- Vijay Krishna, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, U.S.A.
Professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory. Graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives.
- Published: March 2002
- Imprint: ACADEMIC PRESS
- ISBN: 978-0-12-426297-3
"Vijay Krishna's book provides a very thorough and patient presentation of auction theory, starting from the most basic analysis and graduating to sophisticated, state of the art theory, including multi-unit auctions. This book covers a very wide range of auction topics, providing a clear and accessible treatment. The theory is presented in a careful and easily understood style accessible to honors undergraduates as well as all economics graduate students. Krishna's book will certainly become the central book on auction theory."
--R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas
"This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions--including results that are very recent--but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work."
--Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.
"The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions."
--Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
"This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject."
--Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, U.K.