- Vijay Krishna, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, U.S.A.
Vijay Krishnas 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishnas ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions.
Hardbound, 336 Pages
Published: September 2009
Imprint: Academic Press
"Krishnas superbAuction Theory is an ideal text and reference because his clear and precise exposition distills the vast literature and provides excellent motivation, examples, exercises, and connections to commercial applications."--Robert B. Wilson, Stanford University "On its publication in 2002, Vijay Krishna's book immediately became a central reference in auction theory. But the subject has continued to develop, and so we're very fortunate that Krishna has now updated the text."-- Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study, Nobel Laureate in Economics
I Single Object Auctions
Private Value Auctions, The Revenue Equivalence Principle, Qualifications and Extensions, Mechanism Design, Auctions with Interdependent Values, The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle, Asymmetries and Other Complications, Efficiency and the English Auction, Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, Bidding RingsII Multiple Object Auctions
An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions, Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values, Some Revenue Considerations, Sequential Sales, Nonidentical Objects, Packages and Positions, Multiple Objects and Interdependent ValuesIII Appendices
Continuous Distributions, Stochastic Orders, Order Statistics, Affiliated Random Variables, Some Linear Algebra