- Vijay Krishna, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, U.S.A.
AudienceGraduate students and professors working in finance, economics, and industrial organization, and professionals learning about or developing auctions, either in a university setting or in industry.
- Published: August 2009
- Imprint: ACADEMIC PRESS
- ISBN: 978-0-12-374507-1
Table of Contents
IntroductionI Single Object Auctions Private Value Auctions, The Revenue Equivalence Principle, Qualifications and Extensions, Mechanism Design, Auctions with Interdependent Values, The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle, Asymmetries and Other Complications, Efficiency and the English Auction, Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, Bidding RingsII Multiple Object AuctionsAn Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions, Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values, Some Revenue Considerations, Sequential Sales, Nonidentical Objects, Packages and Positions, Multiple Objects and Interdependent ValuesIII AppendicesContinuous Distributions, Stochastic Orders, Order Statistics, Affiliated Random Variables, Some Linear Algebra