate students. Krishna's book will certainly become the central book on auction theory."
--R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas
"This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions--including results that are very recent--but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work."
--Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.
"The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions."
--Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
"This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject."
--Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, U.K.
- Section I: Single Object Auctions Private Value Auctions: A First Look The Revenue Equivalence Principle Qualifications and Extensions Mechanism Design Auctions with Interdependent Values The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle Asymmetries and Other Complications Efficiency and the English Auction Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values Bidding Rings Section II: Multiple Object Auctions An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values Some Revenue Considerations Sequential Sales Nonidentical Objects Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values Section III: Appendices A: Continuous Distributions B: Stochastic Orders C: Order Statistics D: Affiliated Random Variables E: Some Linear Algebra F: Games of Incomplete Information G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions References Index